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ABSTRACT: In most multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), science advisory bodies 
(SABs) are tasked with producing guidance on scientific aspects of the problem. SABs are a 
necessary infrastructure of global environmental management because they provide a forum 
where experts come together to negotiate a consensus on matters of science relevant to a given 
MEA. This consensus, much more than merely an assessment of available information. creates 
new knowledge that feeds into decision-making. I propose, that to contribute effectively to 
implementation, this consensus must be both valid (scientifically accurate) and sustainable 
(acceptable to stakeholders and not requiring frequent renegotiation). This thesis identifies two 
institutional design features of an SAB that are crucial for obtaining a valid and sustainable 
outcome: representative membership, and a transparent and flexible organization of work. A 
three-tier SAB design is recommended based on these findings, and its theoretical application to 
the provision of science in the Biodiversity regime is explored. 
Representative membership describes the individual experts chosen to contribute to an SAB's 
work. To maximize validity and sustainability, I identify several kinds of diversity which can 
enhance the validity and sustainability of the SAB outcome, namely national. economic. 
institutional. disciplinary, regional and personal diversity. A process which is both transparent 
and flexible are also classified into several types of transparency and flexibility. including: 
access to meetings; document release; and the establishment of norms and procedures. This 
thesis concludes that while all these types of diversity, flexibility and transparency have the 
potential of improving the SAB consensus' validity and sustainability . the relative importance 
assigned to each of these should be tailored to the MEAs needs to produce the best consensus. 
The thesis is based on the in-depth study of six MEAs: the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the Ramsar Convention on 
Wetlands, the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Biosafety Protocol, the Vienna 
Convention and Montreal Protocol on the ozone layer, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants, and the Rotterdam Convention on a Prior Informed Consent Procedure for 
the transport of hazardous chemicals. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
In "The Day After Tomorrow," a 2004 disaster movie about accelerated climate change, a lone 
American climatologist (played by Dennis Quaid) is called upon to report on "the science" to 
world leaders as signals of impending doom threaten the planet'. While this vision of a unitary 
and certain voice of scientific expertise may be what policy-makers seek, in reality when turning 
to science to assist them in complex decision-making, policy-makers are often faced with many 
divergent claims. 
At the national and local level, policy-makers routinely turn to "blue ribbon" panels to guide 
them - calling on the most qualified experts to provide answers and assist decision-making. And 
at the global level, as the world's nations seek to address environmental problems through 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), they too turn to science advisory bodies to fulfill 
their needs for scientific input. 
In effect, these varied stakeholders are looking to science advisory bodies to provide 
enlightenment to guide their decision-making, and as such the science advisory body's essential 
role is to facilitate the emergence of a science consensus. Unfortunately, not all such efforts to 
broker consensus within a science advisory body are likely to be accepted by policy negotiators 
or allowed to serve as a basis for policy decisions. 
This introduction will review some of the existing scholarship on science for public policy- 
making, outline the way MEA's are negotiated and structured, and introduce six MEAs that will 
be used as the basis for this study. 
' The Day After Tomorrow Directed and written by Roland Emmerich, Released May 2004. 
SCIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 
Public policyinakers have long turned to the science coinmunity for assistance in solving 
problems and evaluating policy options (Guston, 2000; Barker and Peters, 1993; Jasanoff and 
Wynne, 1998). And, even as scholars in the field of science and technology studies (STS) have 
been exposing the myth of science "speaking truth to power" (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; 
Sarewitz, 1996), policymakers are still, to a large extent, looking to the science community to 
gather "all the facts" and produce answers to troubling questions. 
The myths surrounding the role of science are further accentuated when policymakers seek 
means of addressing global environmental threats. These clearly fit Weinberg's definition of 
trans-science, or "questions which can be asked of science but which cannot be answered by 
science" (Weinberg, 1 972). 
Global environmental challenges often fall under the heading of what Funtowicz and Ravetz 
call post-normal science (1992), as issues with high systems uncertainty and high decision 
stakes. They suggest that these require a broader coalition of contributors to the production of 
knowledge. This reinforces the relevance of the growing STS scholarship highlighting what is 
called the "social construction of science" (Jasanoff, 1990; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). 
Nevertheless, little of this work has been applied in practice. In seeking science input on 
environmental problems, policy-makers still for the most part look for an enlightened source of 
advice. Approaches to providing science advice in environmental decision-making at national 
and global levels (the core focus of this thesis) are presented in greater detail in Chapter 11. Most 
MEAs have acknowledged this need through the creation of science advisory bodies (SABs), 
most often a small subsidiary body to a larger Conference of the Parties (COP) entrusted with 
providing global decision-makers with guidance on scientific issues. The institutional make-up 
of these SABs varies widely and is often the focus of contentious negotiations leading up to their 
establishment. And while existing scholarship on science in MEAs is rather limited, some ideas 
have emerged as to the most successful approaches to providing science advice on a global scale. 
Early efforts to learn about the role of science in MEAs focused on identifying successful 
models of science advice, the most readily cited example being the technological assessments of 
the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances (Parson, 2002) and the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change associated with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (Agrawal, 1998). 
Another significant wave of scholarship centers on stakeholder perception of the salience, 
credibility and legitimacy of the output of global environmental assessments. Several research 
projects produced by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government's project on Global 
Environmental Assessments emphasize the inevitability of trade-offs between: salience, or 
"whether an actor perceives the assessment to be addressing questions relevant to their policy or 
behavioral choices"; credibility, or "whether an actor perceives the assessment's arguments to 
meet standards of scientific plausibility and technical adequacy"; and legitimacy, or "whether an 
actor perceives the assessments as unbiased and meeting standards of political fairness" (Clark et 
al, 2002). These and other investigations into the provision of science advice in the MEA context 
are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 11. 
In this thesis, I propose that the most important output of an SAB lies in the generation of a 
consensus on the relevant science that is both valid (scientifically accurate) and sustainable 
(accepted by stakeholders and not subject to frequent renegotiation). I identify two necessary 
pre-conditions for achieving such an outcome: representative membership and a process which is 
flexible and transparent. In presenting the practical implications of my findings, I will highlight 
how in fact there are opportunities to avoid what is so often couched as an "inevitable tradeoff7 
between validity and sustainability, and instead focus on what can be called a "mutual gains" 
approach to science advising. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The findings presented in this thesis are based on my qualitative study of six MEAs: the 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the Ozone Regime, the Climate Regime, the Biodiversity 
Regime, the Rotterdam Prior Informed Consent Convention and the Stockholm Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (POPS) Convention. These were selected to ensure variation in stages of 
implementation, number of Parties involved and MEA and SAB structure. These attributes for 
each case are briefly described in Table I. 1. These MEAs also vary in terms of the political and 
economic stakes of, and level of uncertainty surrounding, the problem they are intended to 
address. 
Parties 
Wetlands of 
In tcrnational 
I Importance 
Especially as 
~ a t c r f o w l  Habitat 
Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of 
on Substances that 
Deplcte the Ozone 
Layer 
the Ozonc Layer 
I Montreal Protocol 
Convention on 
Climate Changc 
(UNFCCC) 
189 
%zz+ the UNFCCC 
Convention on 
Biological Diversity -- 
Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety 
Summary of Objective 
130 
Rotterdam 
Convention on the 
Prior Informed 
Consent (PIC) 
Procedure for 
Ccrtain Hazardous 
Chemicals and 
Pesticides in 
International Trade 
Stockholm Persistent 
Organic Pollutants 
(POPs) Convention 
to stem the progressive 
encroachment on and loss 
of wetlands 
I 
100 
114 
cooperation on 
monitoring and data and 
research exchange 
Setting targets for the 
phase-out of ozone 
deplcting substanccs 
the stabilization of 
grccnhouse gas 
concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangcrous 
anthropogenic 
interference with the 
climate system 
emissions reductions 
commitments for 
developed countries to 
5% below 1990 levcls 
- the conservation of 
biological diversity 
the sustainable use of its 
components, and the fair 
and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from the 
use of genetic resources 
safc transfer, handling 
and use of living- 
modified organisms 
promotc shared 
rcsponsibility and 
cooperative efforts" in 
protecting human health 
and thc environment and 
to contribute to the 
environmentally sound 
use of certain hazardous 
chemicals 
to protect human hcalth 
and the environment from 
twclve persistent organic 
pollutants 
Date of 
Adoption 
1971 
1985 
Date of 
Entry into 
Force 
1975 
1988 
1989 
1994 
2005 
Science Advisory 
Body 
Scicntific and Tcchnical 
Review Pancl (STRP) 
Scientific Asscssmcnt Pancl 
Environmental Assessment 
Panel 
Technology and Economic 
Asscssment Pancl (TEAP) 
Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA) 
Intergovernrncntal Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) 
Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific Tcchnical and 
Technological Advicc 
(SBSTTA) 
Roster of Experts 
ad hoe Working Groups 
Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 
Chemical Rcvicw Comrnittec 
POPs Review Committee 
ad hoc Expert Group on Best 
Available Tcchniqucs and 
Best Environmcntal Practices 
for reducing the production 
of unintentional POPs 
Type of Science 
Advisory Body 
Singlc, smaller 
scientific pancl 
Three overarching 
panels, with 
several smallcr 
Tcchnical Option5 
Committees, 
including on 
methyl bromide 
Large (plcnary 
style) subsidiary 
body 
Independent , 
intergovernmental 
large-scale 
assessment 
Large (plenary 
style) subsidiary 
body 
Independent 
large-scale 
assessment 
Single, smaller 
scientific panel 
- several smaller 
scientific panels 
Table I. I --- Overview of : Selection 
-- -- 
As of December 2005 
The theory developed in this thesis is based on materials gathered through participant 
observation, stakeholder interviews, surveys, a review of meeting reports and reactions, and a 
close reading of official documentation. Participant observation was carried out primarily from 
July 2002 to December 2005. During this period, I attended 16 meetings3 related to the MEAs 
being studied as a report writer and editor for the Earth Negotiations ~ u l l e t i n ~  (ENB). In this 
capacity, I was granted access to proceedings (including contact group meetings), and also had 
an opportunity to conduct both informal interviews and more structured interviews with my 
choice of participants and administrators. This material was supplemented with more detailed 
interviews with administrators, and an e-mail survey of some randomly selected COP 
participants (government delegates, non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives and 
SAB participants). ENB reports, other records and position papers related to the MEA's 
negotiations, and of course the MEA's official documents, were also rich sources of information. 
Prior to introducing the cases, it is helpful to briefly explain how MEAs are negotiated and 
administered. 
NEGOTIATION AND STRUCTURE OF MEAs 
Multilateral environmental agreement negotiations (as opposed to bilateral discussions) bring 
many countries together again and again, and under these circumstances, certain norms have 
developed regarding the negotiation and administration of MEAs (Chasek, 2000). In fact, some 
are managed under the auspices of the UN or a UN agency like the UN Environment Programme 
(LJNEP). For example, the majority of MEAs (including those addressing biological diversity, 
Due to scheduling conflicts, I was unable to attend in person meetings of the Ramsar Wetlands Convention. 
Nevertheless this case was still included in light of the richness of materials available from the Secretariat (including 
detailed minutes of meetings of subsidiary bodies) and access to stakeholders' interviews and surveys. 
' ENB reports have become the record of note for many MEAs. While ENB is an NGO (a subsidiary of the Canada- 
based International Institute for Sustainable Development), it is most often contracted directly by the MEA's 
Secretariat to provide daily summarized reports of proceedings. 
ozone layer depletion, desertification and chemicals management) are administered by UNEP or 
entities overseen by UNEP, and as a result they share some of the same operational 
characteristics, including for example conducting meetings in the UN's six official languages. In 
contrast, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands is hosted by the World Conservation Union 
(IUCN). 
Since the traditional approach to convening a large number of countries requires an official 
and institutionalized call for negotiations to begin, the moment of problem definition truly marks 
the initiation of any MEA. Problems have varied in the way and speed with which they have 
been put on the global agenda. In some cases, the UN may be pressed to act by a small group of 
countries who have already adopted national level legislation to deal with a problem (as 
illustrated by the role of northern countries with arctic interests in promoting action on persistent 
organic pollutants5). In other instances, specialists within a scientific community identify the 
need for action (as posited by Peter Haas in his discussion of epistemic communities pushing for 
the Mediterranean Action plan6), or alternately events in the public eye may spur action (as 
occurred with global concern over the "ozone hole7' and the negotiations that led to the ozone 
regime). 
When an issue is "ripe7" for action, an international entity is charged with developing the text 
of a possible treaty. This can be a pre-existing body or a body specifically created for that 
purpose. It is often the UN General Assembly that will establish such a negotiating body (often 
called an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee). This body's work can proceed over several 
5 As described in Eckley, 2001, POPs were first addressed by a series of regional agreements, including the UNIECE 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, whose Protocol on POPs was spurred by Canadian 
concerns about the level of POPs found in arctic indigenous populations. 
This is discussed in great details in Haas, 1990, and the applicability of this concept to other phenomena is 
discussed in greater detail in Haas et al, 1995. 
' This notion of "ripeness7' is analogous to what Kingdon (1995) refers to as "an idea whose time has come." In the 
international arena, "ripeness" is often signaled by agreement within the UN General Assessment to examine the 
need for a global agreement. 
years (indeed, an average of ten years!), and its membership often grows as the discussions 
advance. For example, INC-1 for the Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS) Convention drew 
delegates from 92 countries8, while INC-5 (the last INC prior to the adoption of the Convention 
text) involved delegates from 122 countries9. 
The first step is generally to identify the scope of the problem and the objectives of a 
possible MEA and then negotiate a subsequent agreement with more specific objectives, in what 
has become the norm of the Convention/Protocol approach (Susskind, 1994). The initial text (the 
Convention) usually does little beyond specifying common beliefs and establishing an 
administrative infrastructure to pursue further negotiations. For example, while the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer emphasized the need for cooperation on 
monitoring, and on data and research exchange1', it is the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting 
Substances that lays out phase-out schedules for banning CFCs and other ozone depleting 
substances1 '. Similarly, under the climate regime, Parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change state their objective of "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system'*" while it is the Kyoto Protocol which sets specific emissions reductions targets for 
Parties and puts in place mechanisms for achieving these targetsI3. 
Once the intergovernmental negotiating committee reaches consensus on a "convention 
text," it is adopted by those present, and opened for signature by those countries who wish to 
join. Signatories must then initiate a ratification process. The ratification process varies by 
"arth Negotiation Bulletin, vol. 15, no.5, June 29 1998 
Earth Negotiation Bulletin, vol. 15, no.20, December 12 2000 
10 Text of the Vienna Convention, Article 2: "General Obligations" 
'I Text of the Montreal Protocol, Article 2: LLC'ontrol Measures" 
12 Text of the 1 ;N Framework Convention on C'limate Change, Article 2: "Objective" 
l 3  Text of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. 
country and refers to the administrative steps required to generate a national commitment (this 
can include parliamentary approval). For example, in the United States, the President must obtain 
the concurrence of the Senate (Hunter et al., 1998). The convention text usually specifies a 
minimum number of ratifying countries for entry into force. Once the convention enters into 
force, countries that have ratified it become Contracting Parties. Some conventions never reach 
this stage. When this occurs and there are no prospects for further ratifications, negotiations 
usually cease. 
The threshold for entry into force is negotiated as part of the convention text and will vary 
according to the aims of the MEA. This is designed so that early ratifiers are not legally-bound 
by the convention unless a sufficient number of other countries are liable as well14. Perhaps the 
most elaborate requirement for entry into force was specified in the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Protocol's entry into force depended not only on its ratification by 55 Parties, but also required 
ratification by developed countries accounting for 55% of the emissions subject to reductions 
according to the ~ ro toco l '~ .  This 55% requirement was designed so that either the United States 
or the Russian Federation (the two largest emitters subject to reductions) would have to ratify 
before the Protocol entered into force, thus protecting smaller emitters from being at a 
competitive disadvantage1 6. 
14 This is seen as a means of avoiding the so-called "free-rider" problem often associated with common-pool 
resources (Ostrom, 1990). Since access to common-pool resources (such as the atmosphere for example) can not 
practicably be restricted, free-riders will be able to reap the benefits of fewer greenhouse gases without having to 
take steps to reduce their emissions. Therefore if the convention entered into force right away, those few countries 
who ratified the Convention would be committed to (disproportionally) bearing the costs of action, while those 
countries who don't ratify, and don't bear these costs, will still benefit from the action of a few countries, thus 
becoming "free-riders." 
Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, UNFCCC Website, 
http://unfccc.int/essential~background/items/2 13.php accessed on November 
19,2005. 
16 ENB, vol. 12, no. 76, 13 December 1997 
In the period between a convention's initial adoption and its entry into force, the negotiating 
body often continues to meet to specify additional obligations of future Parties. These "interim" 
negotiations generally cover controversial issues on which agreement remained elusive, or 
administrative details regarding day-to-day operations. Graph I. 1 presents the idealized timeline 
for an MEA negotiation. 
For example, under the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, the interim 
process (still called the INC) met six times", and its work included "ironing o~t'~"o~erationa1 
details of the secretariat, and resolving remaining disagreements in the Convention text, for 
example the membership of the Chemical Review Committee. In fact, the interim process under 
the PIC Convention is also unique in that it provided for beginning the process of reviewing 
potential chemicals for addition to the Convention's purview prior to the Convention's actual 
entry into force. This "interim PIC procedure'9" allowed for countries to nominate chemicals, not 
included in the Convention text, so that they too be subject to the PIC procedure. Upon their 
nomination, these chemicals were reviewed by the Interim Chemical Review Committee (ICRC) 
to determine whether they met the Convention criteria for listing under the Convention. The INC 
then considered those chemicals whose nominations were forwarded to them by the ICRC and 
agreed to the listing of 13 additional chemicals. These decisions by the INC were then quickly 
approved by the Rotterdam PIC Convention Conference of the Parties (COP) at its first meeting, 
1 1  
see www.iisd.ca/voll5/ 
I8 this reference to "ironing out housekeeping issues" was often employed by delegates and administrative support 
staff in discussing the matters at hand at these meetings. 
19 The details o f  the "interim process" were agreed upon in a "Resolution on Interim Arrangements" adopted at the 
same Conference of the Plenipotentiaries that adopted the Convention text in September 1998. (ENB, vol. 15, no. 
99) 
Graph I. 1 : The MEA Negotiation Process 
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and soon after it's entry into force the Rotterdam PIC Convention had already expanded its 
scope. 
The convention sets in place an administrative structure, the core of which generally operates 
on an interim basis until the convention enters into force-though that is, of course, dependent 
on the signatories' willingness to provide financial support. In fact, the negotiations for the POPs 
Convention were financed by the "POPs club2'" a fund established by UNEP, and which 
collected voluntary contributions from governments, but also from intergovernmental 
organizations and non-governmental organizations, including for example a donation by the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference at POPs INC-6. Throughout the negotiation and INC process of the 
Stockholm POPs Convention this POPs Fund was used to finance the Convention's negotiation 
and the interim process. 
An MEA's administrative structure (see Graph 1.2) generally involves a secretariat (which 
has a permanent staff and is self-standing or hosted by an international organization) and a 
Conference of the Parties (COP)- a body made up of representatives from all Contracting Parties 
which holds meetings at regular intervals (these intervals are usually spelled out in the 
Convention). It is the secretariat's responsibility to prepare material for consideration by the 
COP and these materials serve as the starting point for negotiation by Parties. At its first official 
meeting after ratification, the COP usually considers all resolutions brokered in the period 
between the Convention's adoption and its first meeting2'. 
'' http:l/www.chem.i~nep.ch/pops/POPs~C1ub/popsScl~~b.htm 
? '  The practice has evolved to use COP-I as a shorthand for the first meeting of the COP, COP-2 for the second 
meeting, etc. This same practice applies to meetings of an intergovernmental negotiating committee (INC- 1, INC- 
2 . .  .), or for a Protocol to meetings of the Meeting of the Parties (MOP-1, MOP-2.. .) 
Graph 1.2: The Administrative Structure of MEAs. 
In some cases, the text of the Conventions also establishes subsidiary bodies (most often to 
provide science advice but also to oversee compliance and implementation). The COP also 
retains the authority to establish subsidiary bodies or ad hoc groups to carry out work between 
COP meetings. The structure of these science advisory bodies varies widely across MEAs, but 
can be broadly described as fitting into one of three categories: a large subsidiary science 
advisory bodies, one smaller scientific panel, or several smaller expert panels (Kohler, 2002). 
Large (plenary) subsidiary science advisory bodies do not restrict membership and their 
meetings will generally be attended by government delegates and held in the traditional UN 
plenary format. For example, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) is, as specified in the 
Convention, "open to participation by all Parties (...), multidisciplinary" and made up of 
"government representatives competent in the relevant field of expertise.22" However, the 
Convention does not specify who determines a participant's competence, nor does it put in place 
a process for identifying relevant fields of expertise. In addition, participation by other 
stakeholders, for example from academia, industry and environmental non-governmental 
organizations is not addressed under the Convention, but rather is only covered as part of the 
Convention's rules of procedure. The implication of such membership considerations is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 111. 
In other instances, international environmental conventions have called upon one smaller 
scientific panel, a more limited group of specialists, to provide science advice. The Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands has entrusted such a small committee -- The Scientific and Technical 
Review Panel (STRP) to provide its science advice23. 
" UNFCCC: Convention, Article 9: "Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice" 
2 3 ht tp://www.ramsar.org/abol~t/abou t-strp.htm 
International conventions have also called upon multiple expert groups to integrate scientific 
knowledge into policy-making. The Executive Body to the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) has designated three separate panels to provide science 
advice. These are: the Working Group on Effects, the Working Group on Strategies and Review, 
and the EMEP Steering Body. The EMEP refers to the 1984 Protocol of the Convention and 
relates to a Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and   valuation^^. 
While meetings of the COP are usually plenary sessions with simultaneous translation into 
the Convention's official languages, contentious negotiations are often handled by smaller 
groups and are usually conducted in English only. Each COP elects a bureau, a small committee 
with equal membership from all regional groups25. This bureau meets regularly during the 
meeting of the COP itself and is also mandated with the supervision of intersessional meetings 
prior to the next meeting of the 
As COPS meet to monitor implementation, some adopt amendments or protocols, which in 
turn need ratification again to enter into force. These amendments often set specific targets and 
timelines, or put in place procedures intended to achieve specific goals. For example, while the 
Montreal Protocol set targets for reduction of CFCs and halons by developed countries, 
subsequent amendments not only accelerated the phase-out schedule, but expanded it to include 
phase-out commitments for developing countries, and introduced phase-out schedules for other 
ozone depleting substances not originally included under the scope of the Montreal ~ r o t o c o l ~ ~ .  
In some instances, a Protocol can become the central focus of the regime and the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Protocol (MOP) may be more frequent that those of the Convention itself. For 
'~ttp://www.greenyearbook.org/agree/atmosphe/lrtap.htm 
'' the definition of regional groups varies according to each MEA. This is discussed in greater detail in Box 111.2. 
'" There is also a long-standing tradition in most MEAs that the President of the COP (and of the Bureau) be a high- 
ranking administrator from the COP meeting's host country. 
" http://www.~~nep.ch/o~one/Treaties and~Ratification/montrealgrotocol amendments.asp 
instance, under the Ozone Regime, the Montreal Protocol, which sets out specific phase-out 
targets for ozone-depleting substances, has more frequent MOPS and a larger budget than the 
original Vienna   on vent ion*'. 
SIX MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
Ramsar Wetlands Convention 
Wetlands are a particular type of ecosystem whose definition has historically been 
contentious, but which, according to some estimates, cover at least 6% of the Earth's land 
surface. While wetlands have a long history of being drained and converted to other uses, from 
the 1960s there has been increased attention to their value of wetlands, first as wildlife habitats 
and then as polyvalent ecosystems, with implications for water supply, fisheries, agriculture, 
forestry and tourism. 
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
(Wetlands Convention) was signed in Ramsar, Iran in 1971, and entered into force in 1975. As of 
December 2005, there are 147 Parties to the Convention, which aims to stem the progressive loss 
of wetlands. 
The Convention defines wetlands as "areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural 
or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fiesh, brackish or salt, 
including areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six metres." The 
Convention provides for Parties to designate within their territory wetlands "of international 
significance in terms of ecology, botany, zoology, lirnnology or hydrology." Each Party must 
designate one such wetland in order to ratify the Convention, but there are no limits to the 
number of wetlands each Party can add to this "List of Wetlands of International Importance." 
- 
'' ENB, Vo1.19, no. 24,2 December 2002 
In its thirty-year existence, the COP has overseen the preparation of several 
recommendations on the management and protection of wetlands, which have been applied by 
managers at the local level, and, as of December 2005, Parties have listed 1524 wetlands of 
international importance, representing a total surface area of 129.2 million hectares. 
The Ramsar Secretariat is hosted by the IUCN, and meetings of the COP are held at least 
once every three years29. A sixteen-member Standing Committee (reflecting the geographic 
distribution of Parties) is elected at each COP to oversee Convention matters until the next COP 
meeting. In 1993, the COP established a Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP) 
mandated with providing scientific and technical guidance to the COP, the Standing Committee 
and the Secretariat. 
Ozone Regime: Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol 
The ozone layer is the stratospheric portion of the atmosphere protecting the earth from 
harmful ultra-violet rays, which are known to have detrimental impacts on natural ecosystems 
and also on human health, especially through higher incidence of skin cancer and cataracts. In 
the 1970s, scientists discovered that chlorofluorocarbon (CFC), an industrial compound widely 
used as a coolant and solvent, was reaching the ozone layer and leading to the breakdown of 
ozone molecules. Several large scale science assessments focused on this process, and in 1985 a 
team of scientists discovered evidence of an "ozone hole" over the Antarctic. 
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was adopted in 1985 and 
entered into force in 1988. It has 190 Parties and calls for cooperation in monitoring and data and 
research exchange. It was supplemented in 1987 by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Protocol entered into force in 1989 and as of December 2005 had 
189 Parties. The Montreal Protocol set out targets for developed countries (referred to as non- 
20 Article 6 of the Rarnsar Convention 
Article 5 Parties) to control ozone depleting substances (some CFCs and halons). Under the 
Montreal Protocol, developing countries (referred to as Article 5 Parties) were granted a grace 
period to continue their use of these chemicals prior to committing to control measures. 
Subsequent amendments to the Montreal Protocol have set out accelerated phase-out 
schedules for an even wider range of ozone depleting substances for both developed and 
developing countries. Developing countries are granted a longer time-period for achieving phase- 
out, and these phase-out activities are supported by contributions from the Montreal Protocol 
Multilateral Fund. 
Since its entry into force, Parties to the Montreal Protocol have successfully phased out the 
use and production of hydrobromofluorocarbons and bromochloromethane. Developed countries 
have also successfully phased-out their use of CFCs, carbon tetracholoride and methyl 
chloroform. Developed countries are also are expected to phase out methyl bromide by 2005, 
although several developed country Parties have been granted exemptions for critical uses of 
methyl bromide in 2006 and 2007~'. Finally, developed countries are scheduled to phase-out 
consumption of HCFCs by 2030. As CFCs were first being phased out, HCFCs were widely used 
as CFC substitutes, but have more recently been found to have significant global warming 
potentials. Their rapidly increasing atmospheric concentrations has been the focus of discussion 
under the Climate regime as well. 
Developing countries are required to phase out CFCs, halons and carbon tetrachloride by 
2010, methyl chloroform and methyl bromide by 2015, and consumption of HCFCs by 2040. 
Production of HCFCs is scheduled for stabilization by 2016. The ozone regime is widely 
3 C, The review of these critical use nominations for methyl bromide have been the responsibility of the Methyl 
Bromide Technical Options Committee. and disagreement among Parties regarding the size of these exemptions 
have necessitated the convening of two extraordinary meetings of the MOP. 
heralded as the most successful MEA (Parson, 2003), and was in fact used as a template in 
negotiating the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. 
The Montreal Protocol MOP is convened on an annual basis, while the Vienna Convention 
COP meets every three years. Every three years the COP and MOP are held jointly. The Ozone 
Secretariat is hosted by UNEP in Nairobi. An Executive Committee, with 7 representatives each 
from Article 5 and non-Article 5 Parties oversees the work of the Multilateral Fund, which was 
established in 1992 to help Article 5 Parties cover the incremental costs of phasing out ozone 
depleting substances. Since its creation, the Multilateral Fund has disbursed over US$1.3 billion. 
Leading up to the negotiation of the ozone regime, several large scale international 
assessments examined the question of ozone depletion, and at it's first meeting in 1989, MOP 
established a Scientific Assessment Panel, an Environmental Assessment Panel and a 
Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) to provide Parties with science advice. 
The TEAP's work is subdivided into several Technical Options Committees (TOCs), which have 
been reorganized several times to meet science advice needs of the MOP. These TOCs are tasked 
with reviewing Parties' critical use exemptions for chemicals scheduled for phase out for which 
no suitable alternatives exist. 
For example, in the case of methyl bromide, several developed-country Parties, committed to 
a methyl bromide phase-out by 2005, have submitted critical use nominations to the Methyl 
Bromide Technical Options Committee (MBTOC), outlining specific uses for which no suitable 
alternatives to methyl bromide are available. The MBTOC is tasked with reviewing these 
nominations, and forwarding to the MOP recommendations for granting critical use exemptions 
to the applicant Parties. Since beginning to review these nominations, the MBTOC has approved 
the bulk of these exemptions, and in fact many environmental non-governmental organizations 
have highlighted the fact that some Parties' critical use exemptions as approved by the MOP 
signify a steady increase in their methyl bromide use. This issue of critical use exemptions for 
methyl bromide has been the most contentious focus of negotiations in the ozone regime. It has 
spurred the convening of two extraordinary meetings of the MOP prior to approving the 
exemptions, as the MOP has twice turned to the MBTOC for clarification prior to approving 
exemptions. 
Biodiversi~ Regime 
The rapid extinction of species worldwide has long been noted as an issue of great concern, 
and many have underscored its implications not only for ecosystem health, but also for 
economic development, especially with regard to increased vulnerability of food stocks and lost 
opportunities to identify economic and medicinal uses of extinct species. 
In 1992, at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Rio 
Earth Summit), countries adopted the Convention on Biological Diversity, which aims to 
promote "the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources." The Convention 
entered into force in 1993, and as of December 2005 has 188 Parties. In 2000, the Convention 
was supplemented by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which entered into force in 2003 and 
as of December 2005 has 130 Parties. The Cartagena Protocol focuses on living-modified 
organisms3' (LMOs), addressing in particular their safe transfer, handling and use by establishing 
an advance informed agreement procedure for imports of LMOs. Many of the obligations under 
the biodiversity regime relate to the development and ratification of national legislation and 
action plans to further the goals of the Convention and Protocol. 
3 1 outside of the MEA realm these are most com~nonly referred to as genetically-modified organisms. 
The COP meets every two years, while the MOP meets annually. The Biodiversity 
Secretariat is administered through UNEP, and oversees COP and MOP meetings as well as 
several ad hoc working groups. These smaller working groups are granted limited mandates 
(both in terms of the number of times they are to meet, and the scope of the issue they are to 
address), and bring together legal, technical or scientific experts to focus on issues such as 
indigenous knowledge, access and benefit sharing, liability and redress and protected areas. Two 
clearing-houses (the Clearing-House Mechanism and the specialized Biosafety Clearing House) 
have been established to facilitate capacity building and the transfer of information among 
Parties. These entail web-portals that serve as a platform for Parties to make available 
information on their implementation (for example models of legislation and action plans) or 
more specific information on their biodiversity (for example taxonomic information) for 
consultation by other Parties and observers. The Clearing-House Mechanism also maintains a 
database to catalogue opportunities for partnerships for capacity building and technology 
transfer. 
Under the biodiversity regime, the main conduit for science advice is the Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), which meets twice in between COP 
meetings in plenary style with no constraints on participation. This body is supplemented by a 
Roster of Experts, which is maintained by the Secretariat. Names can be added to this Roster, 
again without limitations, and the Roster is available online (with information on experts area of 
specialization, nationality and location) for consultation by Parties seeking expert advice. A great 
deal of science advice is also generated through the work of the many ad hoc groups described 
above. 
Large-scale biodiversity science assessments have alaso been undertaken, although not 
directly under the control of the COP. Most recently, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
concluded in 2005 that biodiversity loss is occurring at unprecedented rates worldwide and 
identified several drivers for this biodiversity loss, including climate change. 
Climate Regime 
Since the industrial revolution, there has been a rapid increase in atmospheric concentrations 
of so-called greenhouse gases, gases that have heat-trapping properties and accentuate the natural 
occurring greenhouse effect. It is widely expected that these unprecedented concentrations of 
greenhouse gases are contributing to long term climate change. This in turn can have significant 
long-term impacts, including extreme weather events, glacial melting and sea level rise. The 
most notable of these "greenhouse gases" are C 0 2  (carbon dioxide- the result of combustion 
reactions, and of particular concern in this case the use of fossil fuels such as petroleum and 
coal), CH4 (methane - the product of anaerobic decomposition, mostly arising from agricultural 
production), and N20  (nitrous oxide - also arising from agricultural production and in particular 
chemical fertilizer use). 
This phenomenon was examined by a series of international science panels in the 1980s, and 
in 1988 the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UNEP jointly established the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a scientific body open to all country- 
members of either WMO or UNEP. 
The IPCC released its First Assessment Report in 1990 (it is now preparing its Fourth 
Assessment Report). This served as the basis for negotiations for a UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, which was adopted in 1992 at the Earth Summit. The UNFCCC entered into 
force in 1994 and its objective is the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system." The UNFCCC was supplemented by the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in 1997 
but only entered into force in February 2005. It sets out emissions reduction objectives for 
developed countries3*, for an aggregate emissions reduction level of 5% below 1990 levels by 
2008-2012. The UNFCCC COP meets on an annual basis, and the Kyoto MOP-1 took place in 
early December 2005, during which Parties began discussions for a framework for negotiating 
post-2012 emissions reduction commitments for developed countries but also for some rapidly 
growing developing countries. 
The text of the Convention does not explicitly make reference to the IPCC, and instead 
establishes a Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to "undertake 
work on methodological and scientific matters as they relate to the Convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol process33." 
Nevertheless, the IPCC has continued to operate in parallel to the climate regime and in 
practice its ongoing work is closely tied to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. For instance, 
the IPCC has taken a lead role in developing guidelines for assessing how changes in land use 
(for example through reforestation) affect the global carbon cycle (for example by stocking or 
releasing more carbon unit equivalents), and more specifically how to measure these effects. The 
IPCC is administered by its own small secretariat, hosted by the WMO. It is funded through 
government contributions to the IPCC Trust Fund and through the provision of in-kind services 
by governments and institutions. 
32 As of December 2005, the UNFCCC has 189 Parties, while the Kyoto Protocol has 157. 
3' http://~mfccc.int/methodsand~science/items/2722.php 
Rotterdam Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Convention 
The growth in the international trade of chemicals since the 1960s and 1970s coincided with 
growing awareness of the threat many of these chemicals posed to both the global environment 
and human health. Today world trade in chemicals is described as exceeding US$400 billion per 
year34. The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure for Certain 
Ilazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade was adopted in 1998 and entered into 
force in 2004, as of December 2005 100 countries are Party to the Convention. The PIC 
Convention was negotiated under the auspices of both the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), building upon a voluntary information 
exchange program put in place in the mid 1980s. 
The Rotterdam PIC Convention applies to "banned or severely restricted chemicals and 
severely hazardous pesticide formulations." Parties aim to "promote shared responsibility and 
cooperative efforts" in protecting human health and the environment and to contribute to the 
environmentally sound use of certain hazardous chemicals. This latter goal is achieved through 
the facilitation of information exchange about characteristics of listed chemicals; a national 
decision-making process on their import and export; and the dissemination of a Party's decision 
relating to a chemical's import to other Parties. 
While the PIC Convention does not regulate, control, or restrict the production or use of the 
chemicals under its purview, the listing of chemicals under the PIC Convention requires their 
standardized labeling in international trade, and requests Parties to decide whether, and under 
what conditions, to authorize the import of a listed chemical. 
The Secretariat administering the Convention is divided between UNEP and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), with the UNEP branch of its Secretariat also assuming 
'* http://www.ril.com/media/speeches/mda/nm~speechesmda~f~~t~ireofchem.html 
administrative oversight of the Stockholm Persistent Organic Pollutants Convention (this "sister" 
convention is described in greater length below). The PIC COP meets on an annual basis, and its 
subsidiary science advisory body is the Chemical Review Committee (CRC), which meets 
annually as well. 
The review of the proposed listing of a chemical, and the drafting of the Decision Guidance 
Documents (based upon which a Party decides whether to allow a chemical's import), both fall 
under the responsibilities of the CRC. Even prior to the Rotterdam PIC Convention's entry into 
force, the CRC was convened in an interim form. This Interim CRC (ICRC) reviewed many 
applications for expanding the Convention's scope, and at the COP'S first meeting, Parties 
approved the addition of 13 chemicals based on the ICRC's recommendations. 
Stockholm Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS) Convention 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) are chemicals that are known to bio-accumulate in 
living organisms (the best known of these is perhaps DDT whose nefarious effects were 
famously documented in the 1970s by Rachel Carson), yet more recently it has come to light that 
many POPs are transported long-distances in the atmosphere and have been found to 
disproportionally affect populations living in northern latitudes. A focus on POPs at the global 
level was first initiated in 1995 when UNEP's General Council launched a global scale 
assessment on POPs, which was followed by negotiations for a Convention. The Stockholm 
POPs Convention was adopted in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. As of December 2005, 
The Stockholm POPs Convention has 1 14 Parties. 
The Stockholm POPs Convention aims to protect human health and the environment from 12 
persistent organic pollutants (often called the "dirty dozen"). These twelve POPs are described as 
falling into three categories of chemicals: pesticides, industrial chemicals and unintentional by- 
products. As of December 2005, the pesticides covered under the POPs Convention are aldrin, 
chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, mirex and toxaphene; the industrial chemicals are 
hexachlorobenzene (HCB) and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs); and dioxins and furans are the 
unintentional by-products identified under the Convention. The POPs Convention provides for 
the elimination of nine of those chemicals, restrictions on the production and use of DDT, and 
guidance on the best available techniques and best environmental practices for preventing or 
reducing the release of unintentional by-products. 
The Convention is administered by a Secretariat, which operates jointly with the PIC 
Secretariat. The Convention text provided for the establishment, at POPs COP-1 of a POPs 
Review Committee (POPRC). The POPRC is charged with reviewing nominations for listing 
additional POPs under the Convention. The POPs Convention also draws on other subsidiary ad 
hoc groups for science advice, including an Expert Group on Best Available Technologies and 
Best Environmental Practices (BATIBEP). 
THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis argues that the most important output of science advisory bodies like the ones 
described above is the generation of a valid and sustainable scientific consensus, which can serve 
as a basis for MEA policy negotiations. I propose that such a consensus necessitates 
representative membership and a transparent and flexible process. Chapter I1 discusses the 
dynamics of science advice for global environmental policy-making and describes the necessary 
attributes of a global science consensus. Chapter 111 presents the diversity considerations that I 
think might be taken into account in ensuring an SAB's representative membership. Chapter IV 
explains how transparency and flexibility in the SAB's organization of its work bolster both the 
validity and the sustainability of the resulting science consensus. In Chapter V, I offer 
recommendations for designing a better system for providing science advice to MEAs. I then 
illustrate how a "three-tier science advisory body" might work in the context of the biodiversity 
regime. 
CHAPTER 11: SCIENCE IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY- 
MAKING 
"I NEED SCIENTISTS!" This emphatic call blared across the cover of the November 5th, 
2001 issue of Newsweek magazine as Tom Ridge, the newly appointed head of the US 
Department of Homeland Security, sought to reconcile conflicting expert views for dealing with 
evidence of anthrax in the US Senate. 
Public policymakers have long been focused with harnessing science for policy needs, and 
this interest has traditionally been focused in science policy, identifying means of influencing 
scientific endeavors to best cater to policy needs (Kuehn and Porter, 1981). In parallel, the 
science community has also sought to ensure that its output is tailored to such policy needs, 
through the pursuit of what Charles Lindblom called "usable knowledge" (Lindblom, 1979). 
This client-driven approach to the science policy interface has spawned the development of a 
myriad of decision-making tools, such as cost-benefit analysis, as a means of facilitating public 
decision-making (MacRae Jr and Whittington, 1997; Barker and Peters, 1993; Guston, 2000; 
Bardach, 2000). In a national policy context, this scientific input is often mediated through the 
establishment of panels or consultations, where a subset of experts is consulted for answers 
(Switzer, 2004). 
A growing segment of scholarship, rooted in the field of science and technology studies 
(STS), has been questioning this notion of science providing clear answers to policy questions. 
In 1986, Collingridge and Reeve challenged this notion of science "speaking truth to power," 
highlighting both policymakers7 "myth of rationality" - whereby policymakers seek the one 
answer based on "all relevant facts" - and the science community's "myth of the power of 
science" - whereby it is assumed that science can indeed "hlfill this role" (Collingridge and 
Reeve, 1986). 
These myths of the power of the science community, including the myth of authoritativeness, 
are quite evident in the context of science advice for environmental problems (Sarewitz, 1996; 
Sarewitz, 2000). Environmental threats often fall under the realm of what Funtowicz and Ravetz 
call "post-normal science," problems of high uncertainty and high decision-stakes that are not 
easily resolved through traditional concepts in science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Saloranta, 
2001). In addition, STS scholars have been highlighting the extent to which the scientific process 
is "socially constructed," subject to norms and preconceptions, thus further questioning the 
notion of "objective" fact (Jasanoff, 1990; Schackley, 1996; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). 
In addition to the complexities arising from environmental challenge's high levels of 
uncertainty and high decision stakes, their transboundary nature and the management 
implications of what are often common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990; Keohane and Ostrom, 
1995), have prompted the global community to enter into a variety of multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) as a means of brokering coordinated global action. 
These global environmental negotiations are technically intensive, and there are essentially 
three options for providing science advice to a MEA process. The first would be to allow each 
negotiating stakeholder to rely on their own science advisors - although this has the potential of 
bringing adversarial science debates into MEA policy-making. The second calls for independent 
international science assessments on overarching global environmental issues. These include, for 
example, the recently completed Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. However, these are multi- 
year endeavors that are often criticized for their lack of policy responsiveness. The third would 
involve the establishment of science advisory bodies specifically tailored to each MEA. It is this 
latter option that has been the preferred option for most MEAs, and I propose here that these 
SABs are essential to the MEA policy process. They help to broker a consensus on the state of 
the science that serves as a basis for policy negotiations. 
SCIENCE IN MEAs 
Multilateral environmental agreements are only recently the subject of scholarship, and the 
bulk of the research to date has focused on assessing the effectiveness of these regimes and 
understanding obstacles to and sources of their success (Young, et al, 1999; Young and Demko, 
1996; Miles et al, 2002; Wettestad, 2001). While little of this research focuses exclusively on the 
provision of science advice in these MEAs, several scholars have identified science advice as 
one of the key ingredients in successful MEAs. 
Young and Dernko identify the integration of scientific knowledge, as one of the necessary 
components of an effective international environmental regime3? Patricia Birnie highlights the 
failure to obtain scientific advice as one of the weaknesses of the original International 
Convention for the Regulation of She emphasizes the importance of "independent 
scientific groups" and "commonly agreed-upon scientific data" for developing effective 
environmental regimes. Similarly, Nicholas Guppy identifies a "lack of understanding of the 
biosphere and its functioning" as one of the underlying causes of failure of international land 
3 7 resource regimes . 
" p. 237 in Young, OR and Dernko, GJ. (1 996). Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Governance Systems. In Young, OR, Demko, GJ and Ramakrishna, K (Ed.). Global Environmental Change and 
International Governance (pp. 229-246) Hanover: University Press of New England. 
36 p. 66 in Birnie, P. (1996). Regimes Dealing with the Oceans of All Kinds of Seas fiom the Perspective of the 
North. In Young, OR, Dernko, GJ and Ramakrishna, K (Ed.). Global Environmental Change and International 
Governance (pp. 47-92) Hanover: University Press of New England 
17 p. 152 in Guppy, N.  ( 1996). International Governance and Regimes Dealing with Land Resources from the 
Perspective of the North In Young, OR, Demko, GJ and Ramakrishna, K (Ed.). Global Environmental Change and 
International Governance (pp. 136-1 65) Hanover: University Press of New England 
The necessity of incorporating science has been particularly emphasized in the context of 
global action on climate change. In their 1996 article, Tim O'Riordan and Andrew Jordan 
provided an institutional definition of science as "an articulation of knowledge, a structure of 
self-examination, and a product of dominant political and social interests." They also identified 
scientific knowledge as one of the triggers of policy change. They further identify the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the "impartial" scientific knowledge it 
provided as a great influence on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)~~. 
Much of the existing scholarship on science in MEAs has focused on the role of scientists in 
placing an environmental problem on the global policy agenda, and to scientists as contributors 
to civil society input into MEA negotiations (Haas, 1990; Corell, 1999; Lohan, 2003; Dimitrov, 
2003). The International Council for Science (ICSU) has also prepared several special reports 
focused on harnessing the ability of the world science community to meet MEA needs. 
There is rapidly evolving scholarship focusing specifically on the institutional features of the 
science advisory process for MEAs. Many of these are in-depth case studies of specific regimes 
that examine how science advice is taken up by policy-makers. Several research endeavors 
arising out of Harvard's Global Environmental Assessment project have focused on how 
different institutions have incorporated science into policy-making for sustainable development, 
emphasizing in particular the importance of enhancing the salience, credibility and legitimacy of 
the information being produced (Cash, 2003; Litfin, 1998). 
There are also research efforts focusing on the science advisory process associated with the 
Ozone Regime (Parson, 2003), the Biodiversity Regime (Gupta, 2004), and the Climate Regime 
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(Miller and Edwards, 2001). Over the last five years, there have been several overviews 
cataloguing the myriad of science advisory bodies associated with MEAs (Fritz, 2000; National 
Research Council, 2002; House of Lords, 2005). In 2000, Andresen et al. also carried out a 
systematic comparative overview of science and politics in five international environmental 
regimes, which concluded that while institutional factors were important, the state of knowledge 
"seems to be a more important determinant [of success] than organization and procedure." 
SABs AS SITES OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
Once an MEA enters into force, it is typical to establish a science advisory body to meet the 
COP'S decision-making needs (see Chapter I). At first glance, and in most examinations of SABs 
in MEAs, the SABs are identified as "assessors" of knowledge. For example, the IPCC describes 
its role as "assess[ing] on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, 
technical and socio-economic infomation relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of 
human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and 
mitigation3'." In fact, the official description of the IPCC further limits its mandate by specifying 
that "the IPCC does not carry out research nor does it monitor climate related data or other 
relevant parameters." 
Similarly, under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the first tasks explicitly assigned to 
the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice in the Convention text 
(Article 25) apply to "provid[ing] scientific and technical assessments of the status of biological 
diversity" and to "prepar[ing] scientific and technical assessments of the effects of [. . .] measures 
taken." In the same vein, under the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the 
need for scientific and technical information stresses the collection and exchange of information, 
while under the Ramsar Wetlands Convention, the Scientific and Technical Review Panel was 
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established to "review," and in some cases "evaluate," aspects of the work of the Convention's 
Bureau, Standing Committee and COP. 
Yet, even if the mandate of the SABs focuses on a review of existing knowledge, in carrying 
out their work the experts taking part in the SAB are in fact doing much more, even if this aspect 
of their work is not always explicitly acknowledged by those carrying out this work (van der 
Sluijs et al., 1998). Nevertheless there is an emerging field of scholarship acknowledging the 
extent to which these science advisory bodies, at the national and global level, are acting as more 
than mere compilers of scientific information, but are in fact sites of knowledge production 
(Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Miller and Edwards, 2001; Jasanoff and Martello; 2004). In taking 
a closer look at this production of knowledge, it is usefbl to consider three broad types of 
knowledge production: framing and agenda setting; classification and standards; and methods. 
Of course there are many interlinkages among these, and while they are by no means 
independent of each other, they can provide useful lenses for shedding light on how these SABs 
are more than just assessors of knowledge. 
Framing and Agenda Setting 
In the realm of policy analysis, there is an increasing recognition of what are often tacit 
frames in shaping public policies (Schon and Rein, 1994). And just as framing shapes laws at the 
national level, it also comes into play in the realm of global environmental policy, first in setting 
an MEA's objective and scope, but also in reshaping concepts as MEAs are implemented. 
As the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was being negotiated, policy-makers 
decided to focus regulation efforts on several greenhouse gases with differing global warming 
potentials (Miller and Edwards, 2001). This concept of global warming potential, which allows 
the conversion of greenhouse gases to be expressed in terms of carbon emissions, was first 
fonnally introduced in a 1990 issue of Nature, and its definition was then taken up under the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. This concept was embraced by both scientists and 
policymakers in examining the question of climate change (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998) and 
helped hrther the notion that carbon was "fungible" - basically that any reductions of emissions 
converted to tons of carbon through their global warming potential would be equivalent 
regardless of their source (Ramakrishna, 1999). Even though the method for assessing this global 
warming potential continued to be debated in the scientific realm long after its development (for 
example Smith and Wigley, 2000), it rapidly influenced the development of tools under the 
global policy framework designed to take advantage of this feature, for example the creation of 
markets for trading carbon internationally (Greenwire, 711 112005). Yet, this framing has not been 
without criticism, for example in 1991 the Centre for Science and the Environment based in New 
Delhi highlighted the ethical implications of putting what it called "luxury emissions" (for 
example arising from the use of an SUV in a developed country) and "survival emissions" (for 
example emanating from cultivating rice paddies in a developing country) on the same footing. 
Furthermore, by emphasizing emission levels of a target substance, be they greenhouse gases 
or ozone depleting substances, any framework for action will implicitly favor policies which 
regulate producers, thus avoiding directly regulating the consumers of the goods and services 
whose production generates the target compounds. In contrast, experts to the Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, which most centrally addresses problems of acid rain 
in Europe and North America, developed a concept of "critical l o a d  which takes into account 
the conditions of the receiving environment and transport patterns in setting thresholds for 
certain chemicals (Wettestad, 2000). Such a frame requires ongoing collaboration between 
scientists and policy-makers as they negotiate appropriate emissions reductions, and can be 
summarized as an "effects-focused" rather than "production-focused" approach. 
Under the more recent chemical-related PIC and POPs Conventions, negotiators stepped 
away from a chemical production or even consumption framework, instead framing their efforts 
as relating to "chemicals management." In negotiating the terms of reference for these 
Conventions' expert groups (the PIC Chemical Review Committee, the POPS Review 
Committee and the POPs expert group on Best Available Techniques and Best Environmental 
Practices), the need to call upon "experts in chemical management" was a clear focus of 
negotiators. Some interviewees even emphasized the distinction between "scientists" and 
"experts in chemicals management." This latter notion values practical experience in using or 
supervising the use of the relevant chemicals, their alternatives and in monitoring their effects 
(especially on health and the environment). Logically, this concept of chemicals management 
was framed by those active throughout the negotiation process, which were mostly government 
administrators (often from agncultural or pesticides divisions) or representing the industrial 
sector (where a lot of knowledge in developing, using and applying pesticides and other 
chemicals is garnered). Consequently, maintaining this notion of expertise as a standard for 
participation in the relevant SABs might not only hinder participation by "outsiders" with 
differing areas of expertise, but may also delay expert-driven reframing. 
Framing is not limited to an MEA7s development phase, and re-framing repeatedly occurs 
throughout the implementation phase. Under the ozone regime, while the initial framing for the 
Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol focused on reducing the production and use of 
CFCs and halons, amendments were adopted in 1990, 1992, 1995, 1997 and 1999 reframing the 
regime to address a broader "basket" of ozone depleting substances, such as HCFCs and methyl 
bromide (Parson, 2003). In particular, broadening the regime's scope to include methyl bromide, 
especially when it is used as a fumigant in the agricultural sector, not only reframed the ozone 
concern away from what had been perceived as an ahnospheric concern arising from industrial 
activities, but also affected the range of stakeholders taking part in activities of the COP and the 
Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee. 
Under the Wetlands Convention, the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP)'s 
relative freedom of operation has given its members the opportunity to coordinate efforts among 
the wider wetlands-research community to reframe concepts applicable to the global protection 
of wetlands. For example, leading up to the 12th meeting of the STRP Heather McGray 
spearheaded the development of an integrated framework for water resource management, even 
though it "was not in the original mandate" (STRP-12 Report, 2005). Such reframing has the 
potential of redefining wetlands approaches at the more local scale. 
In the day-to-day operation of an MEA, refiaming is often signaled in the setting of agendas 
for future work of the COP and its SAB. Under the most prevalent approach to science policy 
(emphasizing government's influence on the science sector more than the reverse), the process of 
setting research priorities is seen as falling squarely under the responsibility of the policymaker 
(Barker and Peters, 1993; Guston, 2000). According to many models of science policy, the 
government drives the research focus and productivity through the allocation of funds, which 
emphasizes more socially desirable areas of research. At first glance the research agenda of 
SABs at the global level faces similar drivers, with limited manpower and financial resources 
influencing the amount of work that can be carried out. And, indeed, it is often the COP to an 
MEA which will set the pr~orities among the tasks assigned to the SAB. 
Since its 1 993 establishment, the Wetlands Convention's STRP, throughout its many 
incarnations, has played an important role in driving the agenda for future areas of work under 
the Convention. The STRP members are central in identifying thematic areas warranting further 
research. At the end of each triennium, STRP members identify topics warranting investigation 
during the upcoming triennium4'. These are reviewed by the Standing Committee and forwarded 
to the COP for its adoption - under the revised modus operand? (adopted by COP-9 in 
November 2005), this agenda-driving role of the STRP is further enhanced by specifically 
including the identification of high priority areas of work for the next triennium as one of the 
Panel's many responsibilities. 
The STRP has significantly influenced the agenda-setting process by developing new 
terminology for distinguishing the relative importance of tasks in its Work Plan. In particular, 
tasks are divided into those deemed of immediate priority ("which should be initiated by the 
STRP as early as possible in the 2006-2008 triennium using available resources") and those of 
high priority ("which should be initiated during the 2006-2008 triennium as and when the 
resources available to the STRP permit"). The STRP workplan often also identifies tasks of 
lower priority, tasks that fall under the ongoing work of the STRP, and even tasks that should be 
postponed to a subsequent triennium. 
Yet, it is interesting to note that even as the Wetlands Convention has the most explicit 
mechanism for agenda-setting through the SAB, when discussing the issue of agenda-setting, the 
Convention's decision-makers and higher-ranking administrators were more likely to paint a 
picture of a clear-cut top-bottom approach to agenda setting, whereas those directly involved in 
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the STRP more openly acknowledged the indirect ways in which the STRP drives agenda- 
setting. 
Standards and Classifcation 
Much as framing comes into play in defining an MEA's scope and objectives prior to 
implementation, the mere naming of the issue and its components can play a critical role in 
creating new standards, classifications and categories for organizing an MEA. As Geoffrey 
Bowker and Susan Star have explained in Sorting Things Out, classification and standards can 
have far reaching impacts, even if they are often "ordinarily invisible." 
Nominalism can happen throughout the negotiation and implementation of MEAs, and can 
vary in its implications for the broader world beyond the administration of a particular MEA. For 
instance, under the climate regime, assigning the label of "greenhouse gas" to a naturally- 
occurring gas such as carbon dioxide (previously considered inert and inconsequential in the 
realm of pollution) forces it under the scope of regulation and can help to focus attention on its 
emissions. Similarly, under the Rotterdam Convention on PIC, the Interim Chemical Review 
Committee, in examining nominations of several new chemicals for inclusion under the 
Convention's scope, agreed that three should in fact be treated as one class of chemical for the 
purposes of the Convention (ICRC Report, 2002). In this particular context, it is foreseeable that 
such a development would impact not only procedures of global trade but also each Parties' 
chemicals management as well. 
Again under the PIC Convention, negotiators introduced a requirement of "risk evaluation" 
in the Convention's requirement for listing new chemicals. In its interim incarnation' the 
Chemical Review Committee determined that this "risk evaluation" related neither to hazard 
assessment nor to risk assessment - but "something in between." The Interim CRC generated a 
note trying to define this notion, which was forwarded to the INC, to the COP and then back to 
the CRC. In preparing such explanatory materials, the expert Committee is making judgments as 
to which risks are reasonable justification for action, and as to the appropriate norms for 
assessing these risks (discussed in greater detail under methods). 
Yet, nominalism can also hinder implementation progress in the long-run. In the negotiations 
leading up to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Expert Group arduously defined a concept 
of "living modified organism (LMO)" (as opposed to the widely-used "genetically modified 
organism") (Gupta, 2004). In her work, Gupta emphasizes the importance of "ambiguity and 
openness to flexible interpretation," and this same ambiguity contributed to achieving the 
delicate balance necessary for brokering an agreement on the Protocol text, and has also carried 
through to continuing negotiations now that the Protocol has entered into force. 
For instance, at the 2nd Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol in June 2005 
delegates revisited the issue that had, by most accounts, threatened to derail what were already 
delicate negotiations for a Protocol text. The final consensus forged as negotiations threatened to 
collapse related to retaining ambiguity as to the requirement for thresholds for certifying whether 
international shipments contain "LMOs for food, feed or processing (LMO-FFPs)." In this case, 
this ambiguity and flexibility for interpretation led to further confusion as Parties at MOP-2 
lengthily, and to no avail, deliberated trying to reach common ground as to how to determine 
whether shipments should be labeled as containing these LMO-FFPs. 
Yet, an important obstacle to classification by SABs relates to what is often the limited 
applicability of categories developed to fulfill the needs of a specific MEA. Under the Wetlands 
Convention, the STRP has contributed over its tenure to the development of what it refers to as 
"Ramsar terminology." Indeed, at the 1 2 ' ~  meeting of the STRP, in reviewing the wetlands- 
related output of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the STRP acknowledged the limits to 
including this "Ramsar terminology" in a report from another body. Yet, the limitations to such 
classification is illustrated by the STRP's discussion of the evolution of the term "wise use" 
under the Wetlands Convention, and the parallel yet divergent evolution of the "wise use" 
concept in the context of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. 
Similarly, under the climate regime, the IPCC has been instrumental in setting norms for 
classifying the appropriateness of carbon capture projects through the preparation in 2000 of a 
special report on land use, land use cover and forestry. This classification is expected to have 
lasting implications for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol , and especially the potential 
for emissions trading through the Clean Development Mechanism. 
Methods 
Through their work, SABs are building upon and evolving existing norms for assessing and 
validating methods for knowledge production. The evolution of standards of proof, especially in 
the context of courts, has been well documented at the national level (Jasanoff, 1990 and 1995), 
and at the global level SABs are permanently assessing and re-assessing these means of 
producing knowledge, including those arising from experimental investigations, from broader 
assessments and analyses, and from reviews of existing knowledge. Just as framing and 
nominalism is contingent on contributors' values and policy judgments, SAB participants are 
often incorporating their unique combination of perceptions not only of these methods but also of 
broader issues (such as underlying attitudes towards risk) in deciding how to vouch for and 
include the array of different methods relevant to their work. 
At the international level, these divergences over risk have come to the fore in a variety of 
fora, most visibly in the context of a dispute under the World Trade Organization over the EU's 
decision to delay the approval of genetically modified crops (Winickoff et al, 2005). In addition, 
several MEAs have had to openly tackle reconciling what are often widely varying notions of 
risk as they have incorporated structures or requirements for risk assessment as part of their 
implementation, and is generally up to the SAB to ensure these risk assessments are carried out 
appropriately. 
The text of the Stockholm POPs Convention lays out guidelines for risk assessment as part of 
the process for adding chemicals to the Convention's scope and it is the POPs Review 
Committee that determines whether the burden of proof has been met. In effect, Committee 
members are deciding whether long-term risks outweigh short-term benefits, for example 
contrasting the health and environmental implications of long-range transport with the 
socioeconomic implications of regulating or reducing a chemical's use or switching to an 
alternative chemical. This is in turn closely linked to the SAB's membership (discussed at 
greater length in Chapter III), as it is reasonable to expect for example that participants 
representing arctic indigenous communities will give more weight to long-term health effects of 
DDT use while those representing health managers in tropical zones may be more concerned 
with finding, in the short term, viable alternatives to DDT for disease vector management. 
Nevertheless these very individual variations in approaches to risk are impossible to 
generalize according to institutional, disciplinary or national affiliation and are furthermore 
difficult to reflect or account for in any declarations of interests. It is also very challenging to 
reflect these competing frames in the SAB's final output. For example, under the Rotterdam PIC 
Convention, Parties nominating new chemicals for listing are required to submit a risk 
evaluation, but are also given the opportunity to submit risk assessments prepared by another 
body or another Party. Yet, in this latter situation the Party needs to include "bridging" 
information so that the "Committee might determine if the regulatory action was based on a risk 
evaluation involving prevailing conditions in the country." The Chemical Review Committee's is 
not given a framework for assessing the equivalence of prevailing conditions, an assessment, 
which again is linked to just as personal and tacit framings for dealing with uncertainty. 
In some regimes, SABs are also called upon to examine the validity of specific techniques 
and practices, generally through the development of sanctioned best available techniques. Such a 
targeted approach to regulation has also been well-tested at the national level, for example 
through the setting of best available technologies under the Clean Air Act (Switzer, 2004). Yet, 
regulation through the prescription of specific technologies is not without its limitations. For 
example, in the US context, the setting of technology standards has been blamed as a deterrent to 
innovation. In effect, the inevitable regulation lag precludes the availability of markets not only 
for testing and developing these new technologies, but also for making their use economically 
viable. In addition, such prescriptive regulatory approaches can make the decision-making and 
evaluation process susceptible to special interests (Switzer, 2004). 
Under the Stockholm POPs Convention, the role of evaluating and recommending best 
available techniques (BAT) and best environmental practices (BEP) is entrusted to the ad hoc 
BAT/BEP Expert Group, which has a short-term mandate to develop guidelines for reducing the 
production of unintentional POPs (dioxins and furans). When the expert group was established in 
2001, it was broadly acknowledged that much of the necessary expertise relating to these 
cutting-edge technologies rested with many developed country experts and industry 
representatives, and in the end developed country delegates represented 50% of the panel. 
Industry and environmental groups were also each granted two observer seats at the Group's 
meetings, yet several of the Parties' representatives also had strong industry ties. Furthermore, 
the way in which the Expert Group carried out its work differed in many respects from the more 
traditional and transparent SAB process, as prominent members of the Group acted as knowledge 
brokers, in many cases contracting consultants to carry out the necessary research. 
This industry and developed country emphasis came to the fore as Parties to the Convention 
renegotiated and extended the Expert Group's mandate at POPs COP- 1 and developing countries 
highlighted their concern that the Expert Group was not focusing enough on the more affordable 
BATS and BEPs. As the Expert Group continues its deliberations (with a new membership with 
greater developing country participation), it remains to be seen how the experts will reconcile 
these differing interests and develop the necessary guidelines for reducing the production of 
unintentional POPs. 
The most public aspect of the work of many of these SABs relates to the review and 
compilation of the "current state" or "state of the art" of knowledge and research on the issue. 
Yet, as it carries out this task each of these SABs faces several decision moments where 
judgments and assessments of knowledge occur and can in effect signal the legitimation of forms 
and avenues of research. Perhaps the most readily accepted source of knowledge lies in that 
produced through the peer-review process, and these considerations are discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter IV. 
In some SABs, like those of the PIC and POPs Conventions, there is more control over the 
knowledge considered by the C'RC and POPRC. When the POPRC and the CRC begin their 
deliberations it is therefore based on the notifications or nominations presented by Parties. While 
the structure of these applications is laid out in the Convention, the Parties have a great deal of 
latitude in deciding what to include, and the sources on which they rely. Annex 11 of the PIC 
Convention requires that the document demonstrate that the data generated for the application 
have been generated "according to scientifically recognized methods" and that data reviews are 
performed and documented "according to generally recognized scientific principles and 
procedures." 
Under the PIC'S interim phase, the ICRC took the lead in developing the forms to guide 
Parties7 reports and notifications, and set bounds to what constitute such "recognized methods 
and principles. At ICRC-1 a task group was established to examine the format and guidance of 
notification of final regulatory action. Five members of the ICRC were assigned to the task 
group. In its report, the task group notes: "it is therefore of importance to the Committee that the 
information submitted in the notifications is of sufficient quality and relevance to their review of 
the criteria found in annex I1 of the Convention." The work of the task group was carried out 
"off-line" prior to ICRC-2, with a draft work plan and the available documentation circulated to 
the task group members via e-mail - only very few comments were gathered and the Secretariat 
used them to prepare a document as a starting point for further discussion at ICRC-2. 
Under the Ramsar Wetlands Convention, the STRP, especially in its later incarnations, has 
relied on each experts' network of contacts and colleagues to broaden its knowledge base. The 
reach of these networks is extended by the formal involvement of not only the Wetlands 
Convention's intemational organization partners (such as Wetlands International and BirdLife) 
but also the increasing number of other intemational organizations that have been invited to take 
part in STRP meetings. The influence of the knowledge production process by the STRP reaches 
beyond the scope of the Wetlands Convention - as the STRP is increasing its involvement in 
other science assessments (for example the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment) or in 
cooperative ventures with other Conventions (in particular the CBD). 
These SABs are also playing a significant role in validating methods and practices. Under the 
Ozone Regime, the role of the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee in reviewing the 
suitability of critical use nominations in practice is validating specific methods for agriculture 
and fumigation. Similarly, the IPCC has played a key role in driving the methodology for 
compiling greenhouse gas inventories under the UNFCCC. 
A GLOBAL SCIENCE CONSENSUS 
Throughout all of these aspects of knowledge production, the most significant outcome of the 
SAB is in fact the brokering of a consensus on the science that is used as a basis for policy 
negotiations in the COP. The UN system has long operated under consensus decision-making 
rules (see box 11.1) and research on consensus building has emphasized the importance of 
decision-making based on agreed-upon information (Sebenius and Geanakoplos, 2005) - 
especially in the context of technically complex problems (McCreary, 1999; O'Riordan and 
Jordan, 1996). 
Box 11.1 : Consensus Decision-making Rules in MEA 
Decision-making by consensus has long been the norm in MEAs, and calls for all Parties 
need to be in agreement for a decision to be accepted. Such an approach favors the status quo, 
since it requires all Parties to be in agreement to accept a change, and also insulates the decision- 
making process from outside (non-Party) influences (Susskind, 1 994). 
This approach to decision-making is often criticized for bringing about a so-called "lowest 
common-denominator7' approach whereby agreement is only brokered to reflect the lowest 
standard of all Parties involved. 
Some have expressed frustration with this requirement for consensus, blaming it for only 
being able to effectuate change through "baby steps," and many of the more recently brokered 
MEAs include provisions for 213 ma-jority decision-making in their rules of procedure. Yet, in a 
A 
catch-22 situation, consensus among Parties is required for such a rule to take into effect and 
even if the issue has been opened for discussion in several fora, the proposed rule remains 
bracketed (i-e. it is still on the table as an option, but not agreed upon) in most MEA's rules of 
procedure42. 
Similarly, most SABs to MEAs also provide for consensus decision-making, although some 
do include the opportunity for 2/3 majority rule (for example the PIC and POPS Conventions), 
and such a step then requires special attention to be paid to the inclusion of minority views. 
This expectation of consensus is in fact denounced by Collingridge and Reeve as one of the 
myths of powerful science, and at its root the scientific process is often set up in an adversarial 
mode (van Buruen and Edelenbos, 1 990; Jasanoff, 1990; Jasanoff, 1 995), where diverging 
streams of knowledge compete with consensus cast as what some see as an unattainable goal 
(Jasanoff and Wynne, 1 998). 
Under more controlled consensus-building efforts, problems arising out of adversary science 
are most often dealt with through "joint fact finding." As described in the Consensus Building 
Handbook, stakeholders are involved - with vetted experts - in framing the research question 
and often oversee necessary data collection (Ehrman and Stinson, 1999). 
BROKERING A SCIENCE CONSENSUS 
In the global context, several scholars have underscored the importance of MEA SABs as 
consensus brokers (Carmth and Gordstein, 2004), especially as relating to their impacts on 
climate negotiations (van der Sluijs et al, 1998; Shackley and Skodvin, 1995). While the 
outcome expected from SABs is a consensus on the state of the science, the process of arriving at 
this consensus involves overcoming constraints rarely addressed in the study of negotiation and 
consensus building. There are in fact many challenges to be overcome as SABs strive to produce 
not only a science consensus, but a science consensus that will be valid and sustainable. 
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The notion of crafting agreement on "objective" facts is an established means of resolving 
disputes (Fisher and Ury, 19911, yet most environmental challenges warranting action by MEAs 
deal with problems for which the separation between "objective science fact" and "subjective 
policy option" is rarely clear. Indeed, issues such as climate change, ozone depletion, 
biodiversity depletion, biosafety, wetlands and chemicals management fall largely in the 
category of post-normal (high uncertainty, high decision stakes) knowledge (Funtowitz and 
Ravetz, 1992). As a result, policy considerations will inevitably be drawn into many of the SAB 
deliberations for a science consensus, and furthermore, many of the more politically-salient 
aspects of the consensus will be vulnerable to renegotiation under the COP'S policy-negotiations. 
Also, while negotiation theory often encourages efforts to broaden the universe of possible 
outcomes, negotiations for a science consensus will be limited by the constraint of achieving a 
valid outcome, or what William Moomaw describes in his commentary on joint fact finding in 
the Consensus Building Handbook as "scientifically accurate" (Susskind et al. 1999). Indeed, 
while it is possible that political pressures within an SAB could generate consensus on an invalid 
output, such an output would be too vulnerable to expert-based criticism to be able to serve as a 
basis for MEA decision-making. 
In addition, to serve as a useful basis for decision-making, a science consensus needs to be 
sustainable, or what Moomaw describes as a "politically acceptable." To be sustainable, a 
science consensus must benefit from sufficient buy-in from stakeholders so that it will maintain 
credibility in the decision-making process and not require full renegotiation under the COP 
process. One could envision an output which, while valid, does not benefit from the support of 
stakeholders involved in the COP and thus will not be viable as a basis for decision-making. 
In brokering this science consensus, SAB participants are operating in a manner similar to 
that of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States, where, as Stephen Hilgartner 
describes, committees in the end present "a single, unified voice [ ] forged out of many, diverse 
ones" (Hilgartner, 2000). Different SABs have taken varied paths in striving for a consensus 
outcome, yet in most cases SAB members to begin, in one format or another, by presenting their 
views and positions to other members, and identifying common ground. 
Most often, the Secretariat, in some cases in close cooperation with the SAB leadership, will 
compile information and prepare a starting point, akin to a conflict assessment, for the SAB's 
"negotiations." This will generally outline areas of agreement, or at the least areas of perceived 
agreement. The SAB members then have the opportunity to present their views on this starting 
point, reinforcing areas of agreement, and presenting areas of disagreement. 
Beyond the presentation of disagreements, rather than dive into the details of these 
divergence of view points, most successful SABs will next, instead of seeking agreement on 
contentious issues, set out to find an accord on a means of evaluating, assessing or classifying the 
matter at hand. This can often occur through the creation of boundary concepts (Guston), tools 
(for measurement or classification) that are often collaboratively developed and can be used by 
experts from different disciplines. 
For example, under the Rotterdam PIC Convention, members of the Interim Chemical 
Review Committee, and now those of the Chemical Review Committee, have collaborated on the 
development of guidelines for assessing requirements for "risk evaluation" as required in the 
Clonvention text. The ICRC determined that this related neither to hazard assessment nor to risk 
assessment - but "something in between." The ICRC generated a note trying to define this 
notion, which was forwarded to the INC, to the COP and then back to the CRC. In preparing 
such explanatory materials, the expert Committee is first developing agreement on the means of 
evaluating the risks of these chemicals, and it is then based on this common ground that they will 
evaluate country's nominations for chemical listings. 
Such interim negotiations also include, for example, the widespread use of the concept of 
Global Warming Potential (GWP) in the IPCC's work. In addition, much of the work of the 
IPCC is based on predictions arising from Global Circulation Models, and experts first had to 
reach agreement on norms for these models and the emission targets to use in running these 
models. Similarly, under the Ramsar Wetlands Convention, the STRP has contributed to the 
development of what they call "Ramsar Terminology," which has been used in their 
development of advice on management plans, and in particular in defining the concept of "wise 
use." 
Once these common concepts have been crafted, SAB experts can apply them to areas of 
disagreement. The resulting science consensus in fact often involves agreement about likelihoods 
or risks associated with specific outcomes or actions. SABs also vary in the way in which they 
deal with dissenting views in brokering and presenting this science consensus. In negotiating the 
terms of reference of the POPS Convention, delegates discussed a procedure for including 
minority views. In effect, some aspects of the consensus outputs of some these SABs also 
constitute a "dissensus reports," outlining agreement on areas of disagreement (Hilgartner, 
2000). 
Representative membership and a flexible and transparent process are two organizational 
aspects of an SAB which will help ensure that an SAB can produce a valid and sustainable 
science consensus, and these are described in greater detail in Chapters I11 and IV. 
LIMITA'TIONS OF A GLOBAL SCIENCE CONSENSUS 
Even if a valid and sustainable science consensus is achieved, it does not guarantee 
successful uptake in the policy arena. Under the consensus driven UN, it is possible for even just 
a few Parties or a minority coalition to stall proceedings (Sebenius, 1994). Nevertheless, a more 
valid and sustainable consensus will make it more difficult for those minorities to successfully 
present their concerns as relating to the science process (Hilgaher, 2000), and in a world where 
the same delegates and Parties are engaged in many parallel negotiations it will become difficult 
for Parties to stall negotiations if they can not present what others would perceive as legitimate 
concerns. 
Under the Rotterdam PIC Convention, an otherwise successfkl science consensus met 
resistance from a small number of Parties when it came to approving the addition of chrysotile 
asbestos to the PIC procedure. In its interim incarnation, the Interim Chemical Review 
Committee (ICRC) reviewed nominations for 19 chemicals over five meetings. For some 
chemical notifications forwarded to them by the Secretariat, the ICRC members agreed that the 
nomination did not meet all the requirements set out under the Convention. In such cases, the 
ICRC Chair reported to the INC on the Committee's work relating to that chemical but did not 
forward any recommendation as to its listing. When the ICRC members reviewed a chemical's 
nomination and agreed to recommend the chemical for inclusion in the interim PIC procedure, 
they then prepared draft decision guidance documents for each chemical and forwarded the 
document to the INC for its adoption. In some situations, the ICRC recommended that the 
chemical they reviewed not be included in the interim PIC procedure. 
From the perspective of decision-makers, the stakes in preventing or ensuring the listing of a 
chemical differ between the PIC and POPS Convention. At first examination, making a chemical 
subject to the PIC procedure should not have many implications for contracting Parties, as listing 
only leads to notification and documentation requirements and does not set limits on the 
production, use or trade of chemicals. Yet, many delegates see a chemical's listing under the PIC 
Convention as recognition of a chemical's hazardous nature and consider it a "first step" towards 
further restrictions on its production and use. The inclusion of a chemical in the PIC procedure 
can also impact negotiations under way in other fora, for example relating to trade disputes under 
the World Trade 
In contrast, listing a chemical under the Stockholm POPs Convention does imply the setting 
of restrictions on its production and use and could have clear socio-economic and even health 
implication, especially as relating to the availability and affordability of  alternative^^^. In 
addition, there is a provision under the POPs Convention which allows Parties who chose to do 
so to be automatically bound by the addition of chemicals to the POPs Convention without 
having to ratify the amendment, and as such many Parties are likely to scrutinize all the more 
closely any proposals for additions to the Convention. 
In most instances in the course of the ICRC's mandate, these draft Decision Guidance 
Documents were adopted by the TNC with minimal debate. At INC-7 in November 2000, 
delegates adopted Decision Guidance Documents on ethylene dichloride and ethylene oxide. At 
INC-9 in October 2002, delegates adopted Decision Guidance Documents on monocrotophos. At 
INC-10 in November 2003, delegates approved the inclusion to the interim PIC procedure of 
amosite, actinolite, anthophyllite, and tremolite asbestos; DNOC (Dinitro-ortho-cresol) and its 
salts; and dustable powder formulations of benomyl, carbofuran and thiram. At INC-11, held 
43 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop _e/envir-elenvir-backgmdUe/c8s2_e.htm 
44 Of the POPs "dirty dozen," the need for alternatives to DDT for malaria-vector control led to the inclusion of 
special provisions in the Convention text. 
immediately prior to PIC COP-1 in September 2005, delegates approved the Decision Guidance 
Document for the inclusion of tetraethyl and tetramethyl lead into the interim PIC procedure. 
However, the inclusion of chrysotile asbestos in the interim PIC procedure was discussed at 
both INC-10 and INC- 1 1 without achieving consensus. The issue of chrysotile asbestos was first 
taken up by the ICRC at its third meeting, along with the addition of the other four forms of 
asbestos noted above, based on notifications of final regulatory action from Australia, Chile, the 
European Community and the Czech Republic. A task group was established at INC-8 to review 
the notifications, and after discussing their report and deciding to recommend the five forms of 
asbestos for inclusion in the interim PIC procedure, ICRC-3 established a drafting group to 
prepare the Decision Guidance Document for approval at ICRC-4. This recommendation and 
draft Decision Guidance Document was next considered for approval at INC- 10. 
At INC-10, after the Secretariat introduced the ICRC7s communication on asbestos, many 
countries and observers45 supported including amosite, actinolite, anthophyllite, tremolite and 
chrysotile forms of asbestos in the interim PIC procedure. However, Canada supported 
postponing a decision on chrysotile asbestos, so as to enable the completion of its national 
consultations on the substance. The Russian Federation, the Ukraine and several developing 
countries were of the position that the chemical not be included in the interim PIC procedure on 
the basis of insufficient scientific information. 
At ICRC-5, a contact group was convened to focus in particular on alternatives to 
chrysotile asbestos, and at INC-11, the draft Decision Guidance Document on chrysotile asbestos 
was resubmitted to delegates for their review. Many countries supported listing chrysotile 
asbestos, especially as all criteria for inclusion had been met and procedures had been followed 
45 NGO support for listing chrysotile asbestos on this case expanded beyond the traditional coalitions of 
environmental NGCk to include trade unions as well. 
correctly. Yet, a coalition of countries with economies in transition (the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) opposed the inclusion of chrysotile asbestos, on the basis 
of the lack of scientific data, especially relating to threshold levels and effects on human 
population. Canada also opposed the inclusion of chrysotile asbestos, citing especially the lack of 
scientific evidence pointing to safer alternatives to the substance. In the end, compromise was 
unattainable, and the substance was not listed in the interim PIC procedure. As delegates 
informally discussed this impasse, many acknowledged the high economic significance of 
chrysotile asbestos to a handful of countries but were concerned that such concentrated economic 
interests might, in the long run, undermine the goals of the PIC Convention. 
After COP-1, three new notifications on chrysotile asbestos (from Australia, Latvia and 
Switzerland) were received by the Secretariat, and a task group on the substance was established 
prior to the first meeting of the CRC. Again, the Committee decided to recommend the 
Chemical's listing and prepared a decision guidance document for submission to PIC COP-2, at 
which Ukraine cited the CRC process as a reason for not including chrysotile asbestos in the PIC 
procedure (underlining that CRC decision-making should only occur by consensus, while its 
present terms of reference allow for two thirds-majority rule). At the CRC meeting, two experts 
opposed the recommendation to include chrysotile asbestos, with one expert proposing any 
decision await the release of an expected report on the chemical from the World Health 
Organization. 
At PIC COP-2, consensus was again impossible on this contentious issue but it is likely that, 
since the large majority of Parties support this inclusion, the issue will continue to be revisited 
and as the scientific process (within the CRC, but also under other international bodies) gains 
legitimacy. and as political pressures are put to bear, the position of minority opponents is likely 
to becotne inore difficult to present. 
CONCLUSION 
SABs to MEAs are more than simply assessors of knowledge tasked with colnmunicating a 
review of information to the COP. Rather, in hlfilling their mandate SABs generally become 
sites of knowledge production in themselves, contributing to the framing of questions and to the 
developments of standards, classification and methods. In addition, perhaps the foremost role of 
SABs as knowledge producers has become their importance as a loci for brokering a consensus 
on matters of science. 
Parties are looking to SABs to produce a consensus as a basis for negotiations in the COP. 
While of course SABs will vary in their organization and in their success, most often this 
consensus is brokered by first identifying areas of common ground, and then these SAB 
members (who bring to the table different backgrounds, disciplines and theoretical groundings) 
often develop means and methods which they can then apply to areas of "dissensus." The norms 
and procedures drawn upon in reaching this consensus can vary, and include the rigors of peer 
review and the development of a common metric for assessing uncertainty. 
This thesis proposes that the key role of the SAB relates to brokering a consensus on the 
science which is both valid and sustainable. This output is dependent on both a flexible and 
transparent process and representative membership among experts involved. This latter 
requirement is described in Chapter 111. 
CHAPTER 111: REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERSHIP 
The growing awareness of the social constructjon of science (Wynne, 1996; Jasanoff, 1990) 
has drawn increasing attention to the individuals involved in providing science advice for policy- 
making. This marks a significant shift from the long-standing norms of the science community, 
which in practice encourages the decoupling of the scientist from her output - most clearly 
evidenced by he process of blind peer-review. Furthermore, when the science community seeks 
its most qualified contributors, it again relies on long-standing criteria46 of excellence that rarely 
capture scientists' more personal attributes. 
There are several reasons why such an elitist approach to science advice does not generate a 
sustainable consensus to serve as the basis for global environmental decision-making. The first 
relates to the limitation of relying on publication records as a metric for expertise. Albeit 
ingrained in modem scientific practice, the process of peer-review also suffers fkom often 
highlighted drawbacks, including a systematic prejudice to non-mainstream views (Edwards and 
Schneider, 200 1 ; Jasanoff, 1990) 
In addition, the use of publication in prestigious peer-reviewed publications as a metric for 
success constitutes a bias towards English language output and against interdisciplinary 
scholarship which may not be as readily accepted by well-established (and often discipline 
specific) journals. Furthermore, the recognition of a scientists' affiliation with renowned 
academic institutions leads in practice to an underrepresentation of experts from most 
countries47. 
46 These criteria include a scientist's publication record and prestige of affiliation. 
47 According to the 2005 World Ranking of World Universities published by the Institute for Higher Education of 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, the top 20 universities are all in the USA, except for the 2 in the UK and one in 
Japan; in the top 60 there are no institutions from the developing world listed in the top 60, which is again 
dominated by US  institutions. 
The identity of those providing science advice also becomes a crucial element of the SAB, 
especially when acknowledging the SAB7s central duty of brokering a global science consensus 
(see Chapter 11). Indeed, ensuring that all stakeholders are represented in a negotiation is one of 
the tenets of consensus building. (Forester, 1999; Susskind, 1994; Susskind and Thomas-Lamer, 
1999). 
This chapter will investigate whether representative membership is indeed crucial to 
achieving a valid and sustainable consensus on science advice in the MEA context. I propose that 
several aspects of diversity can lead to increases in both the validity and sustainability of the 
resulting consensus. Striving for representative membership of the SAB composition, in effect 
seeking to reflect interests of a broad range of relevant stakeholders, could include ensuring 
representation from a broader array of countries and institutional affiliations, while ensuring as 
well disciplinary diversity, input from local and traditional knowledge, and a variation in 
experts' more personal attributes (including for example age, gender and political views). 
CONSTRAINTS TO REPRESENTATIVE MEMBESHIP 
If representative membership is necessary for a sustainable consensus, one could envision 
that the SAB output will be accepted by all stakeholders - as long as all stakeholders take part in 
the SAB! Yet, MEA administrators face significant logistical and financial hurdles in 
establishing SABs, which in practice require the making of choices between different levels of 
diversity. The first of these constraints is the size of the SAB, and decision-makers are often keen 
to cap the size of science bodies, with a variety of justifications. 
The first of these justifications is grounded in negotiation research - a larger group is certain 
to become unruly in trying to negotiate a consensus on matters of science. In addition, larger 
panels can preclude benefits arising from less structured dialogues. This notion of small 
committee work is well established at the national level, where experts are quick to highlight the 
potential for resolving differences in a more personal context, and the benefits arising from the 
flexibility to meet in smaller groups are discussed at greater length in Chapter IV. 
This logistical freedom is also highlighted as the justification for keeping such deliberations 
to a single language and avoiding the necessary structure and formality of simultaneous 
translation. While many developing countries in particular highlight the need for providing such 
interpretation, opponents highlight not only the logistical concerns of such a measure but also its 
budgetary implications (see box 111.1). 
Box 111.1 : What Is the Universal Language of Science ? 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the prevalence of English as the language of choice for 
international science meetings was rarely questioned. Beyond the underlying budgetary and 
logistical concern favoring unilingual deliberations, this preconception was reinforced by the 
assumption that individuals with the required level of expertise and academic recognition would 
de facto be sufficiently proficient in English so as to be published in leading journals in their 
field. As processes such as the IPCC, the MBTOC and the chemicals regimes have increasingly 
emphasized participation by developing country experts, experts' language skills are increasingly 
s c r ~ t i n i z e d ~ ~ .  
As countries select candidates for nomination to these science advisory bodies, many 
developing country representatives deplore the need to trade off between those experts with the 
most relevant specific expertise and those who could interact most successfUlly in English. For 
example, under the Ramsar Wetlands Convention the lack of full participation by some of the 
STRP members (including through the web interface prior to meetings and during the meeting 
itself) was blamed in great part on those experts' limited English skills. 
In the context of the negotiation of the terms of reference for the PIC and POPS Conventions' 
Review Committees, operating language was again an issue that was difficult to resolve, in fact 
developing countries' strong stand on this point surprised several veteran negotiators. In the 
J 8 In several interviews, this lack of language skill has been flagged as the key constraint to effective participation by 
developing country experts. 
negotiations on the terms of reference for the POPs Review Committee (deliberations began in 
2002, only to be resolved at the 1" meeting of the COP in May 2005), participants in the contact 
group had reached consensus in 2002 that POPRC meetings would be held in English only. Yet 
the issue was reopened at the next meeting of the INC in July 2003. Similar disagreements on 
language of operation arose at the 1" COP meeting of the Rotterdam PIC Convention. 
At PIC COP- 1, even though the Interim CRC had carried out its work only in English, 
developing countries pressed for interpretation at meetings. Developed countries underscored the 
costs of such services, highlighting as well the difficulty of providing competent interpretation 
for such highly technical material. 
In the end, PIC COP-1 delegates agreed that "the operational arrangements relating to 
language used for the interim Chemical Review Committee, having worked well, shall continue 
for the Chemical Review Committee." Indeed this compromise solution agreeing that 
deliberations be carried out in a single language, but without specifying that that language be 
English, satisfied demands of francophone and hispanophone delegations in particular. A similar 
compromise was reached in June 2005 at the 2nd Meeting of the Parties of the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety, agreeing that the language of operation of the Compliance Committee be one of the 
six UN languages, without specifying which one. 
The issue of language of operation was again raised at POPs COP-1 in May 2005. In the 
contact group deliberations on the issue, the Chinese representative argued that English only 
operation would limit full and effective participation by some experts, and noted that it would 
dilute the expertise taking part in the Committee's work - asking if a degree in English Literature 
should be considered on par with adequate scientific credentials as a prerequisite for 
participation. Nevertheless, on the strength of budgetary concerns the issue was seemingly 
resolved in the contact group - which opted for English as the language of operation. 
However, the issue was again raised in plenary. On this issue, many developing countries, 
with the unexpected support of Canada, argued that simultaneous translation should be provided 
in light of the significant policy and economic implications of POPRC decisions. After 
forwarding these concerns to a parallel budget group, delegates agreed to provide simultaneous 
translation into the 6 UN languages, on the condition that POPRC meetings be held in Geneva, 
the seat of the Secretariat where the necessary qualified interpreters could be hired at minimum 
cost (by avoiding the expense of transportation and per diem). 
This 1 lth hour development surprised many, yet confirms the trend of providing 
simultaneous translation for science deliberations perceived as being more prone to "policy 
contamination." Indeed, this model is replicated in the context of the IPCC - where the bulk of 
Working Group work is carried out in English only but where plenary meetings and deliberations 
to approve summaries for policymakers and synthesis reports are carried out with simultaneous 
translation. 
Budgetary concerns over the size of these SABs relate not only to operational costs, but also 
are tied to the proportion of the body's experts from developing countries or countries with 
economies in transition. As is the case of committees at the US national level for example, 
experts participate under a pro hono arrangement- and their employers are expected to account 
for the time necessary for their participation in such efforts. At the MEA level, experts' 
nominating countries or employers are also expected to bear their cost of attendance. Since this 
was often blamed for the lack of participation by developing country experts, many MEAs have 
committed to covering the cost of attendance for experts from developing countries and from 
countries with economies in transition. Consequently, discussions on the size and membership of 
SABs have clearly laid out these budgetary implications. Furtermore, this is often framed as an 
inevitable trade-off between the "best" expertise and the buy-in from Parties (Cash et al, 2003). 
The availability of experts can also challenge efforts to convene a representative SAB. The 
burden of time and effort put on each expert is further accentuated by the fact that many experts 
will often serve on multiple SABs, and that SAB work can conflict with preexisting 
commitments related to their full-time employment (be it in academia, the government, the 
private sector or civil society). 
Nevertheless, participation in these SABs does confer prestige and can assist experts in 
developing essential networks and, similarly to what occurs in the context of academic peer 
review, already over-extended experts will still accept membership on multiple SABs. These 
many co~nmitments can also hinder the possibility of scheduling face-to-face meetings. For 
example, under the Biodiversity Regime, the proliferation of ad hoe expert groups has limited 
opportunities for meetings to be held - to the point that at a June 2005 meeting of legal experts 
only one five-day window was available for scheduling a follow-up meeting in the next ten 
months49. 
Experts' potential conflicts of interests can also complicate any discussions of diversity, as it 
can significantly decrease the pool of available experts - this is particularly relevant for SABs of 
MEAs whose decisions have implications especially for the industrial sector (Krimsky et al, 
1996). 
The notion of size as a validator of science advice is most visible in the work of the IPCC. 
With each assessment released by the IPCC, the increasing number of contributing authors has 
been heavily underscored5'. This is perhaps linked to the theory that the best indicator of the 
scientific consensus and its legitimacy relates to the buy-in by the science community. In 
Protecting the Ozone Layer, Edward Parson introduced the notion of critical mass, while in 
Saving the Mediterranean, Peter Haas used the notion of epistemic communities to explain the 
impetus arising from consensus from a broad scientific community. This focus on size as an 
indicator of consensus is further bolstered by the fact that claims about the number of 
contributing authors to the IPCC are the first to be attacked by so-called "climate skeptics" - 
most notably Bjorn Lomborg who in The Skeptical Environmentalist notes that: "The IPCC's 
reports are often referred to in the press as the result of the work of 2,000 scientists, but if you 
49 This was discussed at the First meeting of the ad hoc Working Group on Liability and Redress in May 2005. 
50 Based on Secretariat documents distributed at IPCC-22. November 2004. 
count, there are only some 80 main authors - and only a smaller number of these actually worked 
on the climate models." 
Limits to the size of SABs also arise out of delegates' political concerns. From a strategic 
perspective, if the SAB produces an output which counters a Party's or a coalition's interests, it 
is much easier to oppose the outcome if it is possible to blame the lack of representation on the 
SAB (Hilgartner, 2000). This type of "insurance" is most easily achieved by limiting the size of 
the S A B ~  ' . 
Yet, even if a larger SAB can strengthen the durability of a science consensus, it will always 
be constrained by considerations described above, and as such characteristics of the restricted 
number of experts taking part in the SAB become essential in addressing a SAB's output. The 
goal then becomes to ensure that all the key stakeholders' interests are reflected in some way in 
the SAB's membership. It is important to underscore here that stakeholders apply to more than 
just an MEA's contracting Parties, but applies more broadly to those affected not only by the 
environmental problem, but also by its potential solutions, interests often represented by non- 
governmental entities. 
ACHIEVING REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERSHIP 
There are many criteria according to which experts could be selected or defined as 
representing specific stakeholders. Each of these criteria have, in cases described in greater detail 
below, have contributed to increases in the SAB outcome's validity and sustainability, and 
conversely, deficiencies relating to each of these types of diversity have hindered both validity 
and sustainability. In practice the negotiation of representativeness guidelines is limited by the 
fact that each expert will exhibit different combinations of criteria (for example a male expert 
5 '  This tactic was highlighted by several interviewees (from the secretariat and from Parties) discussing SABs under 
the POPS Convention. 
from an and African developing country, working for an industrial organization, specializing in 
the use of DDT) and first brokering a consensus on the body's membership is key to achieving a 
consensus on the science. Even if agreement is reached on what would be the ideal make-up - 
the nomination process is often not designed to best achieve is the desired outcome. Indeed, how 
is one nominating party or coalition putting forth candidates for only one or a few slot expected 
to achieve "representation" on so many levels? 
When deciding on how a small group of experts can provide advice suitable for a much 
broader population, it is difficult not to think of these experts' roles in terms of their delegated 
authority similar to that seen in democratic governance (as presented in Sheila Jasanoff s "(No?) 
Accounting for Expertise"). And, even though there is limited equivalent of global democratic 
governance, the question of experts' representativeness at the MEA level is no less salient. 
Indeed, every time an SAB is put in place, its creators face the challenge of ensuring such a small 
committee represents the whole world- or at least is constituted in such a way that the whole 
world recognizes the legitimacy of the SAB's output. 
In negotiating the diversity of an SAB, the discourse stretches to varying degrees across 
MEAs beyond mere national representation. Yet, even if the bulk of negotiations of SAB 
composition have focused on issues of geographic representation (and more specifically national 
and economic diversity), I propose here that several kinds of diversity can enhance (and their 
absence can hinder) the outcome's validity and sustainability, and these include national and 
economic diversity, regional diversity, institutional diversity, disciplinary diversity, and 
"personal" diversity (including gender, age and political views). 
National and economic diversity 
Two concepts commonly used to achieve diversity are based on experts' nationalities: 
national and economic diversity, and indeed an expert's nationality, and the economic 
development of that expert's country of origin have been the central consideration for 
negotiation an SABs membership in a11 the cases studied for this thesis. This emphasis on an 
expert's geographic region of origin is closely tied to the UN-system of ensuring geographic 
representation at all stages of governance, even if, as described in Box 111.2, there is a variation 
in the way in which regions are classified in different intergovernmental organizations. 
BOX 111.2: A Regional Basis for Membership 
Before discussing the distribution and extent of membership of the CRC, delegates at COP-1 
had to reach agreement on the composition of the PIC regions. Deciding to use the F A 0  regions 
as the interim PIC regions had been an uncontroversial decision - and many at COP-1 were 
taken by surprise when the notion of using F A 0  regions as the PIC regions met with substantial 
resistance at the outset of COP- 1. 
This opposition to the notion of FA0 regions was based on several factors. First of all, 
several countries voiced concerns relating to how these regions would combine in effect with the 
limited number of Parties to the Convention at COP-1. Due to the Convention's early state of 
ratification, in practice it would mean that some regions might have only a handful of Parties 
vying for seats. This in turn led to concerns of fairness - member Parties fiom regions with fewer 
Parties would essentially be guaranteed a seat on any CRC based on FA0 regions, while those 
from regions with many Parties would rarely have a chance to send a member to the CRC. 
The second root of resistance to using the F A 0  regions stemmed from the fact that many 
delegates new to the PIC process attended COP-1, marking the Convention's entry into force and 
preparing for the high-level segment scheduled for the last two days of the COP. Many of the 
delegates sent were in fact attached to their country's UN mission in Geneva and as such were 
less familiar with the concept of F A 0  regions. 
Many of the developed countries favored the use of F A 0  regions as they saw their use as 
facilitating the trigger process, which requires notifications from two separate regions before a 
is considered by the CRC, asserting that this requirement would be met more 
countries were spread across more regions. Nevertheless, early into PIC COP-1 
a compromise to usc the UN regions as guidelines for the PIC regions and this 
point for the deliberations of the contact group on establishing the CRC. 
Assurances for national and economic diversity among an SAB's experts can increase the 
resulting outcome's sustainability by facilitating buy-in from a wide range of stakeholders. In 
addition to increasing the apparent legitimacy of the process, such diversity can also heighten the 
likelihood of Party negotiator's having access to experts who have served on the SAB and can in 
turn report directly report on the SAB process. Diversity of experts7 developed- or developing- 
country status can also impact the validity and sustainability of the resulting science advice by 
increasing the likelihood that any resulting advice will be better tailored to developing country 
needs and particular conditions. 
By focusing on national diversity, policy-makers will seek an appropriate model for 
representing all the Parties to the MEA - often proportionate to the number of Parties from any 
given regional division under the MEA. This falls under the model of direct representation where 
each entity is at the national level - i.e. no matter the size, or role played in the environmental 
problem concerned, each country will be granted equivalent access to the SAB. Economic 
diversity relates to representing the interests of groups of countries according to their level of 
economic development, rather than the countries themselves. Under this scheme, one might seek 
to give equivalent voices to developed and developing countries, and to ensure all levels of 
economics development are represented. Such consideration often ensures that the broad 
negotiation coalitions playing out in COP negotiations are replicated in the science negotiations, 
for example through sufficient representation by experts from countries of the Group of 
77lChina. 
The MEA system is inevitably country-based, and the easiest way to develop the SAB is to 
have countries directly nominate members - with the underlying assumption that countries will 
ensure that any predefined nonns of "expertise" are met prior to the nomination. Any other 
aspects of diversity become more difficult to apply as countries as nominators are not conducive 
to achieving disciplinary, institutional or gender diversity. When each country is only nominating 
a few experts (in most cases one52) how then can they practically strive for such diversity? 
The recent negotiations to establish chemical review committees for both the PIC and POPs 
Conventions illustrate how these concerns over both national and economic diversity can play 
out in practice and affect the outcome. Prior to the PIC Convention's entry into force, an Interim 
Chemical Review Committee (ICRC) was established, using the FA0 regions as a framework for 
membership (see Box 111.1). The success of this interim process was unprecedented, as the COP 
was in a position, at its first meeting already, to approve the addition of 14 chemicals and 
pesticides to the purview of the Convention. And, as delegates negotiated the membership of the 
permanent Chemical Review Committee, many acknowledged the importance of replicating the 
success of the ICRC, with several using this "right balance" of experts as a basis for negotiating 
the composition of the CRC. 
However, just as ongoing negotiations to finalize the composition of the POPs Review 
Committee under the Stockholm POPs Convention had struggled to reconcile the Convention 
requirement of "equitable geographic distribution, including ensuring a balance between 
developed and developing nations." Sharp differences predictably arose when the time came to 
reconcile their differing notions of "equitable geographic distribution" and "balance between 
developed and developing countries" in both the PIC and POPs setting. At POPs INC-6, contact 
52 Under the PIC and POPs Conventions, all Parties within a regional group need to first agree on which Parties will 
nominate experts to serve on the Review Committee. 
group delegates wrestled with the concept of "equitable geographic distribution," and did not 
even get to the point of negotiating specific numbers until PIC COP-153. One cannot ignore that 
in parallel to these deliberations on the POPRC, INC-6 delegates did reach agreement on the 
establishment of a time-limited expert group on the BAT/BEP guidance54, with a membership of 
37 experts (with 15 from developed countries, 18 from developing countries, and four seats for 
observers shared equally by industry and environmental NGOs). Yet, when it was suggested that 
equitable geographic distribution in the POPRC might be fulfilled through a similar near 50150 
split between developed and developing country representatives, several prominent 
representatives made it clear that such a membership scheme would never be considered 
"geographically representative of the world today" - signaling that indeed such an arrangement 
would not benefit from the necessary buy-in from developing country Parties. 
These concerns played out at POPs COP-1 where the results of the ad hoc Expert Group on 
BAT/BEP were not readily accepted by Parties and the terms of reference for such an expert 
group were instead renegotiated on the basis of the compromise composition of the PIC CRC 
and POPRC. Several developing country Parties resisted acknowledging the results of the 
BAT/BEP group on the grounds that the recommended technologies and practices did not reflect 
an awareness of developing country conditions, constraints and feasibility. Similarly, under the 
Ozone regime, whose goal of 50150 participation of developed and developing country experts 
was use as inspiration for those BATIBEP terms of references, the outcome of committees, 
especially of the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee (MBTOC), were poorly 
received by the COP, with the lack of participation by developing country experts often raised as 
problematic. 
- 
3 Based on attendance of contact group deliberations at POPs INC-6, POPs INC-7 and PIC COP-1. 
54 This expert group was tasked with preparing a report on best practices and alternatives for avoiding dioxins. 
At the PIC COP-1 negotiations of the CRC membership, delegates came up with several 
options for distributing membership across the regions, based on a variety of rationales (see table 
III.l), with the "successful" model of the ICRC serving as one of the starting points for 
discussion. In the end, the contact group reported these many options for distributing 
membership to the administrative plenary session at COP-1 (the Committee of the Whole 
(COW)), and a small group of the Friends of the Chair was tasked with achieving a compromise, 
agreeing on a formula for a numerical outcome which, in the words of Maria Celina de Azevedo 
Rodrigues, Chair of the COW, left all Parties "equally unhappy5'." Having devoted much of their 
time coming to an outcome on the numerical make-up of the Committee (and on the rotation of 
such members - the contact group got caught up in surreal discussions of how to divide odd 
numbers of experts by 2), little attention was devoted at PIC COP-1 to other aspects of the 
CRC's functioning. 
55 While the discussions at the surface focused only on the number of experts from each region, the discussions were 
also constrained by two developed-country Parties who, while not having any preference relating to regional 
representation, did prefer limits to be placed on the size of the committee due to budgetary concerns. 
Proposal \members per region 
Contact Group Chair's proposal (loosely 
based on the # of countries in each regions) 
ICRC 
(as presented by Secretariat) 
By # of Parties in each region (Developed 
country) 
Assume each seat represents 6 Parties 
("mathematical" approach) 
Based on ICRC, but more for CElTs 
(ICRC member) 
Even numbers 
(latin American country) 
Western 
Europe 
and 
Others 
5 
7 
8 
5 
7 
8 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
6 
Eastern 
Europe 
3 
2 
4 
4 
301-4 
4 
Africa 
8 
8 
8 
9 
8 
8 
Total 
29 
29 
30 
3 1 
30 - 
32 
34 
Asia 
8 
7 
6 
8 
7 or 
8 
8 
Table 111.1 : The evolution of proposed membership for the PIC Chemical Review Committee 
In contrast, at POPs COP-1, a contact group was established to tackle the POPRC terms of 
reference, based on the deliberations at INC-6 and NC-7 and comments submitted by countries 
and organizations in preparation of the meeting. While delegates did begin by reopening the 
numerical wranglings of PIC COP-1, Parties soon came to a compromise to use the same 
"formula" as for the PIC CRC, thus meeting general expectationss6. This enabled POPs COP-1 
participants to devote much more attention to other aspects of the POPRC terms of reference 
(which are discussed in greater detail below). 
Meanwhile, under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the SBSTTA is held in plenary 
format, much as a regular COP of the Convention, and each party is able to send as large a 
delegation as desired. Furthermore, the same rules of procedure apply to the SBSTTA as to the 
COP for granting observer status to non-Parties, including other and as a result 
the membership of the SBSTTA emphasizes foremost national diversity (and the same applies to 
the CBD's ad hoc working groups). 
Yet, the lack of limitation on delegation sizes nevertheless has led to concerns over equitable 
access concerns, as the majority of developing country Parties only receive funding to send one 
or two delegates, who often are not able to participate fully in all the negotiations, often 
underway in infonnal settings, during a typical meeting. This latter concern has been addressed 
in recent years by restricting CBD meetings to a maximum of two parallel events at any given 
More representation from each region 
(southern hemisphere country) 
Compromise solution 
56 This was so expected, that one participant even noted he "would have bet [his] house on it" 
57 http://www. biodiv.org/convention/sbstta.asp 
7 
5 
9 
8 
9 
8 
9 
7 
5 
3 
39 
3 1 
time, but this has in practice only led to an increase in informal consultations, of which many can 
be occurring in parallel. 
The UNFCCC's subsidiary science body, its Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice, operates in a very similar fashion to the CBD's SBSTTA, and the same 
national an economic diversity considerations largely apply. Yet, the UNFCCC case is 
exceptional through the continued influence of the IPCC on the Climate Regime, which predates 
the negotiation of the Convention itself. The IPCC too has increasingly focused on its experts' 
national and economic diversity (Siebenhuner, 2003). While early IPCC reports emphasized 
authors' academic affiliations, experts' nationalities are now underscored, and there are also 
systematic efforts to increase participation by developing country authors. In particular, most 
chapters now have co-"lead authors", one each from a developed and a developing country. 
Since its inception, the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP) of the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands has based its membership on the basis of geographic representation, yet 
in the most recent redesign of the STRP's modus operandi (adopted by COP-9 in November 
2005) national and economic diversity is no longer the prime consideration for selecting STRP 
experts. 
In its first incarnation, the membership of the Wetland Convention's Scientific and Technical 
Review Panel (STRP) was very restricted, and from 1993 to 1999, the STRP had only 6 
members, with one expert from each of the Ramsar regions. In 1999, COP-7 modified the terms 
of membership of the STRP, modeling participation on that used for the Wetland Convention's 
Standing Committee, whose membership is proportionate to the number of Parties in each 
region. These members are nominated by Parties - but it is provided that these experts serve in 
their own capacities and not as representatives of their respective countries. While operating 
under this arrangement the STRP was credited with producing valid and sustainable science 
advice, yet several complained that its work was canied out by only the few most qualified 
experts on the committee, and that this emphasis on national diversity did not lead to the 
selection of those experts most qualified or most available to carry out the work of the STRP. 
And indeed, in terms of the exact composition of the panel, the requirements laid out in the 
revised modus operandi relate to areas of expertise relevant to carrying out high-priority tasks of 
the STRP. The revised modus operandi provide for eleven experts with specific areas of 
expertise and two globally-recognized experts with a broad scope of wetland conservation and 
wise use expertise and experience of the scientific and technical operations and issues of the 
Convention. The revised modus operandi do specify that: "wherever possible, experts on a 
particular theme will be appointed from different parts of the world, for example people based in 
different Ramsar countries or regions andlor from northern and southern parts of the world, and 
gender balance will be sought." Yet, it is emphasized that "[hlowever the overriding priority for 
appointments will be to secure the best expertise available, wherever the expertise is based." 
Disciplinary Diversity 
Many SABs also include provisions for disciplinary diversity, acknowledging that global- 
scale environmental concerns are often interdisciplinary in their scope and require a broad range 
of fields of expertise. The original mandate for an SAB is central to establishing a framework for 
achieving the appropriate disciplinary diversity, but once the SAB begins carrying out its work - 
and fulfilling what can be rapidly changing advice needs, a great deal of discretion comes into 
play in tailoring experts' disciplinary specialty to the needs of the SAB's agenda. 
Disciplinary diversity can have improve the outcome's validity as it may help to consider far 
reaching implications of the solutions often discussed by SABs, and will likely be examined by 
Parties' own experts to determine if the appropriate disciplines have been brought to bear on an 
issue, thus strengthening the outcome's sustainability. Disciplinary diversity reaches beyond 
mere academic distinctions of fields of study, but can also involve areas of study not necessarily 
recognized in mainstream research fields (such as those relating to traditional knowledge or 
interdisciplinary study). Participation by experts fi-om different disciplinary frameworks can help 
the SAB act as a boundary organization where "boundary objects5*" or common concepts are 
created and can help communication among distinct disciplinary streams (Guston, 2000). 
Participation by experts from disciplines not directly, or only tangentially, involved in the 
initial fiaming of the problem can help to identify opportunities for synergies with SABs to other 
MEAs, or even aid in flagging potential deleterious effects of one SAB's recommendations on 
other environmental efforts, thus strengthening the outcome's validity. For example, the IPCC 
and the Ozone Regime's Technical and Environmental Assessment Panel have been cooperating 
on assessing the global warming implications of HCFCs, one of the original CFC substitutes, 
whose use has increased exponentially in recent years and which has been found to have a 
significant global warming potential. 
The IPCC has dealt with requirements for disciplinary diversity through the establishment of 
its three working groups: Working Group I addresses the scientific aspects of the climate system 
and climate change; Working Group I1 focuses on the vulnerability of socioeconomic and natural 
systems to climate change, negative and positive consequences of climate change, and options 
for adapting to it; and Working Group I11 examines options for limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions and otherwise mitigating climate change. 
58 These boundary objects can not only span two disciplines, but can also be used as a tool for communicating 
between the science and policy realms. 
Similarly, as described above, Ramsar's new rnodus operandi for the STRP first emphasizes 
disciplinary needs. In contrast, there have been several complaints over the lack of disciplinary 
diversity in the context of the MBTOC under the Ozone Regime, with several observers 
highlighting the lack of expertise on application and use of methyl bromide alternatives for 
example. And indeed, the new Working Procedures for the MBTOC adopted in December 2005 
by MOP-17 were accompanied by a call to recruit new experts to the MBTOC, and earmark in 
particular the need for expertise emphasizing: "weed scientists, wood disinfection specialists, 
quarantine and pre-shipment, alternatives practitioners, technology cooperation, agricultural 
extension, recapture and recycle, agricultural economists, and regulatory processes & 
registrations9. " 
In the context of the CBD, at the recent Review of Implementation of the Biodiversity 
Convention, the need to control that "adequate" delegates take part in the SBSTTA reflect a 
growing concern that the SBSTTA brings together more policymakers than scientists, and indeed 
there are no disciplinary guidelines in place dictating the expertise of SBSTTA delegates, or 
even delegates to ad hoc groups. The range in size and expertise of these "adequate" delegations 
at SBSTTA are described in greater detail in box IV.2, yet they do show that several Parties are 
likely to emphasize legal and international affairs specializations over expertise more tailored to 
the scientific basis of biodiversity management for example. 
Just as no set guidelines relating to disciplinary specialties were laid out in soliciting 
nominations to the ICRC, the final decisions establishing both the CRC and the POPRC only 
reiterate that members shall be "experts in chemical management." Even if in contact group 
negotiations some lobbied for specific references to expertise in health and environmental 
5 0 Invitation to Help Protect the Stratospheric Ozone Layer as an Expert on the Technology and Economic 
Assessment Panel (TEAP) and Its Technical Options Committees (TOCs). Posted on 
http://www.unep.ch/ozone/teap/TEAP-Nominations.asp (accessed January 2006). 
aspects of chemical management, in the end Parties are encouraged to nominate their experts 
keeping in mind the need for disciplinary diversity, even if under the POPRC Parties are 
encouraged to "take into account . . . the need for balance between different types of expertise" in 
nominating experts6'. 
This output has now been applied in practice. The first POPRC meeting took place in 
November 2005 and the first PIC Chemical Review Committee met in February 2005. While 
both bodies were established based on the same consensus regarding national, economic and 
geographic diversity, the final outcome, as described in table 111.2, does actually differ in 
practice. While the impact of these variations on these Committees' output has yet to be 
determined, it is likely that differences in disciplinary diversity are most likely to affect 
differences in their output's validity, especially as this emphasis on chemical management 
continues to favor participation by those experts who have traditionally been involved in the 
negotiation of these conventions, namely government administrators and industrial 
representatives. 
"" POPRC Terms of Reference, adopted at COP-1 in May 2005. 
r PIC CRC~' I P O P R C ~ ~  I 
I Female I 8 I 5 I 
Economic diversity 
Developed countly 
Developing country 
Country with economy in transition 
Gender diversity 
1 Academia I 4 I 13 I 
- -- 
7 
17 
2 
Institutional diversity 
Government 
-  -- -- -
8 
20 
3 
22 
Disciplinary diversity 
Health 
Conventions 
16 
Environment and risk 
Chemical use and management 
Institutional Diversity 
Institutional diversity refers to the experts7 source of hll-time employment and this variation 
in the institutional affiliation of SAB members of any given MEA can often be traced to the 
MEA7s negotiation process and the MEA7s cultural context. In addition, different MEAs have 
varying levels of openness to observers in their proceedings. This institutional diversity is most 
relevant when examining institutional affiliation of appointed SAB members - but also carries 
over into the participation by observers in the SAB process. Institutional affiliation has also been 
documented as introducing bias into experts' framing (for example in the nicotine addiction 
debate, Murphy, 2001), which can hinder both the outcome's validity and sustainability. Making 
provisions for institutional diversity may help alleviate such concerns and strengthen the 
outcome's sustainability. 
6 
6 1 Of 3 1 nominated experts, only 26 C'RC members attended the CRC's first meeting. 
" Institutional affiliation and disciplinary specialty are assessed based on experts' CVs - only 30 were submitted in 
preparation of the POPRC meeting. 
5 
Table 111.2: Application of Review Committee membership guidelines in the PIC and POPS 
6 
14 
10 
15 
Participation by non-Parties in any given MEA is regulated by the COP'S Rules of Procedure 
- and such observers can include other countries (non-Parties), but also intergovernmental 
organizations (other global-scale entities such as the World Bank, the International Labor 
Organization, or the World Health Organization), environmental non-governmental 
organizations, industrial organizations, academics and indigenous groups. 
Institutional breadth in developing science advice can be reflected in the validity of the 
outcome (especially in terms of identifying synergies for improving SAB outcome across several 
MEAs) and also in strengthening the sustainability of the consensus, by reducing pressure from 
what are often observer stakeholders to denounce the science advice and the policy action based 
upon them. Generally the Ramsar Wetlands Convention, and this also applies to the STW, has 
had a long-standing relationship with institutional organization partners: BirdLife International, 
IUCN-The World Conservation Union, Wetlands International and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature International. Representatives from those institutional partners are granted membership 
on the STRP, and several representatives from related intergovernmental organizations are 
invited to take part in STRP meetings as well. This has been particularly beneficial in helping the 
Ramsar Convention cement its standing as science advisors not only with its own Parties, but 
also in the setting of other biodiversity-related Conventions. Indeed, it is the Ramsar Convention 
which has taken the technical lead in the Biodiversity Convention's inland water programme63. 
The openness to outside observers in the negotiation and day-to-day operation of the MEA 
often carries over into the SAB7s membership. For example, under the ozone regime, the panels 
and technical options committees have historically had significant active participation by 
industry representatives. One explanation is that such reaching-out to industry experts ensured 
63 The benefits of such arrangements were highlighted by several participants reviewing the inland ecosystems work 
programme at SBSTTA- 1 1. 
access to the state of the art of knowledge being developed by industry - often proprietary 
knowledge which would not otherwise be included (Parson, 2002; Parson, 2003). Yet, it is such 
overrepresentation of industrial interests that was a key contributor to the poor reception of 
MBTOC reports from 2003-2005. In fact, at Ex-MOP-1, this lack of institutional breadth was 
highlighted as a central cause for concern by an expert member of the MBTOC who distributed 
pamphlets outside the Plenary hall detailing the MBTOC's vulnerability to industry lobbying and 
denouncing its outcome report. As a result, in the latest MBTOC report which already took into 
account some of the new MBTOC Working Procedures discussed and adopted by MOP-17, the 
list of MBTOC experts contributing to the report include institutional affiliation (as is discussed 
in greater length in Chapter IV under transparency of participant information). 
In the SAB negotiations for the PIC and POPs Conventions, institutional affiliation was 
never explicitly raised as an issue, though negotiations for the POPRC's establishment did 
discuss the role of observers. In particular, negotiators disagreed as to whether specific 
provisions be included in the Terms of Reference to encourage participation by countries or 
industries who would be adversely affected by a proposed listing. In contrast, at POPs COP-1, 
within the same regime, those negotiating the Terms of Reference for a time-limited ad hoc 
Expert Group on Best Available Techniques and Best Environmental Practices for avoiding the 
production of unintentional POPs set an uncommon scene as observers from both industrial 
groups and from environmental NGOs mingled indistinctly with Party representatives and were 
involved in the drafting of compromise text". 
In contrast, under the IPCC, participation by industry representatives is restricted in great 
part to observer participation at IPCC Plenaries, placing a premium instead on participation from 
academia and government scientists. This latter input can be traced to the computational 
- 
64 Based on participant observation in the BATIHEP contact group at POPs COP-I, May 2005. 
requirements of early climate modeling and institutional benefits of long-range data sets, which 
both favored a significant input from government agencies and academia (Miller and Edwards, 
2001). Yet, as the IPCC prepares its Fourth Assessment Report, there has been a deliberate effort 
to include greater input from industry-affiliated scientists. 
Meanwhile, the Convention on Biological Diversity has, in some respects, employed the 
broadest interpretation of institutional diversity, especially as related to the privileged role 
granted to local and indigenous communities in the context of the Working Group on Article 80) 
(Traditional Knowledge), where their representatives are granted equal access as Parties to the 
Convention. However the impact of such inclusiveness is limited by the restriction to this 
approach to the 8(j) Working Group, and indeed these indigenous communities, highlight, for 
example, the need for their voices to be heard in ongoing discussions of an Access and Benefit- 
Sharing Regime. 
Regional diversity 
The issue of regional diversity is in fact quite different from ensuring proportional 
representations from Parties in each region. Rather, regional diversity refers to reflecting, on the 
SAB, the particularities of specific regions on the panel - regions defined more by their 
geographic characteristics rather than by their distribution into spatially distributed regions. The 
more prominent of such regional interests include those shared by small island states, arid areas, 
southern hemisphere states, or even areas whose biomes might be particularly vulnerable to the 
issue at hand (for example countries with artic zones contaminated by POPS). This emphasis on 
regional diversity also arises out of increased acknowledgment of the potential contributions of 
local, traditional and even lay knowledge in environmental decision-making. (Jasanoff and 
Martello, 2004; Wynne, 1988). These stocks of knowledge, which so often do no meet a priori 
standards of expertise (for example an advanced university degree or extensive peer-reviewed 
publications) are now beginning to be recognized as necessary for an effective SAB process. 
Regional diversity is important in achieving a diversity of knowledge, this contributes to a most 
scientifically accurate result, but also helps ensure that the work of the SAB remains relevant to 
all Parties to the Convention, thus ensuring the output's sustainability. 
The increasing emphasis on involvement of experts from small island states in the context of 
the work of the IPCC is an example of where seeking this knowledge, and other sources of local 
knowledge (for example emphasizing knowledge of arid areas, or alpine climates) have been 
instrumental in broadening the acceptance of the IPCC. 
Conversely, in the context of the Stockholm POPs Convention, while arctic countries were 
drivers in negotiating the Convention itself (as POPs' bioaccumulating nature has been found to 
disproportionally affect arctic populations, which are often indigenous communities as well), and 
even as arctic indigenous groups and coalitions often attend the policy-oriented meetings of the 
Stockholm Convention, the POPRC Terms of Reference as they now stand do not include 
provisions for ensuring that those interests are reflected among those experts nominated to the 
POPRC. 
Similarly, under the Rotterdam PIC Convention, in negotiating the membership of the PIC 
Convention Chemical Review Committee, the Australian delegation repeatedly emphasized the 
need for any membership scheme to ensure representation by southern hemisphere Parties, yet 
these concerns were only addressed by expanding the number of experts from each UN region so 
as to increase the likelihood of southem-hemisphere Parties among them to have the opportunity 
to nominate an expert. Also, Under the Ozone, Climate and chemicals regimes, the discussions 
of technological alternatives in particular have been criticized for their lack of regional diversity, 
which is attributed with the development of solutions that are often impractical on the field or 
else do not take advantage of existing stocks of knowledge. 
By extension, this concern to ensure regional diversity should also be tied to efforts to ensure 
that the interests of broad political coalitions central to the MEA's issue be given the opportunity 
to be reflected in the membership of the 'SAB, so as to avoid those Parties' to perceive the SAB 
t 
as a strategic tactic to weaken their negotiation stance. For instance, while under the Biodiversity 
Convention's Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety a dedicated SAB is yet to be established, one can 
assume that the interests of the "Miami Group," a coalition bringing together Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, Chile, the US and Uruguay which emerged as the most "pro-biotechnology" 
group during the Protocol negotiations, would have to be reflected in any successful SAB 
membership scheme so as to avoid the Miami Group's dismissal of any SAB results. 
Under the Ramsar Wetlands Convention, the importance of regional diversity has proved to 
be less evident as the Convention, in its aim, is inherently on local concerns shared by its Parties, 
that is the management and preservation of wetlands. 
Personal Diversity 
There are many aspects of the more intrinsic attributes of any individual scientist, including a 
scientist's age, gender and personal and political views, which can also affect the output's 
validity and sustainability, but which can be difficult to screen for on curriculae vitae6j, and even 
more difficult to negotiate as components of an SAB's membership. At present few SABs 
include provisions to ensure this kind of diversity. 
Of these personal characteristics, gender is the only one being discussed in the context of 
MEA SABs, albeit to a limited extent. Gender diversity is not raised as an issue in all SABs but 
65 while age and gender may appear on some CVs, in North America especially the practice is no longer considered 
appropriate. Listing of political and personal views is quite generally taboo thus hrther hindering any efforts to 
achieve that kind of representation. 
has increasingly been proposed as a consideration for membership. An experts' gender has been 
shown to affect the framing of questions and can also enhance the legitimacy of the process 
(Fox, 1995). For example under the POPs regime, where specific segments of the population are 
known to be more vulnerable to POPs contamination (for example breastfeeding mothers and 
their infants), participation by women on the POPs Chemical Review Panel may be expected to 
weigh risks to those populations more heavily than male experts and produce a more valid 
outcome. Furthermore, in terms of sustainability of SAB output, participation by women in the 
POPRC may help to assure some stakeholders that the concerns of these vulnerable populations 
have been taken into account. Yet, as the contact group discussed a suggestion to "take into 
account gender" in the nomination of experts, several negotiators questioned the need and impact 
of such a provision, although it was ultimately included in the Terms of Reference. Stockholm 
Convention Parties have now nominated their experts for the first meeting of the POPRC, and of 
3lmembers nominated, only 5 are women. This disparity, beyond being a mere reflection of 
Parties' commitment to gender diversity, is perhaps more likely evidence of the difficulty of 
taking into account gender diversity when of the only 3 1 Parties nominating experts, each Party 
is only nominating one expert. 
The importance of gender diversity has also been recently highlighted under the IPCC 
process. At the 22nd session of the IPCC where preparations for the Fourth Assessment Report 
were on the agenda, the IPCC Secretariat distributed statistics emphasizing not only the 
enhanced participation by authors from developing countries, but also the increased incidence of 
contributions from women authors. Another aspect of personal diversity coming to the fore is 
the active role of the IPCC leadership in attempting to balance political views. For example, the 
leadership has the latitude to nominate experts that have not been nominated by their own 
countr~es, most likely due to divergences over political issues. 
In the case of the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee (MBTOC) under the Ozone 
Regime, the new working procedures of the MBTOC adopted by the MOP in December 2005 
(following several years of dissatisfaction with the work and membership of the MBTOC by 
Parties) emphasizes broadcasting information on MBTOC members. The most recent report 
submitted by the MBTOC, lists infomation about participant experts in an annex, and includes 
experts' gender, developing country status and length of involvement. Conversely, gender or 
other personal considerations have yet to be explicitly raise as criteria for membership in SABs 
associated with the Biodiversity and the Wetlands Conventions. 
Under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, there has been to date little emphasis on 
diversity of such personal criteria, as in the CBD where no criteria for personal diversity are set 
out. At the opposite of the spectrum, both the PIC and POPS Conventions have put in place 
procedures for experts to declare potential conflicts of interest which can help guard against, or 
at least bring to light, any financial interests for example that might influence any given expert's 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Representative membership on an SAB is essential for ensuring the validity of the SAB's 
outcome. For example, disciplinary diversity can have implications for the outcome's validity as 
it may help to consider far reaching implications of the solutions often discussed by SABs and 
participation by experts from disciplines not directly, or only tangentially, involved in the initial 
framing of the problem can help to identify opportunities for synergies with SABs to other 
MEAs, or even aid in flagging potential deleterious effects of one SAB's recommendations on 
other environmental efforts. 
Representative membership also plays a key role in contributing to the sustainability of the 
SAB's outcome, as this is often what stakeholders will look to in assessing the SAB's work and 
process. For example, regional diversity helps ensure that the work of the SAB remains relevant 
t:o all Parties to the Convention, thus ensuring the output's sustainability. 
Accordingly, then in the context of SABs to MEAs, it would be necessary to ensure 
representation from a broader array of countries and institutional affiliations, while ensuring as 
well disciplinary diversity, input from local and traditional knowledge, and a variation in 
experts' more personal attributes (including for example age, gender and political views). 
Indeed, every time an SAB is put in place, its creators face the challenge of ensuring such a small 
committee represents the whole world- or at least is constituted in such a way that the whole 
world recognizes the validity of its output. 
However, it is clear from the examination of diversity in membership of SABs across the six 
MEAs studied for this thesis that different aspects of diversity will have the greater impact on the 
resulting outcome's validity and sustainability. For example, it is clear from the problems 
encountered by the MBTOC in its work in the past 3 years that a greater emphasis on economic 
diversity will go a long way towards alleviating concerns over generating a sustainable 
consensus on science advice, while current discourse within the IPCC in preparing its fourth 
assessment report signals that a greater emphasis on institutional diversity has been identified as 
a means of shoring up the sustainability of its outcome among industrial interests. The variation 
of the interplay between membership and the resulting consensus across the cases is summarized 
in Table 111.3. 
Table 111.3: The Relationship between membership and consensus across the cases 
I 
CASE 1 MEMBERSHIP & CONSENSUS I J 
STRP output valid and sustainable 
Accepted by Ramsar COP 
Trickle down to field i~nplementation 
Broad reach of "ra~nsar terminology" 
Ramsar 
Wetlands 
Convention 
Until 2005: Emphasis on national, disciplinary and institutional diversity 
Focus on national diversity blamed for not bringing together "best" cxperts, and especially resulting 
inefficiency I 
Disciplinary divers~ty especially applied in organizing agenda in working groups 
I Institutional diverslty and input from other IGOs and MEAs - key to successtin cooperative ventures I 1 2005 new modus operandi I 
Shiff to enperti~e/network focus 
Change to nomination process so Standing Committee concerned with national and other diversity 
2003-2005: MBTOC output not sustainable 
Repeatedly sent back to MBTOC 
Blamed on lack of developing country expert input 
Ozone 
Regime 
Concerns of vulnerability-to ~ndustrial obbying- 
Validity in doubt: "unable to assess" (concern over appropriate expertise) 
Long term implications 
Increase in use of MBTOC in developed countries 
Participation concerns vis-a-vis developing-country commitments 
Revised working procedures 
Call for new experts with developing/transition status 
Emphasis on specialization/required expertise 
Concern over validity of output 
I Disciplinary diversity and "~dequacy" of expertise 
Biodiversity 
Regime 
Lawlinternational affairs vs. scientific and technical expertise 
Detailed textual negotiations 
Equitable access concerns - geographic disparity 
Variation in delegation size 
Disparate access - especially to smaller contact groups and informal negotiations 
SBSTA 
Many of the same limitations as CBD SBSTTA 
IPCC 
Overall valid and sustainable outcome 
Climate 
Regime 
Dzfferent @pes of output, different levels of scrutiny and acceptance 
Technical output in particular relied upon in UNFCCC implementation 
Expectation of reliance on AR4 for post-2012 negotiations 
~ttributable to historical emphasis on: 
Disciplinary expertise (organization of work into WGI, II, III) 
National diversity (increasingly economic) 
Scale o f  assessment effort 
Institutional affiliation (prestigious affiation us validator ofexpertise) 
Vulnerabilities of IPCC (addressed in preparing AR4?) 
Addressing concerns of lack of local/traditional knowledge 
Diversity in personal attributes (gender, beliefs) 
Broadening institutional variation 
Rotterdam 
PIC 
Convention 
CASE 
ICRC output: valid and sustainable 
Satisfaction with recolnmendations and decision-guidance 
Easy approval of procedural recommendations from ICRC 
Exception of chrysotile asbestos 
high po litical/economic stakes 
limited avenues of attack 
CRC membership 
Equitable geogr. representation vs. balance of developed/dev'ing countries 
Little emphasis on disciplinary expertise 
"chemical management": bias away from 
alternatives, health, environment 
Limits of nomination process 
Little oversight of expertise 
How to achieve diversity with one nomination? 
Output yet to be tested 
High-economic stakes of outcome (some Parties bound by addition) 
Small committee: strategic vulnerability to attack 
POPRC membership 
Same as PIC CRC + "taking into account gender and the need for balance between different types of 
MEMBERSHIP & CONSENSUS 
Output of 1st incarnation: rejected by dev'ing Parties 
Validity concerns: proposed alternatives 
/recommendations seen as unsuitable to 
developing country needs and constraints 
Redesign: move from 50/50 to national focus 
Stockholm 
POPS 
Convention 
The many kinds of diversity described above that can come into play in establishing an 
expertise" 
Added emphasis on expertise in health and environment 
Same nomination limitations, but supplemented by roster of experts 
BATIBEP membership 
SAB's membership should therefore be taken into account to meet an MEA's specific needs - 
and emphasized and de-emphasized to reflect the COP'S expectations and concerns. And 
furthermore, as the COP attempts to negotiate a membership balance suitable to generating a 
valid and sustainable outcome, those selecting SAB members will have to seek out scientists that 
fulfill more than one diversity variable as it is not desirable, or even practicable, for instance, to 
have a geographical diverse, gender balanced assortment of experts representing each 
disciplinary specialization. 
In addition, the dynamics of any MEA are likely to evolve over time and as such any SAB 
modus operundi should include provisions for regularly revisiting guidelines for representative 
membership. While a coordinated membership strategy is warranted at the SAB level, the SAB 
should be granted the flexibility to assess whether, for example, some of its more specialized 
investigations warrant at least temporary adjustments to its membership scheme. 
While the first step to achieving a valid and sustainable science consensus arises out of the 
recognition that science is an inherently social construct, representative membership alone is not 
sufficient, and decision-makers will also be looking to the SAB's transparency and flexibility in 
assessing its output - considerations that can also impact the consensus's validity, and that are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
CHAPTER IV: A FLEXIBLE AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS 
In terms of institutional design, the UN system is prone to coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983), whereas new institutions replicate those traditions perceived as "most 
legitimate," and this is often emulated in negotiating the establishment of new MEAs. The UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol are perhaps the most striking 
example of such isomorphism - it is well established that as the climate regime was being 
negotiated, framers were seeking to emulate the success of the Vienna Convention and its 
Montreal Protocol (Parson, 2002). 
This phenomenon of institutional isomorphism also commonly occurs in the establishment of 
science advisory bodies (SABs). For example, under the Stockholm Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(POPs) Convention, negotiations on the establishment of the POPs Review Committee were 
initiated by requests that the Secretariat closely examine SABs of other MEAs and that this 
review serve as the basis for any negotiations on the issue? More recently still, several 
stakeholders involved in the biodiversity regime have been proactively campaigning for the 
establishment of a "biodiversity IPCC" - this proposal is discussed in greater detail in Chapter V. 
Yet, as MEA negotiators gain experience in implementing these agreements, the institutional 
criteria that are emulated have evolved. Several regime theorists have sought to identify 
institutional design features to which a regime's success can be attributed, but scholars have 
struggled to develop clear metrics for assessing the effectiveness of environmental regimes 
(Young, 1999; Miles et al, 2002). Nevertheless several components are often highlighted as 
factors of success, including the development of rules of procedure and the transparency of 
proceedings. 
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I propose in this chapter that transparency is essential not only for guarantying a certain level 
of political buy-in and sustainability of the SAB's outcome, but that transparency can also help 
to enhance the validity of this SAB outcome. In examining the role of a transparent process in 
contributing to a valid and sustainable consensus on the science, I am including more than just 
the traditional definition of transparency, most often assumed to be limited to the amount of 
information on the SAB's work made available to outsiders. The latter is often further simplified 
as defining a "transparent" meeting as one that conducts its work in an "open-door7' fashion. 
However, in examining the cases for this thesis, several means of producing transparency (and 
subsequently increasing the validity and sustainability of the consensus) have emerged. These 
include of course holding public meetings open to observers, but also emphasizes the type of 
information made available in documenting the SAB's work and in broadcasting information 
about the SAB's meeting, process, and participants. 
Furthermore, I propose that a flexible process is also crucial to ensuring full participation by 
the expert community, thus necessary for a sustainable and valid consensus. A closer 
examination of the cases studied for this thesis demonstrate that this flexibility granted to an 
SAB in organizing its work can include flexibility not only in the day to day running of 
meetings, but also in providing opportunities for expanding the network of contributing experts, 
for adapting norms and procedures and ensuring continuity and retaining institutional memory. 
Examples of how these types of diversity and flexibility can enhance, or hinder, the 
outcomes' validity and sustainability are discussed below. 
TRANSPARENCY 
In Science on Stage, Stephen Hilgartner uses the metaphor of performance to discuss the role 
of "stage management - that is, techniques for controlling what is publicly displayed and what is 
concealed" in constituting a science advisory panel's expert authority (Hilgartner, 2000). 
Transparency relates to what is revealed to those not directly taking part in SAB proceedings, 
and the management described by Hilgartner calls for enhancing the outcome's sustainablity 
through transparency, without compromising the output's validity. 
For example, making all scientific deliberations open to observers and transcripted as matters 
of public record has been attributed with limiting the scope of deliberations and hindering 
innovation in the long run, as some participants may be more reluctant to broach what may be 
"politically incorrect" concepts. At the national level, such deterrence was illustrated by the 
controversy following the public disclosure of Harvard President Lawrence Sumners' comments 
- in a private committee meeting - on gender and scientific abilitf7. At the MEA level, such 
fears of transcription can preclude candid discussions of the limitations for implementing certain 
technological fixes in developing countries (for instance if it involves acknowledging, on the 
record, difficulties due to corruption or lack of capacity). 
In the United States, the Federal Advisory Committee Act ( F A C A ) ~ ~  was put in place to 
enhance the transparency of federal agency advisory committees (Spielman, 2003), yet this 
increased scrutiny on official proceedings has, according to some accounts, prompted the most 
contentious discussions to be shifted to informal moments, such as meals, of the committee's 
agenda. Moreover, Hilgartner describes the National Academy of Sciences' struggle to preserve 
its confidentiality procedures and not be subject to FACA, and emphasizes in particular the 
implications for such public scrutiny and government oversight for the outcome's perceived 
independence. 
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68 The Federal Advisory Committee Act calls for federal agencies establishing committees to report on the 
committee'composition, approve of all meetings and agendas, and send government officials to chair or attend each 
meeting (Hilgartner, 2000). 
Transparency relates not only to the access to meetings granted to outsiders, but also to the 
amount of information on the SAB7s work made available, including the type of information, the 
way in which it is presented and its responsiveness to decision-makers' needs. Therefore, the 
way in which a SAB manages each of the different kinds of transparency described in greater 
detail below has implications for the outcomes' validity and sustainability. 
Access to Meetings 
The most traditional definition of transparency may likely focus on the literal notion of 
avoiding "closed-door" meetings, and granting observers (those interested stakeholders, in some 
cases even Parties, that are not members of the SAB) access to SAB proceedings. As described 
in Chapter 111, the composition of SAB membership is often carefully negotiated. Yet 
participation by observers is most often controlled under the applicable Rules of ~ r o c e d u r e ~ ~  
adopted by Parties. By virtue of their status as "observers," those onlookers to the SAB 
proceedings won't have a direct input in any SAB decision or outcome, yet in practice the extent 
to their participation in deliberations vary across MEAs. 
The transparency afforded to observers at meetings of the SAB can strongly contribute to its 
outcome's sustainability as it can generate more trust in the process - concerned Parties and 
observers will be able to monitor what exactly happens at the SAB meeting and this in turn can 
help them assess the SAB's outcome. However, there have also been concerns that increased 
access may in effect be granting unequal access to SAB proceedings. Furthermore, too much 
access to meetings can reduce the validity of the outcome by precluding the consideration of 
information that might not be suitable to open door discussions. 
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Rules of Procedure are included in the bibliography for each case. 
This challenge of balancing access with the discussion of proprietary information has come 
to the fore in discussions of the Chemical Review Committee (CRC) of the Rotterdam PIC 
Convention. According to the Terms of Reference negotiated at PIC COP-1 in September 2004, 
the CRC is subject to the Rules of Procedure as relating to attendance by observers, and therefore 
public meetings are the expected norm. However, the CRC has also put in place provisions for 
considering in their deliberations confidential information (most often from industry relating to 
chemical processes, or form Parties relating to chemical management strategies). It is likely, that 
the CRC, in an effort to retain both the output's validity (by including this confidential 
information in its deliberations) and the output's sustainability (by not appearing to take away 
access that observers feel entitled to according to the Rules of Procedure), will have to manage 
the amount of information released about these confidential consultations (and these types of 
diversity is discussed in greater length under documentation and process). 
Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, SBSTTA also operates under the COP'S 
Rules of Procedure whereby observers include non-Party governments, intergovernmental 
organizations, industries and non-governmental organizations, including academic, 
environmental and indigenous groups. Under the COP Rules, these observers are allowed to take 
the floor, but at the Chair's discretion, and in practice this generally occurs if there is sufficient 
time at the end of a discussion on any given agenda item. In practice, coalitions are often given 
the opportunity to take the floor, and preference is often granted to intergovernmental 
organizations (such as representatives of the Secretariat of a biodiversity-related Conventions) to 
intervene in the course of debate if the topic is particularly related to their focus of attention. And 
in fact, at SBSTTA-11, as experts were reviewing the inland water ecosystem programme of 
work of the C'BD, representat~ves from the Ramsar Secretariat often took the floor throughout 
the discussion. This openness of proceedings does contribute to strengthening the sustainability 
of the SBSTTA outcome by shielding it from criticisms about the openness of the process, and 
especially can contribute to its validity when it ensures that those most qualified experts (in the 
case of wetlands, those fiom the Ramsar Secretariat) can contribute to the outcome. 
Of course, access to meetings alone is not always alone a prerequisite of a transparent 
process and, by extension, a valid and sustainable consensus. For example, under the Ramsar 
Convention, access to the STRP is technically limited to members and invited experts, but these 
invited experts do include representatives from a broad range of intergovernmental organizations 
(for example from the Secretariats of other MEAs). Such broadening of institutional diversity 
expands the range of observers who can testify to the process of the STRP. In addition, as 
described below, the STRP has successfully managed its transparency by emphasizing other 
types of transparency of its operation. 
In sharp contrast, the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee (MBTOC) under the 
Ozone Regime does not grant access open access to its meetings, and furthermore did not, until 
the adoption of its revised Worlung Procedures, provide much information on any aspects of 
these meetings. While the lack of access in itself is not entirely to blame for the MBTOC 
outcome's poor reception by the  MOP^' and in effect its lack of sustainability, this lack of access 
in conjunction with the lack of the other types of diversity described below were a central 
element of the MBTOC's failure, and indeed, the December 2005 revised Working Procedures 
of the MBTOC repeatedly emphasize this need for transparency. 
The issue of access to observers was also one of the issues of debate under both the 
Rotterdam PIC Convention and the Stockholm POPS Convention, as Parties negotiated the terms 
'' from 2003 to 2005 as the MBTOC' reviewed nominations for Critical Use Exemptions for specified methyl 
bromide use by developed countries as the methyl bromide phase-out target neared, and the MOP'S disapproval of 
the MBTOC report was at the center of the need to convene two extraordinary MOPS 
of reference for their Chemical Revlew Committees. While several chemical-producing Parties 
strongly supported including special provisions for ensuring observer access to those Parties 
most likely to be affected by a chemicals' nomination, in the end Parties agreed to grant equal 
access to ail observers, encompassing in this definition even Parties (as both CRCs require 
Parties to nominate specific individuals). 
Under the Rotterdam PIC Convention's Interim Chemical Review Committee, despite the 
process being open to all observers, the observing population was heavily skewed towards 
industrial and commercial interests and towards observers from countries most likely to be 
affected by the chemical's listing. In the interim PIC process, NGOs and trade unions were also 
vocal in highlighting the impediments to their attendance7'. In addition to concerns that 
developing country Parties and environmental NGOs may not be benefiting from the same 
uptake of information likely to result from attendance, several negotiators highlight the potential 
for these observers to influence the outcome of the SAB by granting them privileged access to 
the SAB members. 
Under the Climate Regime, access to meetings under the SBSTA process is similar to that 
applied under the CBD's SBSTTA, but under the IPCC transparency in terms of access to 
meetings is adapted to the different levels of meetings. As such, meetings of the Working Groups 
are less open to scrutiny by outside observers while it is only at the Plenary meetings of the IPCC 
that access is granted to observers, including for example representatives from industry 
(including for example petrochemical corporations but also large insurance companies) and from 
civil society. This access to meetings is a stated component of a much larger transparency 
stategy, which, as described below, emphasizes more document and process transparency. 
7 1 while the I('RC compensated the expenses of developing country experts' participation, no s~lch facilitation 
mechanism is in place to facilitate developing country or NGO attendance. The same now applies to the PIC CRC 
and the POPS CRC. 
Documentation 
Another important option for managing the SAB's transparency relates to making documents 
available to a broader audience, a step facilitated in recent years by the ease in posting 
documents in digital formats on Convention websites. This is increasingly becoming the official 
means of making documents available to delegates, in addition to the regular distribution of CD- 
ROMs and paper copies to Parties in order to ensure access to such documents in countries, 
especially least developed counties in Africa, with limited access to the ~ n t e r n e t ~ ~ .  And indeed, 
under the revised modus operandi of the Scientific and Technical Review Panel of the Ramsar 
Wetlands Convention, highlights experts' "full access to e-mail and web-based communications 
systems for intersessional work" as a required criterion for Panel membership. 
In terms of enhancing transparency, it is also helpful to grant access, not only to the SAB's 
output, but also to supporting and preparatory documents upon which the SAB deliberations 
were based. This is especially essential for the sustainability of the resulting outcome as it will 
serve as an additional check or reference of the process followed in carrying out the SAB's work. 
Under the Stockholm POPs Convention for example, the Secretariat makes available, on its 
website, the nominations for listing chemicals as they are submitted by Parties. It is on the basis 
of these detailed applications that the POPs Review Committee members will discuss the merits 
of adding a chemical to the Convention's purview. Similarly, the Rotterdam PIC Convention 
Secretariat posts all the documents distributed to its Chemical Review Committee members prior 
to their meetings, in addition to submitting to the COP a report of the CRC meeting 
(summarizing the organization of work) and the CRC's recommendations. This helps non-SAB 
members not only to understand the supporting evidence used in decision-making, but can also, 
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when such information is distributed, as is the case in the POPS Convention, prior to the actual 
SAB meeting, can give interested stakeholders the opportunity to monitor the process and 
intervene through formal and informal channels in preparation of the SAB meeting. Of course, 
this latter aspect can also reduce the SAB outcome's sustainability if this is seen as a means for 
facilitating some stakeholders to influence (in non-transparent manners) the SAB outcome. 
Under the Ozone Regime, the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee does not post 
documents considered at its meetings, and instead releases only a single report recommending 
Critical Use Exemptions to the MOP. This lack of transparency (along with other sources of 
perceived secrecy described below) was heavily criticized, by NGOs and developing country 
representatives in particular, and blamed in part for the deep-seated disagreements which 
necessitated the convening of two extraordinary meetings of the MOP (Ex-MOPS). In fact, at the 
1" Ex-MOP, in March 2004, one MBTOC member (a consultant from a developed country) was 
so dissatisfied with the MBTOC proceedings, highlighting especially the lack of open discussion 
and a decision-making process, that she not only attended Ex-MOP-1 but also set up a makeshift 
stand outside the Plenary hall to express her dissatisfaction to delegates. In addition, the MBTOC 
report submitted to Ex-MOP-1, included an annexed clarification and revision proposed by the 
TEAP, the latter which also included a minority view submitted by a TEAP member which read: 
Minority View of TEAP Member 
The TEAP regrets to ah i se  Parties that Mr. Gary Taylor (Chair of the Halons 
Technical OptionsCommittee) is not satisfied with the Clarijication and Revision 
sz~brnitted by the majority of TEAP members (above) and he has advised TEAP that 
he is resigning his position effective 30 June 2004. 
Minority View Submitted to the TEAP by Mr. Gary Taylor 
"Mr. Taylor disagrees with both the procedures followed in preparation and the 
content of the destruction credits scction of the report. Mr. Taylor agrees with the 
concept of destruction credits usprovided in the 2002 Assessment Report of the 
Halnns Technzcai Options Committee and the 2002Assessment Report of the TEAP. 
He is of the opinion that the destruction credits section of the 14FehruarJv 
TEAP/MBTOC Report is seriousl~ jkrwed and that TEAP has grossly exceeded its 
mandate ofproviding analyses and technical infbrmation relevant to policv. " 
Date: I March 2004 
In effect, this lack of documentation made the MBTOC process all the more vulnerable to 
criticisms, which seriously eroded the output's sustainability, and Whennore lead to doubts as 
to its validity. In December 2005, at the 17th Meeting of the Parties, Parties agreed to more 
detailed working procedures for the MBTOC, and some of these have already been applied to 
aspects of the MBTOC's work described below. 
In the context of the IPCC, the reference section of IPCC reports cites the sources of 
information consulted in preparation of the report, and the IPCC Review process7) sets out 
guidelines for making these sources available, especially when dealing with information which is 
not published in peer-reviewed publications. Also, the IPCC Secretariat is entrusted with 
maintaining an open archive of "all written expert, and government review." 
There are however situations where the release of all information considered by an SAB 
might be detrimental to the output's validity, as such scrutiny might preclude the consideration 
of proprietary information. Especially under the Ozone and Chemicals regimes, SABs are often 
called upon to examine new technologies and their suitability as substitutes, and their work will 
be most relevant if they are able to consider the latest technologies. As such, they rely on full 
cooperation from industrial stakeholders to release information they wish to keep confidential. 
This can also affect the outcome's sustainability, as stakeholders are more likely to take into 
account science advice based on the state of the art of knowledge. 
Meeting In formation 
The broadcasting of meeting information can also enhance transparency by giving observers 
advance notice of SAB schedules, and by distributing information on matters to be considered at 
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any given SAB meeting and on who will be taking part. This can significantly enhance the 
sustainability of the outcome by giving observers the opportunity to not only closely monitor the 
SAB's outcome, but also, as necessary, take steps to contact participants and perhaps even 
communicate their special interests as appropriate. Conversely though, this can foster concerns 
over the outcome's validity if the extent of such steps are not controlled for under the process 
guidelines (described below). 
Lack of transparency in advertising the agenda of the meeting can also hinder the output's 
validity (as not all delegates well be sufficiently prepared for fruitful deliberations, or as some 
delegations might not even have sent the relevant experts), but can also affect the outcome's 
sustainability as stakeholders may perceive discussions not original scheduled for an SAB 
meeting as having been "sneaked in" to the regime. 
Under the Stockholm POPs Convention, in addition to being announced at COP meetings 
and posted on the Convention website, meetings of the POPRC are announced to observers 
through communication fora targetted at those interested in global chemicals management. For 
instance, an announcement and call for observer registrations at POPRC-1 was sent out to the 
Chemicals-1 listserv maintained by the International Institute for Sustainable Development. The 
documents for the meeting, including the agenda, are posted on the POPs website, and in fact 
Parties' nominations of chemicals for listing under the Convention are posted to the website 
shortly after they are received by the Secretariat. In preparation for the 1' meeting of the 
POPRC, the Secretariat also posted a list of registered observers. 
Again, the MBTOC rarely announced its meetings, and did not provide many channels for 
gathering information, before the fact, on the meeting's date, location, agenda or participation. 
This secrecy even extended to the reports of the MBTOC, which, until the latest report 
considered at MOP-17, did not provide any background information on the MBTOC or its 
meetings. In contrast, under the CBD, reports of any ad hoc working groups, and SBSTTA 
reports, will always outline how long the body met, along with additional information, for 
example pertaining to who chaired the meeting. 
By operating by the same rules of procedure as their respective COPS, the schedule and 
agenda of the CBD's SBSTTA and the Climate Regime's SBSTA are announced with several 
months notice, and all necessary preparatory documents are also disseminated three months prior 
to the meeting, with all official documents made available in the 6 UN languages74. Similarly, 
under the 2005 Working Procedures of the MBTOC, calls for the preparation and release of "an 
annual work plan [which] will enhance the transparency of, and insight in, the operations of 
MBTOC?~" and notes that this should include, inter alia: envisaged meeting dates of MBTOC, 
the timing of interim and final reports, and "clear references to the timelines relating to 
nominations. " 
Yet, in the context of the Biodiversity Regime, there have been increasing complaints that 
the SBSTTA Programme of Work is set too far in advance, preventing the SBSTTA from being 
truly reactive to urgent COP information needs. This was discussed as part of the review of the 
SBSTTA at the September 2005 meeting of the Working Group of the Review on 
~rn~ lementa t ion~~ ,  where some Parties suggested COP-8 (in March 2006) consider reducing the 
programmed work-load for upcoming SBSTTA meetings and allowing time for consideration of 
last-minute agenda items. Such a step might prevent the transparency concerns spurred by the 
addition of last-minute agenda items, as was the case at SBSTTA-11 when one Party requested 
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re-examining the language of a previously negotiated goal for the Convention's monitoring. 
Since this issue was only proposed at the meeting's opening Plenary, several delegates had not 
been briefed as to their countries position on the issue, and led to significant confusion in 
negotiating the issue. 
Advance information of meetings is also the norm under the IPCC, where work is organized 
according to a well-publicized work-plan, and Working Group meetings are well publicized. 
Under the Ramsar Convention, meetings of the STRP are announced on the Ramsar website, just 
as are meetings of the Standing Committee (the administrative Bureau which serves in between 
COP meetings). 
Process In formation 
If for the reasons described above, including logistical limitations (not all observers could 
attend SAB meetings if they wanted to), stakeholders are unsure of the validity of the SAB's 
outcome, providing information on the SAB's guidelines of operation, along with more detailed 
information of SAB meetings themselves, has proven a successfbl measure for reassuring 
stakeholders as to the safeguards, sources and process used in producing the SAB's output. 
Even if stakeholders only have access to the SAB's output submitted to the COP, they can 
still assess the robustness and inclusiveness of the SAB's work by examining it modus operandi. 
These terms of reference, are often negotiated by Parties (as was the case in the POPS and PIC 
Convention, see Chapter II), but can also be prepared by the SAB and merely approved by the 
COP. For example, the recently approved modus operandi of the STRP under the Ramsar 
Wetlands Convention, were prepared by the STRP and the Secretariat, and then submitted to the 
COP for adoption. 
Yet not all SABs have clearly defined working procedures, and indeed, under the Ozone 
Regime, Parties only approved detailed working procedures for the MBTOC at the December 
2005 MOP-1 6. This move was in reaction to increasing criticisms of the MBTOC and its lack of 
transparency in particular. And indeed, these working procedures repeatedly emphasize the need 
for transparency and accountability, and request the MBTOC to specify many asptcts of its 
work. 
Meanwhile, under the Climate Regime, the IPCC provides detailed guidelines for procedures 
for the preparations of its assessments and technical reports. In addition, the IPCC has developed 
a specific outreach strategy, which emphasizes transparency and strives to provide accounts of 
IPCC Plenaries at least. At the 22nd meeting of the IPCC Plenary in November 2004, delegates 
agreed to grant access to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin so that it would provide daily reports 
and summaries of IPCC Plenaries as the main component of their transparency efforts77. The 
administration of the IPCC is also widely involved in communicating its authorship process to 
the broader academic community, and in preparing the Fourth Assessment Report currently 
underway, Rajendra Pachauri, Chair of the IPCC, embarked on several trips to university 
campus' across the world to publicize the IPCC process and discuss the scoping of the Fourth 
Assessment Report. The IPCC strategy also includes a public outreach effort to describe the 
IPCC's elaborate review process. In a brochure aimed at the general public and at negotiators, 
the IPCC describes this review process as follows: 
"Review is an essential element of preparing IPCC reports and is 
governed by three principles. First, IPCC reports should represent the 
latest scientzfic, technical and socio-economic 
findings and be u.s comprehensive as possible. Secondly, a wide 
circulation process .~hould aim to involve as many experts as possible 
from all regions of the world. Thirdly, the review process should be 
objective, open and transparent. 
Review generally takes place in three stages: 
1. Expert review of the first drc~ff ofthe report 
2. Government/expert review of the second drafi of the report and the 
drafr Summayfor policy maker.^ 
3. Government review qf the revised draft Summary for Policymakers. 
Review periods are normally right weeks. Review Editors ensure that all 
substantive expert and govenzment comments are afforded appropriate 
consideration and advise authors how to handle contentious/controversial 
issues." (From the IPCC brochure: "Procedures: the Preparation of 
IPCC Reports '7 
Detailed minutes of SAB meetings can also provide stakeholders insight into the way in 
which the SAB carried out its work, and in particular into providing insight into dissenting views 
which may not necessarily be reflected in the SAB's final output. For example, in its meeting 
reports the Chemical Review Committee to the Rotterdam PIC Convention summarizes 
discussions and describes how the Committee organized its work, specifying in particular which 
CRC members took part or even took leading roles in reviewing distinct nominations. 
Similarly, the Ramsar Wetlands Convention Secretariat has long made available detailed 
minutes of STRP meetings, and through this means provided information about how the STRP 
organizes its work plan into three separate working groups, and also gives the audience insight 
into other aspects of process, for example, into how minority views are dealt with in brokering 
the consensus outcome. For instance, the excerpt below (edited to focus on discussions of one 
small issue for illustrative purposes) from the minutes of the STRP7s 12th meeting7' shows the 
level of detail provided to stakeholders as background to what are, in fact, very concise 
recommendations to the COP. 
"Agenda item 10: Ramsar site designation (Working Group 4) 
71. The DSG [Deputy Secretary General] drew attention to the extrzrct porn the CBDk 
Decision 1.111/4 on the inland waters programme of work, which invited the STRP to 
elahor-ate the existing Ramsar Criteria in several aspects. 
'' available at: http:/!www.rarnsar.org1st1p/strp 1 2-report.htm 
[-.-I 
73. David Stroud [Chair of Working Group 4 of the STW]  reported that the Group is 
recommending a number of additions and changes to the Strategic Framework for the 
Ramsar List and seeks the Panel's guidance on a number of issues. The terminology still 
must be harmonized with other terms being recommended by the other WGs, and the 
conceptual linkage of the proposed Criterion 1 usage must be made to the broader 
definition of ecosystem services. 
74. [...]On the rolling review of the Criteria (Task 4.3), the WG proposed Strategic 
Framework text for Criteria 5 and 6 on waterbirds and recommended that the COP adopt 
an additional Criterion 9 on "aquatic megafauna", for which a Technical Report will be 
produced in summer 2005 providing background, for the use of the I % threshold. [. . .] 
78. There was considerable discussion of the use of 1 % threshold in relation to aquatic 
megafuna in the proposed Criterion 9. Questions were raised about where the population 
estimates needed for determining I % would come from, and David Stroud cited the 
cooperation of Mariano Gimenez-Dixon and I UCN-SSC's non-avian specialist groups. 
Tobias Salathi wondered whether a great deal of new work might fall to the Secretariat, 
and the SG expressed similar doubts that there would not be enough solid data for many 
species, leading to extra work and contentious arguments. David Stroud explained that the 
proposed Criterion would be linked to an annex of species about which there is suficiently 
reliable data and would thus taxonomically limit the application of the Criterion, and the 
annex would be updated in harmony with IUCN-SSC's specialist groups and others. 
79. The SG [Secretary-General] inquired about where the line would be drawn in 
determining "mega"-fauna, and the DSG [Deputy Secretary- General] preferred the term 
"non-avian wetland-dependent species''. David Stroud thought the Criterion could include 
non-mega fauna, but only if there were good biogeographic and site population estimates. 
The DSG noted that the I % threshold would not be appropriate for some taxonomic groups 
because of their l f e  histories. David Stroud noted that this was also the case for waterbirds 
with respect to Criterion 6. 
80. It was suggested that the annex should include a list of appropriate species, in order to 
get it moving, and more could be added as increased data becomes available. David Stroud 
noted that the waterbird population estimates are not complete, either, but that does not 
impede the utility of Criterion 6. 
r..._I 
83. Tobias Salathk reiterated his doubt that the proposed annex will only list the species 
but not provide the data, and he wondered who will pay for doing that? David Stroud 
promised to discuss that issue with IUCN and report back later in the meeting [see para. 
1041. 
[. . .I 
87. There was discussion about whether the suggested changes to the Strategic Framework 
text should be brought to the COP in an entire new edition of the SF, some parts of it only, 
or just a listing of the proposed additions and changes. 
Decision STRP12-20: The STRP determined to bring [he rationale .for the STRPir 
proposed changes to the Strategic Framework to the COP as an N F O  paper, to propose 
the adoption of' a new Criterion 9 on aquatic ,fauna, and to recommend additions anti 
chcrnges to the Strategic Framnvork, ull subject to the amendments sztggested b y  this 
meeting. Only the proposed changes should bc com~n~tnicated to the COP, and the COP 
shotild be u.9kc.d to mandate the Secretariat to perfirm the editorial tasks of incorpor~ltivzg 
the changes it tzdoptLs. 
Agenda item 10, report back by Working Group 4 on use of the 1% threshold 
104. David Stroud reported back [para. 83 above] on his discussion with IUCN's Mariano 
Gimenez-Dixon, in which they devised a procedure ./or establishing a list of population 
estimates of wetland-dependent /auna and mega-fauna soon and updutirg it in fiture via 
the IUCN's Web-based Speciec. information Service (SIS). It was urge(] that a first list 
should be published as a Ramsar Technical Report at low cost. 
Decision STRP12-25: The STRP endorsed the proposed pi.oces.e .fbr l,r-o~*idirlg upd~~ted 
popula~ion e.st.stinz~ltes .jbr wetl~~ncl-depcnrlent species viu the IUCN's Sj)~jciev iqfOt-tnu~iotz 
Ser-vicv. 
Exchanges such as the one cited above allow interested stakeholders to glean from these minutes the more 
specific nature of experts' concerns as relating to the establishment of a new criteria, providing 
interested stakeholders not only a fuller discussion of the issue that will ultimately be forwarded 
to the COP, but also information as to which experts to contact to gain greater information on 
these specific issues. 
Yet, in addition to the benefits arising from providing detailed minutes or summary 
reports of SAB meetings, stakeholders are, reflecting the increased awareness of SAB 
membership discussed in Chapter 111, increasingly looking to SABs to shed light on those 
actually providing expert advice. 
Participant In formation 
A further dimension of transparency is achieved by making available information on SAB 
participants, beyond their name and the Party or region they represent. The importance of 
diversity criteria such as institutional affiliation, disciplinary expertise and potential conflicts of 
interest (as described in greater detail in Chapter 111) is closely linked to whether the end-users of 
the SAB7s work are provided information on member' diversity characteristics. 
The composition of an Advisory Committee can be a key focus of opponents' attacks, and 
Hilgartner describes how Committees' disciplinary diversity have been used to criticized 
(3ommittee's work in the US context. Yet, if insufficient information about such criteria is 
provided to stakeholders, then the SAB output is all the more vulnerable to dismissal. 
For example, under the Rainsar Wetlands Convention STRP, the Secretariat makes available 
on their website a list of STRP members, including their national and institutional affiliation, as 
well as a brief listing of their areas of expertise, and provides interested Parties an easily 
analyzed snapshot of the expertise coming available to the STRP in completing its work. 
As Parties to the Ozone Regime struggled to reach agreement on the MBTOC's 
I 
recommendations for Critical Use Exemptions, several noted the paucity of information on 
MBTOC members. In particular, developing countries bemoaned the lack of experts from their 
group on the Committee, a reality confirmed by an informal interview with a TEAP Co-chair 
even if no listing of MBTOC participants was readily available to Parties. In fact, while the 
MBTOC reports prepared in October 2003 and February 2004 did include a brief overview of the 
MBTOC review process, they provide no information on the MBTOC membership, not even 
identifying the group's co-Chairs. 
Yet, in the latest report prepared by the MBTOC for the December 2005 MOP, an annex to 
the report includes a detailed list of MBTOC members, including their gender, institutional 
affiliation, areas of specialization, the length of time of service on the MBTOC, and their country 
and its status as an Article 5 Party (this is how the Ozone Regime refers to developing countries). 
The matrix employed by the MBTOC to allay concerns over its membership is illustrative of the 
many options available to SAB leadership in describing their membership, and often SABs have 
chosen to emphasize some criteria over others. 
Under the IPCC, while emphasis has historically been placed on authors' institutional 
affiliation (most often their employing university or government agency) and more recently on 
their nationality, as it prepares its Fourth Assessment Report the IPCC Secretariat is now also 
emphasizing statistics relating to author's gender and developed- or developing-country status. 
As was evidenced in the report on membership characteristics presented by each Working Group 
at IP('C-22. 
Yet, even within the IPCC's work there is variation in the amount and type of information 
disseminated. At IPCC-22, as each Working Group reported its progress on its first draft, 
Working Group 111~~  (mitigation) presented summary statistics of its authors' geographic 
d is t r ib~t ion~~,  economic diversity (distinguishing authors coming from developing countries, 
developed countries, and from countries with economies in transition, the groups' gender 
distribution, and their previous involvement in the Third Assessment Report. Meanwhile, 
Working Group 118' (adaptation) also reported on gender balance, but only provided the number 
of developed or developinghn transition countries, along with the proportion of authors from 
developed countries, from developing countries or countries with economies in transition, or 
from intergovernmental organizations. Furthermore, in its progress report, Working Group I ~ *  
(scientific aspects of climate and climate change) only provides the number of authors involved 
in the preparation of the WGI first draft of the Fourth Assessment Report. While upon its release 
the IPCC reports to provide information on its authors (usually with their name and institutional 
affiliation), it can be expected, based on interviews with stakeholders and discussions at IPCC- 
22, that the IPCC products are more likely to emphasize gender, economic and institutional 
diversity in the future. 
Meanwhile, under the Biodiversity Regime, the Secretariat has introduced the norm of 
making available, most often on the last days of a meeting, a list of participant listing 
'' IPCC-XXIIIDoc. 11 
80 The WG-111 report separates authors from: Africa, Asia developing, Europe, JapanIKorealOceania, Latin 
AmericaICarribbean, and North America. 3 1 % of the author team is from Europe, while 19% is frorn North 
America. 
8 '  IPCC-XXII/Doc. 10 
" IPCC-XXII/Doc .9 
institutional affiliation and addresses for all meeting delegates, be it a COP, a SBSTTA or an ad 
hoc Technical Expert Group. This information however does not provide any insight into 
delegates' expertise or qualifications, and is in fact targeted to serve as a means of exchanging 
contact information rather than a targeted instrument for enhancing transparency. Furthermore, at 
the recent Review of Implementation of the Biodiversity Convention, the need to control that 
"adequate" delegates take part in the SBSTTA reflect a growing concern that the SBSTTA 
brings together more policymakers than scientists. The range in size and expertise of these 
"adequate" delegations and described in greater detail in box IV.2. 
Box IV.2: Selecting "adequate" delegates to take part in SBSTTA. 
The Biodiversity Convention has long struggled with SBSTTA's identity and mandate as 
a science body. As delegates at SBSTTA-11 discussed the future role of SBSTTA, and the 
potential establishment of another international body for biodiversity advice, Parties were 
divided in how they saw the role of SBSTTA in fulfilling the CBD's mandate. Some, 
including in particular Latin American countries, viewed SBSTTA as a science body in its 
own right, qualified to generate science and technical advice for the COP. Meanwhile, others 
emphasized the political nature of the debate within SBSTTA and highlighted the need for an 
assessment process to feed into the SBSTTA. 
This divide is also reflected in the disparity among the size and make-upg3 of delegations 
sent to SBSTTA-11. While Canada (the host country) sent the largest delegation of 26 
representatives, the bulk of these occupy posts as science advisors and technical specialists. 
Meanwhile, the Netherlands's 3 person-delegation included only policy advisors, as did New 
Zealand's 9 delegates. Among developing country Parties, the bulk of them sent only one or 
two delegates, and these often included that country's Biodiversity Convention National 
Focal Point (who in small countries is often responsible for policy and science aspects of the 
issue). In contrast, Saudi Arabia's 7-strong delegation's only clear policy negotiator was its 
representative to Saudi embassy in Canada. Meanwhile, among observers, the United States 
(not a Party to the Convention on Biological Diversity) sent 17 delegates, half of which were 
83 gleaned from their job title and institutional afiiliation 
policy specialists. For the most part IGOs sent technical specialists, while the bulk of NGOs, 
indigenous groups and industry representatives were policy advisors. 
Such disagreement as to which qualifications will ensure "adequate" delegates are sent to 
SBSTTA meetings is sure to be discussed as COP-8 examines the SBSTTA's mandate in 
March 2006, yet as long as SBSTTA meetings are conducted in a policy-oriented plenary 
setting (and indeed following the same Rules of Procedure as the COP), Parties and 
observers are bound to find the need to include at least one policy negotiator on most 
delegations. 
In contrast, the PIC and POPS Convention have made available to the COP submissions by 
Parties containing Review Committee members' CVs and declarations of interests. However, 
these latter CVs do not follow specific guidelines, and in practice the amount of information 
provided ranges from a brief summary of biographical information, to multi-page detailed CVs 
outlining experts' qualifications, work experience and publication records. While on the surface 
this provides much more detailed information about the Committees7 memberships, in effect it is 
much more time-intensive for observers to consult these listings and get a sense of the variation 
on the Committee, as opposed to rapidly visiting the STRP website or consulting the MBTOC 
report and getting a quick snapshot of diversity in membership. In addition, information on 
membership is likely to be more meaninghl to stakeholders if it is provided in combination with 
information on the SAB's process which can in turn provide insight as to which experts carry out 
the bulk of the workg4 reflected in the SAB's output advice. 
As described above, transparency of the SAB's work can be achieved through a variety of 
strategies, which include holding meetings with an open-door policy, but also other approaches 
that may be more or less practicable according to each MEA's specific needs, such as keeping 
stakeholders informed of meetings and deadlines, providing detailed reports of meetings, 
8 I It  is not surprising that SAB members often in the end take disproportionate roles in carrying out the SAB's work, 
but in some cases i t  is really only a very small percentage of those involved that take an active role, prompting one 
Secretariat administrator to identify many of those inactive members as "dead wood." 
granting access to output documents but also to source information, presenting a clear picture of 
the deliberation process and of those involved in that process. Indeed, these different types of 
transparency all impact the resulting SAB consensus' validity and sustainability. In seeking out 
science advice MEAs face different challenges, and provisions to enhance the transparency of 
their SABs should be tailored to their specific needs. Ultimately, it is stakeholders' assessment of 
this transparency which will influence both the outputs' validity (as transparency can influence 
participants' willingness to take part in these science efforts), and its sustainability (as 
transparency can increase political buy-in to the SAB outcome. 
In a sense, SAB administrators are often called upon to exercise flexibility in identifying 
means of improving their overall transparency, for example by opting to hold closed-door 
meetings to ensure participation by industry groups wary of disclosing proprietary information, 
while also opting to release information on the institutional affiliation of those consulted by the 
SAB in this process and developing and presenting clear norms and procedures to guide the 
SAB's work. Yet, the establishment of such rigorous norms and procedures may be perceived, at 
first examination, to limit the flexibility necessary for SABs to carry out their work. In fact, as 
described in the next section, flexibility too can present many facets which in concert will also 
enhance the outcome's validity and sustainability. 
FLEXIBILITY 
The flexibility granted an SAB in organizing its work is crucial to the outcome's validity. In 
fact, too rigid a process (which can often be seen as a straightforward means of ensuring 
transparency) can deter the validity of the outcome by alienating some experts who may be more 
accustomed to operating in what are often more informal settings and interactions, which are 
more common in the academic community. The scientific process often relies heavily on 
informal interactions (Knorr Cetina, 1999), which has been credited with spurring innovation and 
enhancing bridging activities. Indeed, efforts to find ways of fostering some informal interaction 
can positively impact the SAB outcome's validity. Validity can be further enhanced if for 
instance the SAB is granted the flexibility to adapt its work to react to new developments in 
scientific inquiry or the emergence of urgent questions. 
And, as much as the SAB output's transparency can benefit from stakeholders knowing that 
the SAB is carrying out its work according to rigorous, and agreed upon, norms and procedures, 
examination of the cases studied for this thesis highlight how granting SAB administrators some 
flexibility in organizing their work, calling on qualified experts and maintaining institutional 
history will not only contribute to improved validity, by ensuring that experts are not alienated 
by the process' rigidity, but will also improved sustainability, by ensuring the approval of both 
the policymaker and expert communities. 
Just as the examination of these cases highlighted the existence of different types of diversity 
and of transparency, I propose that there are several aspects of flexibility whose application will 
contribute to this increase in validity and sustainability of the SAB consensus, these include 
flexibility afforded to the running of meetings, but also encompasses the expansion of the 
network of contributing experts, the adaptation of norms and procedures, and provisions for 
ensuring continuity and retention of institutional memory. 
Organization of Work 
SABs often have well defined Rules of procedureg5 guiding the way in which SABs organize 
their work. These rules will generally specify administrative requirements (i.e. chairing 
requirements), and also rules for the holding of meetings. Several SABs have also exercised 
8.5 The Rules of Procedure governing each of the MEAs studied in this thesis are identified in the official documents 
section of the bibliography. 
flexibility in distributing the work before them among its membership, a step which can enhance 
the output's validity by ensuring that those most qualified self-select to serve as appropriate, and 
can improve the output's sustainability by contributing to the SAB's efficient operation. 
Under the Ramsar Wetlands Convention, experts are distributed among working groups 
entrusted to carry out intersessional work on different agenda items and report back to the whole 
STRP, and as a result dedicated small groups of STRP experts have taken the lead in developing 
their area of work, including in developing concepts applicable to broader applications. Also 
under the Ramsar Wetlands Convention, the STRP has been successful in providing the COP 
more immediate guidance. For example, at the Ramsar COP-9 held in November 2005, delegates 
were able to discuss the implications for wetlands management of the, at the time, much 
publicized impending threat of an avian bird flu pandemic. 
Under the Biodiversity Regime the SBSTTA operates under the COP'S Rules of Procedure, 
and meetings are held in plenary setting, with simultaneous translation into the 6 UN languages. 
SBSTTA generally divides its work into two parallel working groups also held in plenary 
settings with interpretation. However, such organization of work may not lead to the most 
efficient use of delegates7 time, since not all experts can be expected to intervene equally on all 
items. SBSTTA Chairs do often exercise their discretion in establishing other fora for reaching 
agreement, including contact groups (small groups in more informal settings open to all Parties 
and observers, but without interpretation), informal consultations (involving Parties only), 
"friends of the Chair" groups (bringing together a limited number of Parties), or even by 
deferring to bilateral negotiations. 
Such administrative leeway can help in brokering agreement on contentious issues, yet even 
in the context of policy debate these recourses have also been blamed with compromising the 
process' transparency and, in the long run, its sustainability. At the December 2005 MOP of the 
Ozone Regime in fact, observers noted the marked increase in informal consultations and 
bilateral negotiations. They noted that such organization of work had indeed precluded the need 
to convene a third Ex-MOP (concerns over the MBTOC's recommendations for Critical Use 
Exemptions were in fact resolved bilaterally between the United States and the European 
C:ommunity), but may have slowed the progress of the Ozone Regime overall and compromised 
its tradition of an open and democratic processxh. 
Under the Rotterdam PIC Convention, the Chemical Review Committee also sets up working 
groups to consider nominations for listing- with the Committee as a whole designating the 
Chairs or co-Chairs for these groups. Committee members then decide which, and how many, 
committees in which to take part, and this work is carried out in parallel sessions at CRC 
meetings and also completed in between CRC meetings. The Committee as a whole (or a 
working group including almost all members) usually tackle the more contentious issues, while 
other considerations may involve only a small group of as few as 8 experts87. 
Flexibility in the organization of work also carries significant implications as to the validity 
and sustainability of the outcome arising from linguistic implications. The POPs Review 
Committee, SBSTTA, SBSTA and Plenary meetings of the IPCC all include simultaneous 
translation at meetings, and the decision to break out into small working groups most inevitably 
implies that most, if not all, of these sub-groups will continue their work in English only. 
As expressed at COP-1 of the Stockholm POPs Convention (see Chapter III), but also as 
confirmed in interviews and surveys, there is a deep divide between developed and developing 
countries as to the impact of providing interpretation at SAB meetings. Developing countries 
-- - 
"' A Arjef Analysis o f  MOP-17, contained in ENB, Vol. 19 No. 47 
87 Report of CRC-1, and ICRC Reports available at: 
http://www.pic.int/en/viewpage.asp?Id C'at=70&mTitre=MEETINGS+%26+-DOCUhlENTS 
adamantly maintain that it is only through such interpretation that the best experts, especially 
from their regional groups, will generate the most valid outcome. In addition, their strong stance 
on the issue suggests that the outcome's sustainability is likely to suffer without provisions to 
maintain some interpretation at SAB meetings. In contrast, developed countries, and most 
vocally those of the European Union maintain that such arrangements will hinder the outcome's 
validity by constricting discussion, and will hinder the process' sustainability by placing 
unnecessary financial burdens on the MEA administration. 
Expanding Expertise 
It is also common that, as SABs are consulted for science advice on a wide variety of topics, 
that the membership agreed upon by the COP does not include enough of the expertise most 
relevant to a given concern. In such situations, SABs that maintain the flexibility to consult those 
most qualified experts are in a better situation for producing a more valid outcome. Reaching out 
in such a way, either through the Secretariat or through members' existing networks, will help 
ensure the output's validity but will also shore up sustainability as stakeholders are unlikely to 
stand by an output which did not involve the consultation of those widely acknowledge as 
"world authorities" on a specific topic. 
Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Secretariat is often called upon to provide 
background information to the SBSTTA on some of the more contentious issues before it. 
According to the SBSTTA modus operandi, the Secretariat usually sends out an invitation to 
Parties to forward the necessary information. However, this rarely occurs since most Parties 
struggle to submit the necessary reports on national implementation let alone find the time and 
resources to prepare necessarily broad overviews of the issue. Most often, the Secretariat is then 
tasked with contracting out this task, and the SBSTTA entrusts the Secretariat with identifying 
consultants qualified for presenting the state of the art of knowledge on an issue. 
Most SBSTTA meetings therefore include keynote presentations on topics under review 
according to the agenda. As such, as the Fourth meeting of the SBSTTA met in July 1999 to 
discuss the available knowledge on what many were calling "terminator" seeds (seeds with gene 
restrictive technologies which in effect preclude more than one year of growth), the Secretariat 
turned to Richard Jefferson, Chair of the Center for the Application of Molecular Biology in 
International Agriculture, to author an expert assessment and explain the scientific process 
involved. Similarly, under the Cartagena Protocol, when the ad hoc Expert Group on Liability 
and Redress sought guidance on issues of risk assessment for biosafety, the Secretariat called 
upon independent consultants (who had previously been affiliated with environmental non- 
governmental organizations) to present their knowledge and experience with risk assessment. I 
Other processes prefer to entrust SAB members with the selection of consultants. For 
example, under the POPS Convention large sections of the BATIBEP expert group report 
presented to COP-1 are readily acknowledge as having been prepared in large part by 
consultantsEE. At COP-1, the output of this group was perceived as developed-country biased and 
it remains to be seen to what extent consultants will be relied upon, and to what effect, in 
preparing the group's next report. 
This notion of relying on experts' judgment and knowledge in reaching out to a broader 
expertise base for completing the SABs work is especially reflected under the revised modus 
operandi of the STRP approved in November 2005 at COP-9 of the Ramsar Wetlands 
Convention. Under these new proposed guidelines, the selection of experts (not exclusively by 
Parties, but based on party nominations by a small committee) will not only take into account 
X X 
as readily acknowledged in interviews with Convention administrators. 
national, economic, geographic or disciplinary diversity, but will also seek to expand the STRP's 
reach among different networks of expertise, in order to allow a broader base of expertise to feed 
in to what is still (by most MEA standards) a small SAB. 
Similarly, the recently approved detailed working procedures for the MBTOC note that "with 
a view to supporting a timely review process and ensuring additional expertise that may be 
required for a particular critical-use nomination, MBTOC may seek assistance from additional 
experts," yet this provision for flexibility in expanding the SAB's membership also tempered by 
the recommendation that: "[flor reasons of transparency and accountability, the role and type of 
input of these consulting experts should be clearly set out." 
Under the IPCC, the leadership of the Working Groups is granted significant leeway in 
nominating experts, as lead and contributing authors, but also as reviewing authors, to 
supplement those experts nominated by governments. Such flexibility is also credited 
(O'Riordan and Jordan, 1996) with shoring up the credibility of the IPCC output to ensure that 
no clear dissenting view is excluded from the IPCC process. 
Adapting norms and procedures 
The norms and procedures put in place to standardize and control the work of the SAB 
also can benefit from some elements of flexibility, especially in order to ensure that "non- 
conventional" sources of knowledge are taken into account. The most public aspect of the work 
of many of these SABs relates to the review and compilation of the "current state" or "state of 
the art" of knowledge and research on the issue. Yet, as it carries out this task, each of these 
SABs faces several decision moments where judgments and assessments of knowledge occur and 
can in effect signal the legitimation of forms and avenues of research (this is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 11). 
Perhaps the most readily accepted source of knowledge lies in that produced through the 
peer-review process; yet the flaws of journal peer-review are generally acknowledged (Jasanoff, 
1995; Chubin and Hackett, 1990; Edwards and Schneider, 2001), and of particular interest, are 
concerns over blind-reviews, the difficulty in introducing non-mainstream views, and the biases 
which often hinder publication by developing country scientists (Mainguy et al, 2005). The 
under-representation of local and traditional knowledge in the peer review process are also 
generally acknowledged (Wynne; Jasanoff and Martello, 2004) and SABs vary greatly in the 
extent to which, and the means through, which they seek out this class of knowledge. 
In this regard, SABs can exercise flexibility in engaging and seeking out classes of 
knowledge or considerations which may not be captured by the norms and procedures developed 
and approved by the COP. In compiling "existing knowledge," SABs are also faced with the 
English-language bias prevailing across much of academia today. SABs face numerous technical 
impediments to drawing on even peer-reviewed non-English language published infomation. 
The inclusion of so-called grey literature (produced by government or international agencies) 
also varies from MEA to MEA, and is further complicated by the fact that some countries' grey- 
papers may vary in their availability to the SAB members. Nevertheless, the flexibility to draw 
on non-published sources is afforded to IPCC authors since the review procedures allow for the 
review team to assess these sources and also includes a procedure for making these sources 
available for consultation in a central archive. 
The flexibility to adapt prescriptive rules of procedure to ensure that all stakeholders7 
interests are at least considered in preparing the science advice can significantly improve the 
output's validity. Yet in order to retain the sustainability created by a rigorous and decision- 
communicate approved peer review process for example, it is helpful for the SAB to clearly 
communicate the standards and aims of this flexibility to the MEA stakeholders. For example, 
under the POPS Convention, the POPRC has been entrusted with developing, for COP approval, 
guidelines for assessing the relevance and applicability of so-called "bridging information" so 
that Parties, in nominating chemicals for listing, can submit an assessment prepared for 
application to another country. Similarly, the PIC CRC is entrusted with preparing, also for 
review by the COP, guidelines for applying the concept of "risk evaluation." 
Nevertheless, granting an SAB too much flexibility, especially when accompanied by a lack 
of transparency, can only enhance the lack of sustainability of the SAB outcome, and also creates 
doubts as to the outcome's validity. When the MBTOC first began reviewing Critical Use 
Nominations for methyl bromide use in developed countries, Parties had no information on the 
process used in decision-making, and the MBTOC was not bound by any guidelines in carrying 
out its work, which could have alleviated such concerns. 
Under the Biodiversity Regime, to an extent such flexibility is reflected in the ease with 
which the COP and the SBSTTA have been able to establish ad hoc groups to address more 
problematic issues before them. However, there are doubts as to whether such flexibility has 
enhanced the validity of the outcome of these expert bodies. Several observers and participants 
have complained about the recent proliferation of such bodies, and a few have even implied that 
the most thorny issues are only being shuffled from group to group and are not at all contributing 
to consensus at all. In fact, this perhaps exemplifies, just as the lack of guiding procedures in the 
original MBTOC, the limitations of granting too much flexibility to a SAB. 
Members of the Ramsar STRP are also granted the flexibility to identify areas of work 
beyond those initially set out by the COP. And indeed, in the latest triennium, this was 
exemplified by the STRP initiative to develop an integrated framework for water resource 
management, even though it "was not in the original mandate" (STRP-12 Report, 2005). Thls 
has contributed to COP'S satisfaction with the validity of the STRP outcome, and consequently 
strengthened the consensus' sustainabili ty. 
Ensuring Continuity 
As the membership of these SABs rotate over time, several SAB's terms of reference have 
included provisions which set out details of the nomination and length of office, both to ensure 
rotation and facilitate membership diversity. At the same time, it is also necessary for the SAB to 
find means of ensuring continuity and institutional history. This has been achieved, for example, 
by maintaining, even if they are not released to non-members, records of SAB meetings, and also 
by taking steps that may include past members in perhaps an advisory manner, or making special 
provisions to extend terms of some experts whose leadership or expertise is too difficult to 
replace. 
This emphasis on continuity was at the root of negotiations, in the terms of reference for the 
Rotterdam PIC Convention Chemical Review Committee, to stagger the nomination cycle of its 
members so that only half the membership would be subject to renewal or replacement every 2 
years. This is complicated by the fact that SABs may not face the resource privileges of the 
IPCC, which generally retains its long-time authors while still bringing on board new 
contributors to its ever expanding author base, more generally facing size constraints and the 
need to maintain diversity and even rotations of experts. 
This latter limitation is circumvented under the Stockholm POPs Convention, where it has 
become common practice, first for the interim UNEP Chemicals Programme and now for the 
POPs Convention Secretariat, to often employ individuals who have previously served as 
government delegates, some of whom have also been technical experts, but who, after several 
years of service often return to the ranks of Party representatives. Such flexibility in blurring the 
line between administrators and Parties by ensuring that expertise is retained even as 
membership rotates can ensure the output's validity and, in the POPs context at least, has yet to 
affect the SAB output' sustainability, likely a result of the trust and goodwill which is the 
hallmark of the POPs and PIC negotiation processes and often commented on by Parties, 
administrators and observers alike. 
The Biodiversity Regime does not benefit from such continuity, and in fact a large number of 
SBSTTA participants, and especially those from developing countries, are often attending their 
first SBSTTA, due to the rapid pace of post change in those ministries. Beyond the obvious 
detrimental effect to the sustainability of the outcome if SAB participants haven't been able to 
forge links with their policy counterparts, such high turnover can also impact the validity of the 
outcome as contributing experts will often need time to learn to navigate the SAB's operating 
process. 
In contrast, the Ramsar STRP and Ozone MBTOC do not provide guidelines or term limits 
for their SAB members - which can ensure that continuity of expertise is retained, but can 
conversely lead to concerns of organizational sclerosis. Such a concern has begun to be 
acknowledged by the MBTOC, which, in its latest report not only provided information on its 
experts7 gender, nationality, institutional affiliation and area of expertise, but also in the length of 
their involvement with the MBTOC. 
CONCLUSION 
Both transparency and flexibility in fact are made up of several types of transparency and 
several types of flexibility which are reflected in the SAB's organization of work. Examination 
of the cases studied for this thesis leads to the conclusion that the effective management of these 
many types of flexibility and transparency are necessary to a valid and sustainable SAB 
outcome, yet their management must also be tailored to the needs and particularities of each 
MEA. The link between a transparent and flexible process and the resulting consensus are 
summarized for each of the six cases in Table IV. 1. 
Table IV. 1 : The relationship between process and consensus across the cases. ' 
CASE 
Ramsar 
Wetlands 
Convention 
Ozone 
Regime 
Biodiversity 
Regime 
PROCESS & CONSENSUS 
Access vs. transparency of minutes 
Access to STRP meetings limited (except for wide range of invited IGO partners) 
Detailed minutes of STRP meetings help sustainability of outcome 
Flexibility: organization of work 
STRP granted flexibility for most qualified experts to concentrate on relevant areas of work 
Leads to more valid outcome, more directly relevant to Parties' needs and counters concerns of 
national-centric STRP nominations at expense of expertise 
Flexibility of nominations to STRP 
Under new modus operandi shift to selection burden to Standing Committee, Secretariat, 
STRP Chair 
Transparent criteria for selection, ranked in order of importance 
2003-2005 MBTOC output not sustainable 
Many Parties noted concern with lack of transparency of process 
No understanding qfprocedure for review 
No understanding ef basis f ir  decision-making 
Concerns over membership tied to lack of transparency of participation and meeting info. 
No information on membership in M T O C  
Little infbrmation on MBTOC meeting (where, when, who, how long) 
Too much flexibility: MBTOC process = black box 
High level of mistrust, even internal criticisms 
Dec. 2005 MBTOC Working Procedures 
Emphasis on transparency 
Provisions for flexibility to consult wider expert pool, tied to transparency of process 
SBSTTA 
Transparency of meetings 
Open access to all Parties and observers 
Simultaneous interpretation 
Detailed meeting reports 
Flexibility for infonnal deliberations 
0ften.for more contentious issues, can help reach consensus - 
but is it most valid/susfainable consenszrs? 
Risk of'e.1-i.luding small delegations, non-english speakers 
(long term validity and s~istuinability implications) 
Flexibility to bring in consultants 
1ncrea.ve.s c.fficienc:\l - prepares starting point, for negotiations 
Lack of'o\~c~rsight in con.strltant selection - vzrlnerability to attack 
Flexiblity to establish ad hoc groups 
Most qualifietl experts can self-select for participation 
Concerns in overloaded meeting schedule (again risk of exclusion) 
Potential to shuffle contentious issue from group to group without resolution 
Both transparency and flexibility are essential for achieving a sustainable and valid 
consensus, yet at first glance too much of either of these might be considered detrimental. In fact, 
increased transparency is often presented as a trade-off for validity, while increased flexibility is 
assumed to reduce any resulting consensus' sustainability (Cash et al, 2003). In assessing which 
aspects of transparency and flexibility warrant special attention for a successful SAB, it is also 
necessary to examine the way in which transparency and flexibility may counter-act each other. 
For example, it is foreseeable that over-emphasizing transparency as relating to carefully 
scripted review procedures may hinder SAB members' flexibility to seek out necessary sources 
of information. Yet, rather than framing this interconnectedness between transparency and 
CASE 
Climate 
Regime 
Rotterdam 
PIC 
Convention 
Stockholm 
POPS 
Convention 
PROCESS & CONSENSUS 
Transparency of draftinglreview process 
Clearly set out nonns and procedures 
Compensutes,for lack of' access to actual reliews (e\vn ~ftheoretically accessible) 
Information and stats provided on contributors 
Although beyond distinction of lead uuthor.~, Eitrle infirmation on who wrote what a 
strengthens impression o f  unified consensus 
Differentiation in levels of output 
Different levels of review allow policy-makers to differently weigh outputs 
Transparency strategy 
Includes reports of plenary, and production of brochures emphasizing review process (but concerns 
over their review, and broadcasting as "IPCC materials" 
Flexibility (mixed record) 
Some flexibility (for example in drawing on non-published research) follows strict norms and 
procedures 
Other flexibility (for example in selecting contributing authors) much less transparent and falls under 
"leadership discretion" 
Access to meetings 
CRC and POPRC - invitations to observers 
but how to deal with proprietary info? 
BATJBEP - subject to COP RoP 
Observer attendance vs. lobbying influence and interest declarations 
Flexibility to organize work 
Efficiency enhanced through small committee work (self selection of most relevant expertise) 
Implications for language in POPRC vs. working groups 
Transparency of organization of work 
Detailed meeting reports (prepared by Secretariat) 
Tied to development of norms and procedures 
Devised by Committee, approved by COP, applied by Committee 
But limitations tied to policy constructs? Bridging, risk evaluation 
flexibility as a trade-off, the multidimensionality of each of these two components can be applied 
in concert to maxllnize both validity and sustainability. 
The scientific process has a long-standing tradition of conducting at least some of its work 
behind closed doors, and in situations where the process' validity requires some of the work of 
the SAB to be "black boxed," SAB managers should seek to then shed light on other aspects of 
the SABs process, so as to guarantee a minimum threshold of transparency without which any 
findings will be vulnerable to criticism and are unlikely to be acceptable in the long run. 
If SAB managers chose to move the deliberations of the SAB itself "backstage", then it is 
incumbent upon those managers (if they seek to enhance transparency), to make particular efforts 
to communicate information about the decision-making process and the SAB's organization of 
work to interested Parties and observers. Information on who chaired the SAB meeting, but also 
details of the review and drafting processes, or the organization of any working groups, will all 
contribute to shedding light on the rigor of the SAB process and on the process' insulation from 
political pressures which may affect its validity and sustainability. 
The extent to which the SAB is granted the flexibility to deviate from its prescribed 
organization of work affects how easily SAB members will be able to take extraordinary steps to 
increase the output's validity when necessary and preclude any attacks to the SAB's 
sustainability (for example if it becomes clear that the most qualified experts have not been 
consulted). Conversely, granting too much flexibility in organizing work may decrease the 
accountability granted by transparently set out norms and procedures. A similar challenge arises 
from increased reliance among SABs on virtual fora for conducting work. 
As discussions and drafting are not only delegated to smaller groups but also shifted "online" 
to e-mail exchanges and internet portals (as is the case with the Ramsar Wetlands Convention's 
STRP Support Service which is restricted to STRP members and STRP National Focal pointsg9), 
in effect a significant portion of SAB's work is being moved "offline," and it becomes all the 
more essential to increase transparency at least as relating to how this work is being carried out 
and by whom. In order to contribute to a net increase in validity and sustainability, such 
flexibility should be accompanied by transparent disclosure of information on these experts, their 
selection, and any conflicts of interest. 
The combination of a flexible and transparent process with representative membership 
contributes to the production of a valid and sustainable science consensus, and the examples 
discussed above can be used to extract lessons to inform the design of SABs which could operate 
successfully in practice. Chapter V highlights the lessons learned from this thesis and applies its 
result to the current discussions on the need for a new science advisory process under the 
biodiversity regime. 
x9 The STRP Support Service is described in h ttp://www.ramsar.org/sc/29/key_sc29 report- annex3.htm which 
details its terms of reference 
CHAPTER V: A VALID AND SUSTAINABLE SCIENCE CONSENSUS 
While science advisory bodies to MEAs fblfill a wide spectrum of needs - including agenda 
setting, public education and outreach, and monitoring and assessment - the core function of 
SABs in fact relates to their role in brokering a valid and sustainable consensus on the science of 
the issue at hand. This consensus facilitates negotiations for effective coordinated global action. 
Prior to discussing my recommendations for improving the provision of science advice, I will 
briefly provide an overview of the examination of the science advisory process presented in 
greater detail in chapters 11, I11 and IV. 
Science has been identified by many scholars as a key ingredient in MEA effectiveness 
(Young and Demko, 1996; Birnie, 1996; Guppy, 1996; O'Riordan and Jordan, 1996; Parson, 
2003; Susskind, 1994; Social Learning Group, 2001; Haas et al, 1992) and, although there is no 
clear picture of what constitutes "effective science advice," I propose here that the most effective 
science input into policy negotiations is an agreed upon body of information describing a 
problem and analyzing possible solutions. 
Yet, even if the mandate of the SABs focuses on a review of existing knowledge, in carrying 
out their work the experts taking part in the SAB are in fact doing much more, even if this aspect 
of their work is not always explicitly acknowledged by those carrying out this work (van der 
Sluijs et al., 1998). Nevertheless there is an emerging field of scholarship acknowledging the 
extent to which these science advisory bodies, at the national and global level, are acting as more 
than mere compilers of scientific information, but are in fact sites of knowledge production 
(Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Miller and Edwards, 2001; Jasanoff and Martello; 2004). In taking 
a closer look at this production of knowledge, it is usehl to consider three broad types of 
knowledge production: framing and agenda setting; classification and standards; and methods. 
Of course there are many interlinkages among these, and while they are by no means 
independent of each other, they can provide useful lenses for shedding light on how these SABs 
are more than just assessors of knowledge, and are in fact producing new knowledge as they 
produce this consensus on matters of science to feed in to the MEA decision-making. 
A consensus on the science is not sufficient however for "effective" science advice - in order 
to at least facilitate effective regimes (there are a host of reasons why regimes will fail to be 
effective despite timely and accurate science advice (Miles et al, 2002; Young, 1999; Young, 
Dernko and Ramakrishna; 1996)) this consensus needs to be valid (accurately reflect the 
scientific knowledge on the issue) and also needs to be sustainable (arise from an inclusive 
process so that stakeholders do not oppose it or require its permanent renegotiation). 
Based on the in-depth examination of SABs of the six MEAs reviewed in this study, two 
components of an SAB's design and operation appear to be necessary to ensure a valid and 
sustainable consensus on matters of science: representative membership and a transparent and 
flexible process. And, while these two components are shown to be important in fostering a valid 
and sustainable consensus - the practical means of achieving representativeness, transparency 
and flexibility will vary according to the nature of the problem and the stakeholders involved. 
The second half of this chapter seeks to describe a new method of incorporating these findings 
into a better system for providing science advice to MEAs. 
Representative membership is attained by ensuring that the limited number of experts on the 
SAB reflect the national, economic and geographic diversity of stakeholders (capturing interests 
of those benefiting and suffering from the problem or its solution), while also maintaining an 
institutional and disciplinary diversity suitable to the nature of the problem (including those 
directly or traditionally implicated in the study or management of the problem, while still 
allowing input from other experts more tangentially-related who are likely to identify inter- 
problem linkages). Representative membership also applies to more personal attributes likely to 
influence an expert's frame, such as gender and political discourse. 
Representativeness contributes to both the validity and sustainability of a consensus, and 
different types of diversity will impact the consensus' validity and sustainability. In terms of the 
consensus' validity, national, economic and regional diversity facilitate the inclusion of relevant 
local and traditional knowledge, while disciplinary diversity captures more of the state-of-the-art 
in assessing the problem. Institutional diversity helps include cutting-edge knowledge (for 
example proprietary information held by industry) and more practically-gained knowledge (for 
instance arising from the hands-on management on a broad scale by government agencies). 
As to the consensus' sustainability, national, economic, regional, institutional and gender 
diversity help to ensure that all relevant stakeholders feel some ownership of the SAB's 
recommendations. To this end the appropriate balance of diversity will vary across MEAs. It 
especially needs to reflect the coalitions of interests surrounding a particular MEA's core focus 
and include the necessary types of expertise necessary to craft a valid outcome. 
Yet, even if an SAB could take stock of representational needs, practical considerations limit 
the possibilities of acknowledging all underrepresented stakeholders through combinations of 
representation. Nevertheless, an SAB could institute at least discrete (less frequent but more 
targeted efforts) to include all relevant voices at key moments of the SAB's work. Accordingly, 
it would be necessary to ensure representation from a broader array of countries and institutional 
affiliations, while ensuring as well disciplinary diversity, input from local and traditional 
knowledge, and a variation in experts' more personal attributes (jrlcluding for example age, 
gender and political views). Indeed, every time an SAB is put in place, its creators face the 
challenge of ensuring such a small committee represents the whole world- or at least is 
constituted in such a way that the whole world recognizes the validity of its output. 
These many kinds of diversity at play in examining SAB membership will vary in the way in 
which they interplay and affect the resulting consensus7 validity and sustainability. Some aspects 
of diversity will necessarily gain prominence over others, as the COP attempts to negotiate a 
membership balance suitable to generating a valid and sustainable outcome. In light of what are 
often intractable size constraints, those selecting SAB members will have to seek out scientists 
that fulfill more than one diversity variable as it is not desirable, or even practicable, for instance, 
to have a geographical diverse, gender balanced assortment of experts representing each 
disciplinary specialization. 
Striving for representative membership is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to predict 
which types of diversity are most likely to impact the resulting consensus. Furthermore, the 
dynamics of any MEA are likely to evolve over time and as such any SAB modus operandi 
should include provisions for regularly revisiting guidelines for representative membership. 
While a coordinated membership strategy is warranted at the SAB level, the SAB should be 
granted the flexibility to assess whether, for example, some of its more specialized investigations 
warrant at least temporary adjustments to its membership scheme. 
The SAB's process, more specifically the transparency and flexibility of its organization of 
work, will also impact the consensus' validity and sustainability. Transparency of the SAB's 
work can be achieved through a variety of strategies, which include holding meetings with an 
open-door policy, but also other approaches that may be more or less practicable according to 
each MEA's specific needs, such as keeping stakeholders informed of meetings and deadlines, 
providing detailed reports of meetings, granting access to output documents but also to source 
information, presenting a clear picture of the deliberation process and of those involved in that 
process. Indeed, in seeking out science advice MEAs face different challenges, and provisions to 
enhance the transparency of their SABs should be tailored to their specific needs. Ultimately, it 
is stakeholders' assessment of this transparency which will influence both the outputs' validity 
(as transparency can influence participants7 willingness to take part in these science efforts), and 
its sustainability (as transparency can increase political buy-in to the SAB outcome. 
Increased flexibility in carrying out the SAB7s work can improve the output's validity by 
ensuring that the necessary sources of knowledge are consulted in generating the science advice 
and can ensure participation by experts by not putting in place rigid protocols that might alienate 
experts and deter their particpation. Furthermore, flexibility in the organization of work (for 
example in shifting to informal negotiations) can shore up the output's sustainability by making 
the process not only more responsive to decision-makers needs, but also more efficient in 
addressing the agenda items before it. 
Both of these attributes are essential for achieving a sustainable and valid consensus, yet at 
first glance too much of either of these might be considered detrimental. In fact, increased 
transparency is often presented as a trade-off for validity, while increased flexibility is assumed 
to reduce legitimacy and any resulting consensus' sustainability. For example, making all 
scientific deliberations open to observers and transcripted as matters of public record has been 
attributed with limiting the scope of deliberations and hindering innovation in the long run. 
Similarly, granting too much flexibility in organizing work may decrease the accountability 
granted by set out norms and procedures. 
In the end, I have found through the study of 6 cases is that those SABs that have presented 
representative membership and transparent and flexible process will achieve a more valid and 
sustainable consensus. The following brief exa~nples from cases described in greater detail in the 
previous chapters will illustrate how this relationship between consensus and 
membership/process has played out in practice. 
The worst possible outcome under the theory described above arises from an SAB whose 
membership and process leave a lot to be desired, as had been the case with the Ozone regime's 
Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee (MBTOC), which has been plagued with 
criticisms over its membership (critics are quick to highlight an industry-heavy, and mostly 
developed country participants list) and its process (the only product of the MBTOC is its report 
submitted to the COP and its detractors have no insight into its decision-making processes or the 
source of information being drawn upon for purposes of decision making). 
This inability to generate a valid or sustainable consensus has paralyzed the MEA's process 
over the last two years (requiring the unprecedented convening of two extraordinary MOPS, 
events which place further logistical and financial burdens on the Parties), and has in fact 
prompted the MBTOC to undergo a review and reorganization, emphasizing in particular 
increased participation by developing country experts and enhanced transparency. 
The CBD's SBSTTA is an example where representative membership is achieved by virtue 
of allowing it to function in the same way as a policy forum, and by extension replicating the 
CBD's model for access to what are often underrepresented interests, for example indigenous 
groups and environmental NGOs. However the SBSTTA also suffers from a clouded and rigid 
process which hinders the validity and sustainability of its outcome. The SBSTTA operates 
according to the same rules of procedure as the COP, and brings together policymakers for the 
most part. The deliberation of issues in two parallel working groups is not necessarily conducive 
to discussing the substance of the science advice, and instead the delegates, most often 
policymakers themselves, revert to negotiating linguistic details of recommendations. 
At SBSTTA- 1 1 in December 2005, many participants complained about the politicization of, 
for example, negotiating the language of a recommendation describing the findings of the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment instead of providing substantial science advice for acting 
upon the Assessment's findings. Delegates were also often faced with two extremes of 
deliberation, delegates were either negotiating small textual details in Plenary (with simultaneous 
translation) or conversely a few Parties were taking part in informal consultations on the most 
contentious issues (for example on drafting a recommendation on positive incentive measures 
and valuation tools). This resulted in most of the science-relevant discussions being moved 
behind closed doors to most stakeholders. 
The process also suffers from the confusion reigning at present as regarding science advice 
under the biodiversity regime - while the SBSTTA is the core SAB, the CBD has also spurred 
the creation of numerous ad hoc "expert" working groups, maintains a roster of experts 
(searchable by discipline or nationality), took part in the recently completed large-scale 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, and has yet to address a January 2005 proposal by France to 
establish an equivalent to the IPCC on biodiversity matters. The confusion arising out of these 
often ill-defined ventures only cloud transparency and weaken the outcome of any of these 
science efforts. 
Yet other science advisory processes benefit from solid and well-respected process 
arrangements, but are often criticized when it comes to their membership. Two SABs exhibited 
such symptoms in their early days of existence: the lPCC and the Ralnsar Convention STRP. In 
both cases, membership concerns have been repeatedly addressed, and the validity and 
sustainability of the science consensus generated has been bolstered as a result. 
When it was first established, the IPCC's legitimacy in academic circles was strengthened by 
its close adherence to strict principles of peer-review, yet its reliance on what were mostly 
westem-trained scientists fiom a few disciplines weakened both the validity and sustainability of 
the resulting scientific consensus. And even if the early consensus produced by the IPCC were 
able to successfully feed in to the policy process (and have been highlighted as contributing to 
the negotiation not only of the UNFCCC but also of the Kyoto Protocol), the reach of the IPCC7s 
output has been bolstered in subsequent years (for the production of the third and fourth 
assessment report and also of special reports), and the availability of the IPCC7s Fourth 
Assessment Report has been a key consideration as countries prepare to negotiate post-Kyoto 
commitments. Indeed, the targets outlined in the Kyoto Protocol apply for the 2008-20 12 range, 
and it is widely expected that negotiations on any post-2012 instruments would have to be well 
under way by the end of 2007, and at the 22nd Plenary of the IPCC in November 2004, some 
countries were keen to ensure its Summary for Policymakers would be released in time to feed 
into those negotiations (ENB, vol. 12 no. 1 48). 
In its more recent incarnation, the IPCC has not only expanded its authorship base, but 
has also expanded input from developing country scientists, access to local and traditional 
knowledge, and gender diversity (Siebenhuner, 2003; Agrawal, 1999; ENB, vol. 12 no. 148). The 
IPCC now places great stake in the fact that most chapters have co-"lead authors" from each a 
developed and a developing country, and highlights the steady increase in gender diversity 
among its broader author pool. In terms of tapping into traditional and local knowledge, the 
IPCC has emphasized the importance of relying on local knowledge in small island developing 
States, especially as relating to mitigation and adaptation to climate change. These develop~nents 
constitute a key element of the IPCC's public image and have taken away ammunition for some 
of the criticisms voiced against the early IPCC process. 
Similarly, when the Ramsar Wetlands Convention first established the Scientific and 
Technical Review Panel in 1993, it already exhibited much of its transparency and flexibility but 
its membership was very restricted. In its original incarnation, in 1993, the STRP had only 6 
members. In intervening years, the COP has adapted its membership in attempts to find a 
process, which generates the most valid and sustainable outcome, with varying measures of 
success. In 2003, the STRP was expanded, but did not provide for control on which experts 
regions nominated to serve on the panel. By the end of the 2003-2005 triennium there were 
complaints that previous efforts at expanding the STRP7s membership had in fact hindered the 
outcome by reducing the stock of available expertise. Some interviewees actively involved in the 
STRP's work noted that only a few of the STRP members were cawing out the bulk of the 
Panel's work, while several other experts did not interact through the online interface in between 
meetings and sometimes did not even take part in the meetings themselves. These same 
interviewees however also highlighted that some participants, while perhaps not contributing 
actively to the Panel's advisory role had emphasized the importance, especially for some experts 
from developing countries, of their STRP membership from a capacity-building perspective. At 
its 9th meeting, the Ramsar COP approved yet another shift to the STRP7s membership 
arrangement, based on revised modus operandi prepared by the Secretariat with consultation 
from the Ramsar partner organizations (described in greater length in Chapter 111). 
A NEW SYSTEM FOR SCIENCE ADVICE 
In recent years, the limitations of the existing MEA science advisory structures have 
increasingly been the subject of policy debateg0 and have prompted some discussions of 
alternatives to the status quo. I will discuss some of the more prominent proposals before 
presenting the institutional innovations I suggest based on the findings of this thesis. 
PROPOSED SOL UTIONS TO THE SCIENCE AD VICE QUANDARY 
The "multi-IPCC" model 
Many scholars and policy-makers have identified the IPCC as a successful model of science 
advice, and there have been proposals to emulate this example, at the thematic and global level. 
For example, in January 2004, delegates to the Intergovernmental Consultation on Strengthening 
the Scientific Base of UNEP~' considered the creation of an intergovemmental panel of global 
environmental change92, and many see the recently completed Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MA) as the first step towards a biodiversity analog for the I P C C ~ ~ .  
Nevertheless the disadvantages of establishing other thematic intergovemmental panels a la 
IPCC are many. The first consideration relates to the length of the process - from question 
framing to final approval, which reduces such an SAB's responsiveness to policy-making needs. 
For example, in preparing its Fourth Assessment Report, scoping discussions began in 2002 
while the final product will not be released until 2007. Similarly, under the biodiversity regime, 
the SBSTTA's agenda is set several years ahead of schedule, which does not allow SBSTTA the 
opportunity to address issues which warrant more immediate attention, as was highlighted by 
90 Discourse on the link between science and policy in MEAs is discussed at greater length in Chapter I. 
9 1 Earth Negotiations Bulletin. Summary of the Internovernmental C'onsultation on Strennthenina the Scientific Base 
of UNEP. Edited by Pam Chasek. Published by IISD. 2004. available at: http://www.iisd.ca,vol16/enb 163 le.html 
" In the end delegates could not agree on establishing such a panel. with the US highlighting that it would politici~e 
the issue of scientific assessments and other countries calling instead for the strengthening of existing efforts. 
93 Based on discussion at a SBSTTA-4 workshop on the MA in June 1999 and interviews with delegates at meetings 
of the Biosafety Protocol in Montreal in June 2005. 
participants at the Spetember 2005 Working Group on the Review of Implementation of the 
Biodiversity Convention. In contrast, at the November 2005 meeting of the Ramsar Wetlands 
Convention COP-9, delegates were able to address wetlands' implications of the recently 
exposed threat of a bird flu pandemic. 
One can also question the availability of resources for so many parallel large-scale and long- 
term assessments. For example, until the delivery of the Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, the 
IPCC is scheduled to spend between 6 and 7 million US$ per year on its operations94. In contrast, 
in 2003 the Secretariat to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer had 
an operating budget of about 3.5 million US$, including its financial support of its science 
advisory process95. 
Some have also stressed the fear that such institutionalization would reduce the quality of the 
outcome over time due to "organizational sc le r~s i s~~ ."  Indeed, several contributors to the MA 
reacted quite strongly against suggestions that the MA infrastructure and process be extended - 
explaining that the MA's success arose in part from the certitude that it represented a one-time 
~ommi t rnen t~~ .  They propose that the best means for efficiently meeting decision-making needs 
is to design separate, time-bound, assessments, as this would ensure that only the most qualified 
experts are involved in addressing a well-scoped question. They fear that long-running 
assessment infrastructures, like the IPCC, would have trouble effectively adapting the scope of 
their investigations over time. Some interviewees also questioned the feasibility of framing as 
9 .l IPCC. Draft report of the IPCC. Twenty-First Session, Vienna, Austria, 3 and 6-7 November 2003. available at: 
h ttp:/lwww.ipcc.chlmeet/drepipcc2 1 .pdf 
" ozone Secretariat. Report of the 1 5th ~ e e t i n ~  of the Parties. UNEPIOzL-Pro. 1519. 2003. available at: 
h ttp:l/w~~w.unep.chlozone/pdfs/ I Smop-9.e.pdf 
06 this consideration was vocalized by a high-level administrator, experienced in the management of both MEAs and 
science- focused organizations. 
v 7 From interviews with delegates at the Biosafety Protocol 2"d Meeting of the Parties, June 2005. 
clear a question or mandate for other themes - noting that the IPCC benefits from having only 
one MEA as its core audience98. 
In addition to the obvious resource and logistical constraints of establishing several parallel 
large scale efforts to consult hundreds or thousands of scientists over several years fiom problem 
framing to the generation of recommendations, it is unlikely that such a process would succeed 
in generating a valid and sustainable consensus. It would be unlikely that Parties of each MEA 
would feel that such a structure was providing the most relevant and useful output for 
implementing the treaty in question. In addition, it is foreseeable that the long-response time 
from issue framing to "result" might be used as a negotiation tactic by some Parties for stalling 
progress in implementation through well-timed requests for additional information. 
Science advice under a "Super-Secretariat " 
Another proposed solution is closely associated with calls for more centralized 
environmental administration at the global level - what many call a Global Environment 
Organization and see as an answer to the prevalence of the World Trade Organization 
(Bierrnann, 2000; Esty, 1999). Yet, the difficulties arising in implementing the joint-Secretariats 
of the closely-related PIC and POPs Conventions illustrate the myriad of potential complications 
arising 60m centralizing all global environmental policy-making and science advice. 
Negotiation of the POPs Convention closely followed upon the PIC Convention's adoption, 
both Convention's interim processes operated in parallel, and their first COPS were held within 8 
month of each other. At that stage of deliberation, both Conventions were administered by the 
UNEP Chemicals Programme, and both at PIC COP-1 and at POPS COP-1 Parties agreed that 
the Conventions' share a joint Secretariat (Earth Negotiations Bulletin: vol. 15, No. 105; vol. 15, 
98 While the IPCC is technically independent from the UNFCCC, in carrying out its work policy-considerations of 
the UNFCCC regime are often invoked. In contrast, the MA was specifically geared at the CBD, Ramsar and also 
the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. 
No. 1 17). Even at such a small level involving only two MEAs, discussions were complicated by 
the relative importance of the two Convention's mandates, and the agreement included 
provisions for a larger percentage of the Secretariat's work to be devoted to POPs matters (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin: vol. 15, No. 105; vol. 15, No. 1 17). Nevertheless from the outset at POPs 
COP-1 confusion rapidly emerged in budget discussions as to exactly how the Secretariat was 
distributing its work between the two MEAs (Earth Negotiations Bulletin; vol. 15, No. 117). 
And, even if some Secretariats have made efforts to improve coordination with other MEAs, 
this has resulted in few concrete outcomes, especially as relating to the provision of science 
advice. There is an effort in place to facilitate communication and information sharing among the 
biodiversity-related Conventions - a self designated group which includes the CBD, the Ramsar 
Wetlands Convention, the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES), the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and the World Heritage Convention 
(WHC). The main product of this initiative has been the creation of a joint website describing the 
information made available on their respective websites. More specifically relating to the 
provision of science advice, the Committee on Science and Technology to the UN Convention to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1998 prepared a paper focusing on other science advisory 
bodies on "the work of other bodies performing work similar to that envisaged for the 
Committee on Science and Technology", yet little action has been carried out based on this 
report99. 
The creation of a one single oversight authority for all MEAs is most unlikely to facilitate the 
generation of a valid and sustainable consensus. First, if such an organization were to follow the 
lead of the UN and appoint a single, or small office, of science advisor to the Executive 
Secretary of such an overarching administrative entity, such an individual, or even a small group 
of individuals, are bound to be questioned in terms of their representativeness of all Parties. 
Second, even if this "mega-Secretariat" continues to administer each treaties science advisory 
process separately, and especially if science advice is similarly centralized to one umbrella 
authority, concerns over issue prioritization and resource allocation will inevitably become more 
politicized and influence the sustainability and validity of any outcome. 
Abolishing MEA 's science advisory bodies 
Alternatively, some might even suggest that science advisory bodies are irreparably 
inefficient and that delegates should instead rely on their own internal science advisory 
processes, a course of action also supported by some theories of negotiation, according to which 
opportunities for issue-linkage should be maximized in order to achieve the optimal negotiated 
outcome (Fisher and Ury, 1991). As such, by doing away with the negotiation of a separate 
consensus on the state of the science, some might maintain that policy-makers would be able to 
broker a more creative consensus. For example, under the Cartagena Protocol for Biosafety, 
there is, as of yet, no dedicated science advisory body for the issue of transport of living- 
modified organisms (LMOs), and one can envision a situation whereby the final consensus on 
the labeling for the handling, transport, packaging and identification of LMOs for food, feed, and 
processing would be best addressed by a political body, despite its technical nature. Indeed, 
while a science advisory body may focus only on identifying the minimum threshold for 
detecting minute amounts of LMOs in a shipment, in the policy-arena one might expect Parties 
to incorporate into this decision pre-standing agreements to follow, for example, the 
precautionary approach. 
Nevertheless, such a combined approach to negotiating science and policy aspects at once 
can also facilitate strategies for hindering a consensus outcome by providing a less transparent 
means of justifying a negotiating position, while helping to shield the Party hindering consensus 
from public pressure. A t MOP-2 of the Biosafety Protocol in June 2005, as Parties were 
negotiating new text for labeling shipments that may, or may not, contain LMOs, New Zealand 
was very persistent in opposing any compromise text developed in contact groups, yet was able 
to do so without providing justification that could be accommodated by other Parties. 
Similarly, another recourse would involve relying on the output of existing international 
science assessments, for example from intergovernmental organizations (some under the aegis of 
the UN, such as those arising from the Food and Agriculture Organization and from the World 
Health Organization; others related to more economic organizations, such as the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development or the European Community) or from international 
scientific organizations (for example outputs of specialized committees of the International 
Council for Science-ICSU). 
Yet, these processes are far removed from the COP needs and this has been identified as 
problematic in the application of such assessments, as presented by the relative lack of uptake by 
the CBD COP of the outcome of the 1995 Global Biodiversity Assessment. And while such 
large-scale assessments, including as well the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, have 
proven useful in providing a valid and sustainable consensus on the state of affairs or what one 
might call a "snapshot" of the situation, they have not been as successful in providing a common 
basis for decision-making at the COP level. 
The ''good leadership " model 
Leadership is often cited as a crucial asset to environmental regimes (Andresen et al, 2000; 
Young and Ramakrishna, 1996), and several records of negotiations, (especially those written in 
retrospect by key players in those negotiations) have underscored the driving force of the 
proceeding's Chair (Tolba, 1998). This may lead some to assume that the solution to the need 
for science advice lies in finding the most apt leaders to lead their proceedings. 
In relation to SABs in particular, Andresen et al, stress the importance of competent 
leadership for building the IPCC's scientific authority. They explain that the leadership of the 
IPCC's Working Groups selects the experts who take part in their work (even if the IPCC 
Plenary may suggest experts), and develops the rules of procedure for their work. Andresen et a1 
also emphasize the Working Group's leadership in acting as a link between the contributing 
authors and the IPCC Panel. As the link between the authors and the IPCC Plenary (and member 
government delegates), the Working Group leadership is responsible for communicating the 
Working Group in a transparent manner that enhances sustainability of the outcome, while also 
exercising the flexibility granted to them to seek out the best expertise to shore up the outcome's 
validity. 
The skill of the individual elected to chair any SAB meeting can indeed also influence the 
outcome's validity and sustainability. The extent to which a Chair takes advantage of the 
flexibility to convene informal deliberations can have implications on a successful outcome yet 
may deter fiom the process' transparency. For example, if a Chair is too quick to convene 
informal consultations on a delicate issue, some SAB participants may feel excluded from 
proceedings and agreement on the issue at hand may be elusive in the end. 
Such a scenario almost played out at the December 2005 meeting of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity's SBSTTA where the Working Group Chair only tabled to most contentious 
issue of incentive measures in an informal contact group (in the Plenary conference room, 
without simultaneous interpretation) late on the penultimate night of meetings. The issue was 
never discussed in regular sessions of the Working Group and even more restricted consultations 
were held prior to presenting the results to the closing Plenary for approval. The outcome 
agreement was eventually approved, but not without complaints, especially from delegates from 
smaller developing countries as to this lack of transparency of the negotiations on this issue. 
However, other experts have discounted the central role of leadership in securing 
agreements. One seasoned negotiator of the biosafety regime, representing a developed country 
and also often called upon to Chair meetings in MEAs, underscored instead the need for interests 
to overlap sufficiently to be able to identify common ground. Recalling the difficult negotiations 
leading to the adoption of Cartagena Protocol, he maintains that (as Parties and coalitions 
interests are ever shifting as relating to living-modified organisms) agreement was only possible 
at that particular time and place, regardless of other confounding factorsloO. 
In this thesis, by emphasizing the essential need for representative membership and a flexible 
and transparent process, I do not mean to discount the benefits, and more often than not, the 
encumbrances introduced to these SABs through varying abilities of chairing of meetings. 
Rather, by emphasizing on two institutional criteria of SABs which can increase the output's 
validity and sustainability I aim to propose a system which can indeed benefit from the 
increased efficiency and sustainability often arising from able leadership, yet which is, to some 
extent, "inoculated" against the potential impacts of poor leadership. 
IMPLEMENTING CHANGE 
In devising a proposal to improve on the provision of science advice it is necessary to 
distinguish among the different scales of institutional coordination required to implement each 
recommendation, and therefore this proposal is separated into two stages. 
I O(I Based on interview conducted at MOP-2 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
Stape I: Redesi~ning an MEA's SAB 
The first stage of improving the way in which science advice is provided to MEA's requires 
the redesign of each MEA's science advisory process. I propose a multi-tier advisory process as 
the best means of ensuring representative membership and a fixed and transparent process. For 
each MEA, I suggest there be created a Science Advisory Committee, a Science Advisory Panel, 
and a Science Advisory Network. This three-tier science advisory process is summarized in 
Graph V.1. 
Stage I - Tier I: the Science Advisory Committee 
The top tier of this system would be the MEA's Science Advisory Committee - which would 
be modeled upon an academic journal's editorial board. The COP would have to first agree on 
the size of the Science Advisory Committee - which logistically should bring together between 
ten and fifteen members. The COP will also have to agree on the minimum disciplinary 
distribution for the Committee, and as the advisory needs of the COP are likely to evolve, there 
should be a built-in review period for this disciplinary distribution (every five to seven years 
depending on the MEA's COP meeting schedule). In order to shore up this Committee's 
vulnerability to attack and criticism, the COP will also negotiate guidelines for national, 
economic, institutional and regional diversity. 
Membership: Membership on the Committee should be instituted so as to ensure rotation on a 
regular basis, but not at the expense of the organization's institutional memory. Members will be 
divided into three groups, and one of these groups will be up for renewal or replacement every 
two to three years (again depending on the Committee's meeting schedule), so that ideally half of 
the Committee will always be made-up of returning members. Each member should serve for 
three-year terms (or half of the COP disciplinary review cycle), with be limited to serving two 
terms (if consecutive) - serving on the Committee for those two terms should not preclude 
serving on the Committee at a later date. The leadership structure of the Committee should also 
be geared towards continuity. 
At any given time, the Chair, previous Chair, and future Chair should be identified and 
coordinating their work. It is indeed foreseeable that the selection of the Committee Chair will be 
heavily politicized'0', yet since at the outset two (and subsequently three) individuals will have a 
shared stake in the chairmanship, it should be easier to satisfy varied interests. 
At its inception, the membership of the Committee should be established by the Bureau of 
the coplo* in consultation with the Secretariat and the chairs from any pre-existing science 
advisory bodies to that MEA. Once the Committee is established, existing Committee members 
should also be involved in the selection of future members. 
While the COP will have identified the disciplinary priorities, there should be more seats 
available than those merely prescribed by the disciplinary assignments so as to better fulfill the 
COP-negotiated guidelines for representative membership (ie national, economic diversity etc). 
The balance could be used to allow those selecting Committee members to more easily ensure 
representation of under-represented interests. Committee members will be selected based on 
nominations by Parties and observers, but also based on selectors' existing networks. In some 
cases, the COP might also set out requirements for gender or institutional diversity on the 
Committee. 
10 1 A similar politicization of the leadership of the IPCC came into play in selecting Rajendra Pachauri to succeed 
Robert Watson as Chair of the IPCC. 
"' The COP Bureau is the administrative structure of the COP that serves at COP meetings and in between COP 
meetings - its membership is usually designed to reflect the geographic distribution of Parties. For example, MEAs 
administered under the UN will usually have one or two Bureau members from each of the UN's five regional 
groups. The Bureau will also often include the COP President, most usually a representative from the COP 
meeting's host country. 
For example, in the context of the Stockholm POPs Convention, the COP might agree that 
the Committee should have 15 members, consisting of, at a minimum, two experts in chemical 
management, one expert in chemical development, one expert in pest management, one expert in 
plant physiology, one expert in bioaccumulation, one expert in entomology, one expert in health 
risk assessment, one expert in epidemiology, and one expert in liability. Those selecting the 
Committee members can seek out the most qualified, and available, experts for each of these 
slots, and the five-seat balance will be available to them to ease their task of ensuring a more 
representative membership. Based on the recent negotiations under the POPs regime, it is likely 
that the COP would have also set guidelines for gender diversity and representation of vulnerable 
population interests. 
Transparency: Once the Science Advisory Committee has been selected, each Committee 
member will be required to make available a list of qualifications in addition to filling out a 
detailed declaration of interests. This information should be made widely available, for example 
through its inclusion in official MEA documents and also on the MEA's website. The declaration 
of interests should be more detailed than the form currently in use under the PIC and POPs 
Conventions, which requires experts only to certify their lack of conflict of interest. Instead, each 
MEA should devise a tailored questionnaire regarding for example institutional affiliations and 
commercial interests. Transparency will also be enhanced by making available (through the 
MEA's website) minutes of the Committee's meetings and Committee documents. 
Mandate: The Science Advisory Committee will be charged with selecting the membership 
of the larger Science Advisory Panel (this aspect of their mandate is discussed in greater detail 
under Stage I - Tier 11), and will also coordinate the work of the Panel. 
Graph V. 1 : The Three-tier Science Advisory Process 
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In particular, the Committee will act as an intermediary between the COP and the Panel, and will 
be in charge of framing the Panel's work. The Science Advisory Committee will also be 
available for more immediate consultations with the Secretariat or the COP Bureau, and take a 
lead role in interacting with science advisory processes to other MEAs. 
Process: The Science Advisoly Committee will have to meet several times a year to be able to 
fulfill its mandate, yet the financial implications of such frequent meetings can be addressed by 
providing for one of these meetings to occur in parallel with (or immediately prior to) a meeting 
of the COP and the other to take place in parallel with (or immediately prior to or following) a 
meeting of the Science Advisory Panel. Therefore, only one free-standing meeting of the Science 
Advisory Committee might be necessary, and again costs could be kept to a minimum by 
arranging for that meeting to coincide with a meeting of the most relevant academic association, 
which several of the Committee members may already be attending. 
In contrast to the current MEA norm of covering the expenses only of participants from 
developing countries and from countries with economies in transition, I propose instead that 
travel and accommodation expenses be provided for all Committee members. As a result, 
considerations of geographic representation on the Committee will not have any explicit 
budgetary implications. Meetings of the Committee need not extend more than two or three days, 
but should be designed as intensive exercises, where Committee members are encouraged to 
interact over meal times as well. It is important that this stage of the Science Advisory Process 
encourage innovation, and therefore the work of the Committee will be carried out only in 
English so as to facilitate informal interaction. The Committee can also take advantage of ever- 
improving technologies for continuing their work off-line, although this will take on a greater 
role (and will be discussed at greater lengths) under Tiers I1 and 111. 
Stage I - Tier II: the Science Advisory Panel 
The Second Tier of this system will be most clearly the equivalent of the existing science 
advisory process. 
Membership: It will fall unto the COP to negotiate the size and diversity requirements for this 
panel. So for example, one would envision that under the Stockholm POPS Convention, the COP 
would again agree upon a 3 1-member Panel and on an arrangement for regional distribution. 
Whereas one would expect that under the climate regime, one might expect the COP to opt for a 
larger Panel. Nominations for Panel Members would be submitted to the Committee by Parties, 
but also by observer govemments and organizations. These nominations would have to detail 
nominees credentials and a short declaration of interests. 
With the help of the Secretariat, the Committee would review the nominations and identify 
those experts meeting the necessary qualifications; it will then be the Committee's responsibility 
to finalize the Panel's membership in a way that optimizes representative membership (as 
discussed in Chapter 111, it is impracticable to expect govemments nominating one expert to take 
diversity into account). Again, a staggered membership rotation would be most appropriate. 
Process: It is most likely that the Panel will only meet once a year, and as these Panels are likely 
to be rather large, at least part of their work will have to take place in Plenary setting, and in 
order to enhance transparency, simultaneous translation should be available in the MEA's 
official language. For MEAs with fewer resources available for translation services, it may be 
helpful to investigate means of facilitating active participation by experts who may not be fully 
comfortable in the English language, for example by ensuring translation of relevant, or even 
exploring the usability of "passive" interpretationlo3. 
The Chair of the Committee will serve as the Chair of the Panel. The Panel will likely be 
mandated with different types of work, and will need the organizational flexibility to best 
organize its work. Therefore, the Panel will require organizational flexibility to establish more 
targeted sub-panels, and these should be co-Chaired by a member of the Panel and a member of 
the Committee. It is in establishing these sub-panels that the Science Advisory Network will be 
called into play (see Stage I- Tier 111). 
As to the financial support for participation from experts, experts whose employers or 
governments are not able to bear the cost of attending Panel meetings will have the opportunity 
to apply for financial support for their travel and accommodation expenses. Since Panel members 
will be entrusted with acting in their personal capacity this will allow participation by experts 
whose views may not be in line with that of their home country, for example experts affiliated 
with environmental non-governmental organizations or industry. 
Again, in between meetings a great deal of work (and coordination with the Science 
Advisory Network) can be carried out in between Panel meetings by taking advantage of online 
interfaces, this of course is limited by access to the internet and computer facilities and thus 
closely tied to Stage I1 - Institutional Strengthening. 
Output and Transparency: The Panel's output will have to be tailored according to each 
MEA's science advisory needs, yet it is essential that the output be promptly available to 
103 So-called "passive" interpretation has been used in meetings of the European Union. Under this system, which 
assumes that participants are more likely able to understand English rather than be able to express their views in 
English, and therefore translation is provided into English, but not back to other languages (based on intervention of 
Colin Church -representative of the UK speaking on behalf of the EU- at the POPS COP- 1 ,  Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
May 2005). 
interested Parties by posting on the website, translation into the MEA's official languages, and 
distribution to the MEA ' s existing networks. 
One key output likely to be sought from each MEA is coherent methods for assigning 
uncertainties and assessing risks associated with specific outcomes and recommendations. Such 
systematic guidelines would aid the work of the sub-panels and in providing an output more 
usable by decision-makers. 
A key step towards transparency relates to the proceedings' openness to observers, and it is 
important that at this stage observers are able to follow the progress of the Panel's work, yet, 
since the representativeness of the Panel's membership is a key focus of expert selection, limits 
will have to be put in place to control these observers' inputs into proceedings. In addition, since 
observer participation is often skewed towards industrial interests, a funding system (with 
applications, to be reviewed by the Secretariat and Committee) will be put in place to support 
observation by underrepresented groups. 
Stage I - Tier III: the Science Advisory Network 
The Science Advisory Network will be a broader-based network of scientists called upon to 
assist the Panel in carrying out its sub-panel work. This aspect of the science advisory process 
will be emulating for example the wide reach of the IPCC and the knowledge-brokering role of 
the Expert Group on Best Available Techniques and Best Environmental Practices under the 
Stockholm POPS Convention. 
Membership: Participation in this Tier of Stage I will be broad-based and tailored to an MEA's 
specific advisory needs. When sub-panels are established under the Science Advisory Panel, its 
co-Chairs and those Panel members interested in taking part will determine its expertise needs. If 
they are not met by Panel and Committee members, then sub-panel members will be called upon 
to identify potential contributors from their own networks, be they academic, institutional, 
national or regional networks. Experts that are invited to serve on the sub-panel will also be 
required to submit credentials and a short conflict of interest report. 
Process: Since the Panel itself will carry out a large component of the framing of a sub-panel's 
inquiry, much of the sub-panel work will be limited to the drafting and review of reports and as 
such will be quite conducive to being prepared through a dynamic online interface. 
A key component of the participation in the sub-panel's work of this Science Advisory 
Network relates to the way in which the process will be incorporating minority views. Indeed, 
the process of academic peer-review has often been criticized for excluding non-mainstream 
views, and in presenting a consensus on science advice the challenge arises from stnving to 
present dissenting views, without overemphasizing them (as the press is often blamed with doing 
in systematically presenting "both sides" of climate change). This is where drawing on the 
Panel's agreed-upon risk and uncertainty can facilitate the most effective input by the Science 
Advisory Network. 
Staee 11: Institutional Strengthening 
The second stage of this solution to the MEA science advisory process relates to addressing 
needs that are often implicitly fulfilled through the provision of science advice: most broadly 
categorized as capacity building. 
Participants in several MEAs have emphasized the importance of the science advisory 
process for capacity building, especially for developing-country scientists. For example, when 
discussing options for improving the provision of science advice under the Ramsar Wetlands 
Convention, long-time participants of the Scientific and Technical Review Panel noted that 
although participants from developing countries might not have always participated filly in the 
generation of science, they often characterized their participation as a very fruitful learning 
experience. 
While according to my proposed solution the emphasis should be on the provision of science 
advice rather than on capacity building, a mechanism for capacity building is necessary in the 
longer term, especially as a means of alleviating concerns of trade-offs between geographic 
representation and scientific credibility. 
In the day-to-day implementation of MEAs, discussions for capacity building in reality often 
boil down to a debate over technology transfer,lo4 which is often framed as a one-way transfer of 
proprietary technology from industry in the "North" to governments in the "South." Yet, for the 
purpose of improving long-term science advice, the strengthening of capacity building should 
focus on the institutional strengthening of expert communities not only in developing countries 
but also within organizations representing vulnerable populations in these MEAs. 
Many activities geared at the institutional strengthening of science communities in 
developing countries are currently being carried out within the science community itself, as 
illustrated by the International Council for Science-ICSU's strategy for capacity building for 
sustainable development (ICSU, 2002) which emphasizes both North to South collaboration and 
South to South collaboration. The recommendations outlined in this 2002 report were recently 
solidified at the end of October 2005 at ICSU's General Assembly, where delegates approved 
ICSU's Strategic Plan for 2006-201 1, which provides for, inter alia, the establishment of ICSU 
regional centers in developing countries. 
Many MEAs, and by extension their science advisory processes, have the potential to also 
contribute to capacity building through increased regional emphasis. For example, under the 
Base1 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
104 This is especially apparent in the negotiations over the phase-out of DD'T under the Stockholm POPS Convention. 
Disposal, Base1 Regional Centers for technical assistance have served as models for similar 
ventures under the PIC and POPS Conventions. It is foreseeable that, when MEAs have access to 
such regional centers, the Science Advisory Committee could not only take advantage of these 
facilities but also ensure that the output of its work is integrated in these regional centers' work 
and that Science Advisory participants (from the Committee, Panel and Network) take part in 
these regional efforts. 
In the longer term, as expert communities in all countries are strengthened, then it is likely 
that upon the regular revisiting of the three-tier process membership guidelines, other criteria of 
diversity may have to more clearly prescribed, as it will be easier to meet disciplinary and 
expertise needs while maintaining geographic diversity. 
IMPROVING SCIENCE ADVICE IN THE BIODIVERSITY REGIME 
As described above and in previous chapters the Biodiversity Regime is suffering from 
confbsion when dealing with its own science advisory process. While the SBSTTA is widely 
acknowledged as the CBD's central science mechanism, its proceedings are often accused of 
veering too far into the political realm, and as SBSTTA-11 came to a close in December 2005, 
Mexico and other participants called for the re-examination of SBSTTA's role and operation at 
COP-8 in March 2006. 
In addition to this large body teetering between science and policy roles, the Biodiversity 
Regime has also established a wide range of ad hoc (time limited) Working Groups tasked with 
more or less technical mandates for furthering the work of the Convention and Protocol, 
including for example the Working Group on Liability and Redress, which brings together legal 
experts in exploring the potential for a liability regime, and also the Working Group on Protected 
Areas, which seeks to provide guidance on the establishment and management of protected 
areas. However, these Working Groups have had varying degrees of success in facilitating the 
work of the COP, and some observers noted that little resolution as a rule came out of these 
Groups, with the most contentious issues often being shuffled from Group to Group. 
The biodiversity science advisory process has also more recently been influenced by the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a global scale assessment of the health of ecosystems and 
biodiversity. While this Assessment was independent from the Biodiversity Regime, it was 
overseen by several of the same international institutions that collaborate closely with the CBD, 
and also consulted often with the SBSTTA throughout its scoping, research and drafting. 
In January 2005, France hosted a conference on "Biodiversity: Science and Governance," an 
informal high-level dialogue between scientists and policymakers. At this event, participants 
decided to establish a consultative process on the potential establishment of an International 
Mechanism of Scientific Expertise on Biodiversity (IMoSEB). An Executive Secretairat has been 
established to oversee this consultative process, which will likely be co-Chaired by Michel 
L,oreau (France) and Jose Sarukhan ( ~ e x i c o ) ' ~ ' .  As of yet, there is little information available on 
this consultative process despite the holding of an informative event on the issue at SBSTTA-11, 
and the process for taking part in the consultations lacks transparency. A meeting of the Steering 
Committee has been announced for February 2006, but as of December 2005 there is no 
information available on this Committee' s membership or on means of participating in this 
effort. 
This initiative has also met with strong opposition, especially from Parties in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, who cite their concern that an emphasis on another science mechanism would 
weaken the SBSTTA and reduce already scarce resources. However, as delegates at SBSTTA-11 
took part in a joint meeting with the UNFCCC SBSTA to discuss in particular the findings of the 
- 
I05 lnfonnatlon note on IMoSEB distributed at SBSTTA- I 1 .  
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, several observers in interviews highlighted the need for a 
more "scientific" science body under the biodiversity regime, noting that SBSTTA, despite 
calling itself a scientific entity, was too political to generate science advice which would assist 
Parties in implementing the Convention. 
Further, at the September 2005 Working Group on the Review of the Implementation of the 
Biodiversity Convention, several Parties stressed the need for better engagement with the 
scientific community, and also emphasized the need to examine, and improve, the selection of 
SBSTTA delegates. Several Parties suggested means of enhancing SBSTTA's work as a 
provider of science advice, and in particular improving the technical content of recommendations 
of SBSTTA to the COP. The possible revision of SBSTTA's modus operandi was also 
discussed, again with some delegates calling for example for SBSTTA to engage with the wider 
scientific community. At this same meeting, delegates discussed setting clearer guidelines for the 
establishment of ad hoc Working Groups and Expert Groups, with, not surprisingly, developing 
countries calling for equitable geographic representation in determining their membership. 
The issue of science advice under the Biodiversity Regime is certain to be an issue of debate 
at COP-8 in March 2006. In addition, in early January, a new Executive Secretary of the 
Biodiversity Convention will be taking office. The combination of so-many science-related 
concerns coming to the fore (discussions at SBSTTA and in the Working Group on the Review 
of Implementation, the release of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the launching of 
the consultative process for an IMoSEB), in combination with the upcoming meeting of the COP 
and the change of leadership within the Secretariat indicate that the Biodiversity Regime may be 
in a situation to soon begin significantly modifying its science advisory process. Therefore, I will 
briefly discuss how my proposed three-tier science advisory process could be applied in practice 
to the biodiversity case. Of course, in the context of this exercise, it is not possible to replicate 
COP negotiations of administrative details and I will identify the options likely to optimize the 
output's validity and sustainability. This three-tier science advisory process as it applies to the 
Biodiversity Regime is summarized in Graph V.2. 
Tier I: the Science Advisov Committee 
I propose that the Biodiversity Science Advisory Committee should have 15 members. This 
larger size is necessary as the Committee will have to combine expertise on both matters of 
biodiversity and biosafety. In terms of setting disciplinary guidelines for the Committee, one can 
expect that the COP would want to ensure participation by at least 2 experts each in: ecosystem 
assessments and management, taxonomy, risk assessment, invasive species, and genetic 
engineering. These disciplinary guidelines should be reviewed every 4 years (by every second 
COP meeting). The COP would also negotiate guidelines for national, economic, regional, 
institutional and personal diversity. 
Membership: The members will be at first selected by the Bureau and Secretariat based on 
nominations by stakeholders. These nominations should include detailed CVs, but also detailed 
declarations of interests. These Committee members will be serving in their personal capacity, 
but those selecting the Committee should of course take into account efforts to achieve a 
geographically and economically representative Committee. In the context of the Biodiversity 
Regime, it is also important to include an expert with ties to the indigenous communities, and 
also experts who reflect the interests of some of the broad coalitions, for example the Miami 
Group in matters of biosafety (this latter aspect is where the COP-negotiated guidelines for 
regional diversity will come into play). 
The 15 Committee members will elect one of their own to serve as Chair for the first 2 years, 
and, at their first meeting will also elect the Chair-elect who will assume functions 2 years later. 
Eventually, at any given time the Committee will include a former Chair, the current Chair and 
the Chair-elect to help ensure institutional consistency. In general terms, members will be 
nominated for 3-year terms, and shouldn't be allowed to serve more than 2 terms consecutively 
(therefore, anyone who will Chair the Committee will be serving at least a full 6 year term, but 
may have to serve a 7 year term). 
So as to ensure that no more than a third of the Committee is replaced at any given time, the 
initial nominations will be staggered, so that every year 5 Members' terms will be up for renewal 
or replacement, and no more than 5 new Members will join the Committee. If any expert were to 
resign prior to the end of her term, then the Committee would seek a replacement in consultation 
with the Bureau and Secretariat, again keeping an eye to striving for representative membership 
when possible. 
Transparency: Once the Science Advisory Committee has been selected, each Committee 
member will be required to make available a list of qualifications in addition to filling out a 
detailed declaration of interests, which will be made available to Parties and observers. Also, in 
discussing each agenda items, Committee Members should at first highlight any potential 
conflicts of interest relating to that item. Preparatory documents from the Committee, as well as 
minutes of Committee meetings, will also be made available on the CBD website. However, 
Committee meetings will not be open to observers. 
Mandate: The Science Advisory Committee will be charged with selecting the members of the 
second Tier and will coordinate the work of the Panel. In particular, the Committee will act as an 
intermediary between the COP and the Panel, and will be in charge of framing the Panel's work. 
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should overlap in tenure on Committee. 
SCIENCE / ADVISORY 
Possible membership requirements 
set by COP: SCIENCE ADVISORY 
10 experts from each UN region 
3 from Megadiverse Countries PANEI, \ 
3 from small island developing states 
4 from indigenous communities 72 members 
5 with industrial ties chosen by Committee based on: 
5 with environmental NGO ties nominations by Parties and observers 
strive for 40% women membership requirements set by COP 
strive for 20% under 35yrs of age 
strive for 60% from developing (6 year terms, every 2 years 24 members up for 
countries or countries with 
economies in transition Meets once a year, and work carried-out through on-line 
strive for 15% from least interface 
developed countries \ 
SCIENCE ADVISORY NETWORK 
/ Network of scientists to assist the Panel in carrying out sub-panel work. \ / Sub-panel co-Chairs and members identify expertise needs and identify potential candidates from their own disciplinary, national and institutional networks. \ / Bulk of work carried out through online interface, sub-panel will have opportunity to meet in person at annual Science Advisory Panel meeting. \ 
Each COP meeting will have the opportunity to review the Committee's research agenda, so as 
to ensure the broad base of end-decision makers is aware of the framing in generating the science 
advice. At the very least, the Chair of the Committee will attend COP meetings to address any 
Party concerns-The Committee may also identify among its members those that have the greatest 
potential for enhancing synergy with the science advisory process of other MEAs. For example, 
one of the experts in biodiversity management may already play an active role in the Ramsar 
Wetlands Convention, and as such could be charged with reporting on science developments 
under that MEA. 
Process: The Science Advisory Committee will meet at a minimum three times a year. One 
meeting can be arranged to coincide with the annual meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, and the other with the annual meeting of the Science Advisory Panel. A 
third meeting could take place independently of other meetings, but may also be scheduled to 
coincide with an academic gathering which a majority of Committee members may already be 
planning to attend. Each meeting will last 1 and a half to 3 days (depending on the agenda), and 
will be held in English. They will also have the opportunity to closely collaborate in their work 
in between physical meetings through the use of a web portal hosted by the Secretariat (this 
interface will be private). 
Incremental costs of attending Committee meetings will be covered through the Secretariat, 
which will designate at least one full-time staff person to coordinate the science process in 
general and the work of the Committee in particular. 
Tier 11: the Science Advisory Panel 
The Second Tier of this system will supplant the existing SBSTTA and other Technical 
Expert Groups and Working Groups. 
Membership: It will fall unto the COP to negotiate the size and diversity requirements for this 
panel. One could envision that in terms of representative membership, the COP might call for a 
72 member Panel with: 10 experts at least from each of the 5 UN regions, with the inclusion as 
well of 3 experts from Megadiverse Countries, 3 from small island developing states, 4 from 
indigenous communities, 5 with industrial ties and 5 with environmental NGO ties. The COP 
might also decide that the Committee should make efforts to strive for other diversity thresholds, 
with for example a minimum of 40% women experts, 20% of "young" participants (under 35yrs 
of age), 60% from developing countries or countries with economies in transition, and 15% from 
least developed countries. 
The COP would also have to set some disciplinary guidelines (probably quite similar to those 
developed for the Standing Committee), but it would be the Committee's role to develop this 
disciplinary balance, in light of the other membership constraints set out by the COP. The 
Committee will review nominations by Parties and organizations and first rank them for relevant 
expertise. The Secretariat will then work with a small sub-committee of Committee members to 
flag the membership attributes of each nomination (highlighting which category each nominee 
fulfills), and this information will then be used by the Committee in finalizing the Panel 
membership. 
Process: The Chair of the Committee will serve as the Chair of the Panel, and will discuss with 
the committee the potential of establishing more targeted sub-Panels, whose membership will be 
mostly drawn from Panel members. Panel members will have the opportunity to select the sub- 
Panels in which they wish to take part. These sub-panels will be the closest equivalent to the ad 
hoc technical expert and working groups currently operating under the CBD. 
The Panel members, will, with the Committee, specify the mandate and scope of each of 
these sub-Panels, whose membership will be supplemented under Tier 111 - the Science Advisory 
Network. These sub-panels will be co-Chaired by a member of the Panel and a member of the 
Committee. The Panel will meet annually for 5 days to address overarching issues not suitable to 
the establishment of sub-Panels, and will also review the work of these sub-Panels. 
While the Committee does serve as liaison with the COP and Bureau, it is only the Panel 
which will be tasked with reviewing and forwarding recommendations to the COP for use in 
decision-making. 
During this annual meeting, 2 to 3 days will be devoted to parallel meetings of the sub- 
Panels. While some sub-panels may only meet annually and carry out their work in between 
Panel meetings through a private online interface, other sub-panels may generate interest by 
some Parties who may chose to fund more frequent meetings of that small group of experts. 
Output and Transparency: The Panel's output will have to be responsive to the needs of the 
COP, and as such Committee members will have to work closely with the COP Bureau in 
fiaming the Panel's agenda. While the Panel is aiming to present a consensus to the COP for its 
decision-making, it should also investigate ways in which it may elucidate consensus on options 
for steps forward, rather than recommending one specific policy option. 
In particular relating to biosafety, the Panel will have to develop a clear framework for 
assigning uncertainties and assessing risks associated with specific outcomes, and provide 
regular updates, for example, in technological developments for the detection of LMOs. 
The annual Panel meeting should be open to observers, yet their participation in deliberations 
should be controlled so as not to upset the membership balance prescribed by the COP. 
Similarly, the Panel will interact in between meetings through a private online interface, yet 
nlinutes of any meetings, and summaries of progress on preparing documents will be posted 
online so as to be available for monitoring by observers not directly involved in the Panel's work 
(therefore, an observer will be able to monitor the evolution of a discussion without being able to 
contribute directly to textual changes for example). 
Tier 111: the Science Advisory Network 
The Science Advisory Network will be a broader-based network of scientists called upon to 
assist the Panel in carrying out its sub-panel work. The Biodiversity Regime is fortunate in that it 
can easily tap into existing networks of scientists, such as that convened for example in carrying 
out the Millennium Ecosystem Approach, but also experts involved in the provision of science 
advice to other biodiversity-related MEAs. This Tier of the solution would be an alternative to 
the establishment of a separate IMoSEB, though the science advisory process might yet benefit 
from another "snapshot" assessment of biodiversity in another decade (perhaps a 201 5 
Assessment). This Network does not refer to a static institutional body, but rather to a pool of 
a.vailable applicants which can be drawn in to take a more formal role in the biodiversity science 
advisory process. 
Membership: Participation in this Tier will not be subject to the membership considerations 
applied in Tiers I and 11, rather gaps in expertise in the Panel or Committee will be identified and 
posted on the biodiversity website. In addition to nominations by Parties and observers, 
particular weight will be given to experts located through networks (disciplinary, institutional or 
national) of Panel and Committee members. These gaps in expertise are most likely to occur in 
fulfilling the mandates of sub-Panels. and as such recommendations for experts from those that 
are already sub-panel members will be examined first by the Committee and sub-panel co- 
Chairs, and the sub-panel co-Chairs will have the final say in selecting their inembers from the 
Science Advlsory Network. Experts that are invited to serve on the sub-panel will also be 
required to submit credentials and a short conflict of interest report. 
Process: Since the Panel itself will carry out a large component of the framing of a sub-panel's 
inquiry, much of the sub-panel work will be limited to the drafting and review of reports and as 
such will be quite conducive to being prepared through a dynamic online interface. 
The Science Advisory Network can also be called upon in validating the work of the Panel. 
Some of the work arising from the Biodiversity Science Advisory Panel, for example relating to 
risk assessment of LMO releases, may benefit from an extensive peer review process which 
could include a broader range of experts from this Network. Input from this Network could, for 
example, be expected to identify options for synergies, or threats of unintended consequences of 
Panel recommendations. Network members who would want to take part in such a review 
process, would have to submit their nomination to the Secretariat, who would approve their 
relevant expertise, in consultation with the Committee and Bureau as necessary. 
Overcoming obstacles to implementing a new biodiversity science advice process 
It can be expected that several Parties will resist such a shift to a science advisory system so 
much smaller than the current SBSTTA, especially in light of the increased limitations on 
participation. Nevertheless, the increased oversight provided by the Science Advisory Committee 
may help to increase the legitimacy arising from this process, and a greater emphasis on 
expertise and qualification is sure to bolster the science advice's validity. 
Others might question the availability of experts to take part in such an intensive venture, and 
it is likely that the system will have to first establish its reputation to attain the level of academic 
and professional recognition arising, for example, from participation in the IPCC. However, the 
growing dissatisfaction with the current model for biodiversity advice might help galvanize the 
science community to take an active role in developing, but also in staffing and strengthening 
this novel approach to science advice. And indeed, one key component to the success of such a 
venture is ensuring that the science community is included in discussions to establish such a 
process, through input from the International Council for Science, but also from different 
biodiversity-related academic associations. Parties, and national-level decision-makes will also 
have to be involved in these negotiations, and become more educated consumers of knowledge. 
By that I mean that they should gain a greater understanding of the dynamics of knowledge 
production and the limits of science advice so as to best tailor their requests for science advice. 
NEXT STEPS 
Science advisory bodies have been acknowledged as necessary components of multilateral 
environmental agreements, yet there is a need for a broader recognition that their central role 
relates to brokering consensus on matters of science. For this consensus to successfully feed in to 
decision-making - and ultimately contribute to an effective MEA, provisions for representative 
membership and a transparent and flexible process are key elements of an SAB's institutional 
design. The three-tier science advisory process described above would provide an institutional 
framework that optimally incorporates these considerations, yet an essential finding arising from 
the careful study of science advice across these six cases is that, while membership and process 
are crucial to the SAB's success, the exact distribution of the types of diversity, transparency and 
flexibility will have to be tailored to the needs and even to the organizational culture of any 
given MEA. 
The role of SABs within MEAs warrants much further study, and in particular it would be 
helpful to examine the role these SABs in stakeholders' broader MEA negotiation strategies. For 
example, it is foreseeable that some Parties might favor the discussion of an agenda item under 
an SAB's purview, not out of a need for a science consensus, but rather as a means of effectively 
taking some options "off the table" in the COP negotiations, thus reducing the universe of 
possible solutions. Similarly, it would be helpful to investigate the SABs role not as a producer 
of consensus, but rather as a staging ground for "parking" contentious negotiations until they are 
ripe for consensus in the policy arena. This might be one interpretation of the current role of the 
SBSTTA and the many ad hoe groups under the Biodiversity regime. While many observers and 
stakeholders have complained that some issues, such as access-benefit sharing have been 
shuffled fiom body to body with no resolution in sight, it would be interesting to examine 
whether such cases, rather than exemplifying SAB failure, may in fact serve strategic means and 
act as a "lifesaver" of sorts by ensuring that discussions continue outside of the policy arena until 
it is "ripe" for agreement by the COP. 
In expanding the study of SABs to MEAs and broadening the case array, the examination of 
the benefits arising from the institutional aspects of membership and process emphasized in this 
thesis would contribute to a deeper examination of their impact on the SAB's ability to broker a 
valid and sustainable consensus. Further insights could be drawn form the study of the impact of 
both a representative membership and a transparent and flexible process on the outcomes of 
SABs that include provisions for majority, rather than consensus, decision-making (as is the 
case, for example, under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora). Further, it would be interesting to investigate how paradigm shifts in the 
science relevant to an MEA may affect an SABs function, and whether these or other 
institutional features of an SAB can provide the robustness and adaptability most likely required 
of SABs in such situations. 
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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 
Ramsar Convention for the Protection of Wetlands of International Importance 
- Convention text, as amended in 1982 and 1987, available at: www.ramsar.org/key~conv~e.htm 
- Introduction to Ramsar: available at: www.ramsar.org/index~about~ramsar.htm#int 
- About the STRP: www.ramsar.org/about~about~strp.htm 
- STRP reports: www.ramsar.org/strp/key~strp_index.htm ( inutes of 5th to 1 2 ~ ~  meeting of 
STRP) 
- Revised modus operandi of STRP: COP 9 DR12, available at: 
www .ramsar.org/cop9/cop9-dr 12-e.htm 
- COP reports: COP-9 report available at: www.ramsar.org/cop9/cop9~conf~rptte.pdf 
COP-8 report available at: www .ramsar.org/cop8/cop8~conf~rpt~e.htrn 
- ENB reports: Vol. 17, Nos. 1-25 (COP7-COP9), at: www.iisd.ca/vol l7/ 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
- Convention text, available at: www.unep.ch/ozone/pdfs/viennaconvention2002.pdf 
- Protocol text, with adjustments and amendments (1 990, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999), available at: 
www.unep.ch/ozone/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2OOO.pdf 
- Ozone Secretariat website: www .unep.ch/ozone/index.asp 
- About the TEAP: www.unep.ch/ozone/teap/about~TEAP.asp 
- MBTOC reports: www.unep.ch/ozone/teap/Reports/MBTOC/index.asp 
- MBTOC Working Procedures: 
- COP, MOP and Ex-MOP reports: www .unep. ch/ozone/Meeting~Documents/index. asp 
- ENB reports: Vol. 19, Nos. 1 - 46 (COP-5IMOP- 1 1 to COP-7/MOP- 17), at: www.iisd.ca/vol l9/ 
Convention on Biological Diversiw and Cartagena Protocol on Biosafetv 
- Convention text, available at: www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-un-en.pdf 
- Protocol text, available at: www.biodiv.org/doc/legaVcartagena-protocol-en.pdf 
- About the Biodiversity Convention: www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/guide.asp 
- About the SBSTTA: www .biodiv.org/convention/sbstta.asp 
- SBSTTA modus operandi: www.biodiv. org/convention/sbstta.asp?page=modus 
- SB STTA reports: www . biodiv .org/conventionlsbstta. asp 
- COP and MOP reports: www.biodiv.org/convention/cops.asp and 
www . biodiv.orglbiosafetylcop-mop/default2.aspx 
- ENB reports: Vol. 9, Nos. 1-333, (from octl 1 1993 to SBSTTA-1 1) at: www.iisd.ca/vol09/ 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol 
- Convention text, available at: unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf 
- Protocol text, available at: unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf 
- About the Climate Convention: unfccc.int/essential - background~items/2877.php 
-- About the SBSTA: 
unfccc.int/essential~background~conventiodconvention~bodies/items/2629.php 
- SBSTA modus operandi: 
- About the IPCC: http://www .ipcc.ch/about/about.htrn 
- IPCC procedures: http ://www.ipcc.ch/about/procd.htm 
- SBSTTA, COP and MOP reports: unfccc.intlmeetingslarchive/items/2749.php 
- IPCC reports: http://www.ipcc.chlpub/pub. htm 
- ENB reports: Vol. 9, Nos. 1-333, (from oct 1 1 1993 to SBSTTA- 1 1, includes 1PCC-22, IPCC- 
24) at: www.iisd.ca/vol09/ 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 
- Convention text, available at: www.pic.int/en/ConventionText/ONU-GB.pdf 
- About the PIC Convention www.pic.intlenNiewPage.asp?id=392 
- ICRC and CRC reports: ww.pic.int/en~viewpage.asp?Id~Cat=70&mTitre=MEET~GS+~026+DOCUMENTS 
- CRC terms of reference: www .pic.int/incs/crc 1 /c3)/English/CRC%20 1-3 .pdf 
- Decision Guidance Documents: www.pic.intlenNiewPage.asp?id=239 
- COP reports: www.pic.intlenNiewPage.asp?id=3 53 
- ENB reports: Vol. 15, No. 1 - 129 (PIC, POPs and SAICM) available at www.iisd.ca/vol 1 5/ 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS) 
- Convention text, available at: www .pops.int/documents/convtext/convtext~en. pdf 
- About the POPs Convention: www.pops.int/documentslbackground/ 
- POPRC reports: www .pops.int/documentsimeetings/poprc/default. htm 
- POPRC terms of reference: Decision SC 1/7, available at: 
www .pops.int/documents/meetings/poprc/Text%20020SC 1 -7.doc 
-BAT/BEP terms of reference: 
www .pops. int/documents/meetings/bat bepi 1 st session/EGB 1 INF7 - mandate.doc 
- COP reports: http:l/www.pops.intldoc~rnents/~eetings/cop ~meetingdocs/enldefault.htm 
- ENB reports: Vol. 15, No. 1-129 (PIC, POPs and SAICM) available at www.iisd.ca/vol l5/ 
MEETINGS ATTENDED 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
- 14" Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (MOP- 14) and 6th Meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP-6) to the Vienna Convention, 25 - 29 November 2002, Rome, 
Italy. 
- First Extraordinary Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (ExMOP), 24 - 26 March 
2004, Montreal, Canada. 
Convention on Biological Diversity and Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
- Fourth Meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice 
(SBSTTA-4) to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2 1 - 15 June 1999, Montreal, Canada. 
- Second Ad-Hoc Open Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, 1 - 5 December 
2003, Montreal, Canada. 
- Third Meeting of the Ad hoc Open-ended Intersessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and 
Related Provisions of the CBD, 8 - 12 December 2003, Montreal, Canada. 
- First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Cartagena Protocol On Biosafety (COP-MOPI), 23 - 27 February 2004, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia. 
- First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Liability and Redress under the 
Biosafety Protocol, 25-27 May 2005, Montreal, Canada. 
- Second Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (MOP-2), 30 May - June 
3 2005, Montreal, Canada. 
- Eleventh Meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice 
(SBSTTA-11) to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 28 November - 2 December 2005, 
Montreal, Canada. 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 
- Sixth Meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (POPS INC-6), 17 - 2 1 June 2002, Geneva, Switzerland. 
- Seventh Meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (POPS INC-7), 14 - 18 July 2003, Geneva, Switzerland. 
- First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Stockholm Convention on POPs (POPS 
COP-I), 2 -6 May 2005, Punta del Este, Uruguay. 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 
- Eleventh Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an International Legally 
Binding Instrument for the Application of the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals 
and Pesticides in Intemational Trade (INC- 1 1 ), 18 September 2004, Geneva, Switzerland. 
- First meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP-1) to the Rotterdam Convention on a PIC 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in Intemational Trade, 20 - 24 
September 2004, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Other Processes 
- Third Session of the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF-3), 26 May - 2 June 2003, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
- 22nd Session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 9 - 11 November 
:2004, New Delhi, India. 
- UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR), 18 - 22 January 2005, Kobe-Hyogo, 
Japan. 
